Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer observed an individual walking in the middle of a street at night near a location known for drug activity. The officer, believing this to be a violation of Kentucky’s jaywalking statute, attempted to stop the individual by asking him to approach the patrol car. The individual ignored the officer’s verbal commands, turned away, and increased his pace. The officer then physically seized the individual by grabbing his arms and escorted him back to the patrol car. During this process, the officer observed the individual discard drugs, which led to his arrest. Additional drugs were found in the individual’s possession after the arrest.The Nelson Circuit Court held a suppression hearing, during which the officer and the defendant’s mother testified. The court found that the officer had probable cause to believe a jaywalking violation had occurred and concluded that the officer’s actions were justified. The court denied the motion to suppress the drug evidence. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to amended charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, reasoning that an officer may detain a pedestrian for a traffic law violation to issue a citation, and distinguished the case from prior precedent involving different circumstances.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The court held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when police physically seize a person for an observed violation, such as jaywalking, for the purpose of issuing a citation if the person fails to comply with verbal commands. The court found the officer’s use of minimal force to be objectively reasonable under the circumstances and concluded that the subsequent discovery of contraband was not the result of an unreasonable search or seizure. The denial of the motion to suppress and the convictions were affirmed. View "BUECHELE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Darrell Strunk participated in two robberies on the same day in December 2011: first, a home invasion, and then a business robbery. He was indicted for the business robbery, and later, with his consent, additional charges from the home robbery were added. Strunk entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of second-degree robbery, each enhanced by his status as a second-degree persistent felony offender. The agreement called for consecutive sentences of 20 years and 10 years, totaling 30 years’ imprisonment.The Fayette Circuit Court accepted the plea and imposed the 30-year sentence, despite Strunk’s counsel raising concerns that this exceeded the statutory maximum under KRS 532.110(1)(c), which limits the aggregate sentence for Class C felonies to 20 years. Strunk later filed a motion under CR 60.02 to correct his sentence, arguing it was illegal. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the plea agreement treated the two robberies as separate cases and that Strunk had knowingly accepted the deal. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 30-year sentence violated the statutory cap and that the statutory limit could not be waived, remanding for resentencing within the legal maximum.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that Strunk’s aggregate sentence of 30 years was illegal under KRS 532.110(1)(c), as the statutory maximum for his offenses was 20 years. The Court further held that, because Strunk sought only correction of his sentence and not withdrawal of his guilty plea, the proper remedy was to remand for resentencing with instructions to impose the highest legal sentence—20 years’ imprisonment. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. STRUNK" on Justia Law

An individual diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease was admitted to a personal care facility in Kentucky after his spouse, who had been appointed his conservator by a Tennessee court, signed a mandatory arbitration agreement required for admission. The spouse did not specify her capacity when signing. The patient later suffered injuries and died, leading his spouse, as administratrix of his estate, to file suit alleging negligence, wrongful death, and other claims against the facility and its operators.The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the spouse had authority to sign the agreement under the Tennessee conservatorship order or, alternatively, under Kentucky’s Living Will Directive Act, which allows a spouse to make “health care decisions” for an incapacitated person. The Fayette Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that signing an arbitration agreement was not a health care decision under the Act and that the spouse lacked authority to bind the patient. The court did not rule on unconscionability. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, distinguishing prior cases involving powers of attorney and holding that the Act’s definition of “health care decision” did not include entering arbitration agreements.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether a spouse may bind an incapacitated person to arbitration for facility admission under the Living Will Directive Act. The Court held that signing an arbitration agreement is not a “health care decision” as defined by Kentucky law, which limits such decisions to consenting to or withdrawing consent for medical procedures, treatments, or interventions. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the denial of the motion to compel arbitration, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LEXINGTON ALZHEIMER'S INVESTORS, LLC V. NORRIS" on Justia Law

A child was born in 2012 to Kendra and Christopher, but due to concerns about Kendra’s fitness as a parent, the child was placed with her paternal grandmother, Denise, and Denise’s long-term partner, David Lemaster, under a Cabinet safety plan. Denise was later granted permanent custody of the child, and the child lived with Denise and Lemaster for her entire life. Kendra, the child’s mother, was initially denied visitation but later received supervised and then unsupervised visitation. Denise and Lemaster jointly raised and financially supported the child, functioning as a family unit. In 2022, Denise died, and Lemaster sought to intervene in the ongoing custody case, claiming de facto custodian status and seeking custody or visitation.The Greenup Family Court granted emergency custody to Kendra and, without holding an evidentiary hearing, later awarded her full custody, denying Lemaster’s motion to intervene as untimely and finding he could not qualify as a de facto custodian. Lemaster’s motion to alter or amend was denied. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Lemaster’s intervention was untimely and that he could not be a de facto custodian since he co-parented with Denise, the legal custodian.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded. It held that Lemaster had standing to intervene as a “person acting as a parent” under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and had sufficiently alleged a basis for de facto custodian status, even though he was not married to Denise. The Court found that Lemaster’s motion to intervene, filed two days after Denise’s death, was timely, as his interest was previously protected by Denise. The Court ordered the family court to allow Lemaster to intervene and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine his status as a de facto custodian. View "LEMASTER V. STILTNER" on Justia Law

A man named Donald Prater, Jr. was found partially nude and behaving erratically after leaving a hospital, having previously told a deputy he had used methamphetamine and was hallucinating. Law enforcement officers from the City of Paintsville and Johnson County, along with emergency medical personnel, responded to reports of his behavior. When officers attempted to arrest Prater on a public street, he resisted and force was used, including a taser, pepper spray, and baton strikes. After being handcuffed, Prater stopped breathing and, despite immediate lifesaving efforts, died. The medical examiner found no lethal trauma and attributed the death to excited delirium syndrome, with other health factors possibly contributing.The personal representative of Prater’s estate filed a wrongful death suit in Johnson Circuit Court against various city and county entities and their employees, alleging excessive force, negligence, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the officers and emergency personnel were entitled to qualified official immunity, that the force used was reasonable, and that there was no evidence their actions caused Prater’s death. The court also dismissed claims against the city and county entities, including those for negligent hiring and supervision, on the basis that no underlying tort had been established.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some claims against the city and police department for negligent hiring and supervision could proceed, and that the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity required further factual findings. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that all defendants were properly dismissed. The Court concluded that the officers’ actions were discretionary, performed in good faith, and within the scope of their authority, entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for any necessary proceedings. View "CITY OF PAINTSVILLE V. HANEY" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider participated in Kentucky’s Medicaid program, offering in-home services to recipients in rural areas under the Home and Community Based (HCB) Waiver program. The Department for Medicaid Services had, for several years, reimbursed the provider at enhanced rates for “case management” services, even though the relevant administrative regulation did not list “case management” as a reimbursable “revenue code service.” In 2016, the Department determined that these payments were made in error and sought to recoup over $1 million from the provider for services rendered between 2011 and 2013.After the Department initiated recoupment, the provider contested the action through the Cabinet’s administrative process, arguing that the omission of “case management” from the regulation was a drafting error and that the Department should be estopped from recouping the funds due to its prior representations and delay. The administrative hearing officer rejected these arguments, finding the regulation’s text unambiguous and concluding that neither equitable estoppel nor laches applied. The Secretary of the Cabinet adopted this decision. The provider then sought judicial review in the Franklin Circuit Court, which affirmed the agency’s decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the Department’s regulation unambiguously excluded “case management” from the list of services eligible for enhanced reimbursement, and the Department was within its authority to recoup the overpaid funds. The Court declined to read omitted language into the regulation, found no basis for equitable estoppel or laches against the Department, and rejected the provider’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Department’s audit. View "PROFESSIONAL HOME HEALTH CARE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES" on Justia Law

On the night of June 23, 2019, a group of minors, including the defendant, traveled around Louisville discussing a planned burglary. Later that evening, two minors, J.M. and R.O., were shot and killed, while a third, S.H., survived her wounds. S.H. testified that the defendant shot her and R.O. after the group had driven to various locations and after an incident involving J.M. in an alley. The defendant was indicted for the murders of J.M. and R.O. and for the first-degree assault of S.H. He did not testify at trial.The Jefferson Circuit Court conducted a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of the murder of R.O. and the first-degree assault of S.H., but acquitted of the murder of J.M. The jury recommended a life sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for the assault conviction, which the trial court reduced to life in prison. The defendant appealed, raising several claims, including challenges to the admission of cell phone location evidence, the handling of prospective and seated jurors, and the admission of a recorded jail call.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case as a matter of right. The Court held that the trial court did not err in permitting a detective to testify about cell phone location data, finding that the detective’s testimony, though based on specialized training, was sufficiently disclosed and did not require exclusion or a Daubert hearing since the defense did not challenge the methodology’s reliability. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decisions regarding juror challenges and the admission of the jail call, concluding that there was no evidence of juror bias or prejudice and that the recorded call was properly admitted for the jury’s consideration. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "HOLLINGSWORTH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

James Lynch was stopped in April 2022 under suspicion of driving under the influence and was subjected to five standardized field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Lynch showed signs of impairment and was arrested and charged with DUI. In February 2023, Lynch moved to exclude the HGN test evidence, arguing it was unreliable without expert testimony. The Gallatin District Court agreed, requiring expert testimony for the HGN test and excluding it from evidence.The Commonwealth sought a writ of prohibition from the Gallatin Circuit Court to prevent the exclusion of the HGN test. The circuit court denied the writ, finding that the Commonwealth did not demonstrate great injustice or irreparable injury, as other evidence from the sobriety tests and officer observations could still be used. The Commonwealth appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the exclusion of the HGN test constituted irreparable injury and that the test was admissible without expert testimony if properly administered by a trained officer.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate great injustice or irreparable injury, as required for a writ of prohibition. The court emphasized that the remaining evidence was sufficient for prosecution and that the exclusion of the HGN test did not cause incalculable damage. The case was remanded to the Gallatin Circuit Court to reinstate the order denying the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Lynch v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Bobby Ray Osborne entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, receiving a five-year prison sentence. The case arose when officers, acting on a tip about a stolen trailer, visited Osborne's property. Osborne consented to a search, during which he was found with a baggie containing a brown substance believed to be heroin and a large amount of cash. The officers did not find the stolen trailer but obtained a search warrant for Osborne's residence, yielding additional evidence.The Estill Circuit Court denied Osborne's motion to suppress the heroin and cash, finding that he voluntarily consented to the search. Osborne's subsequent motions to reconsider were also denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case to clarify the distinction between a consensual encounter and an investigative detention under the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that Osborne voluntarily consented to the search. The court found that the officers' actions did not convert the consensual encounter into an investigative detention. The court also upheld the application of the plain view doctrine, determining that the incriminating nature of the baggie was immediately apparent once Osborne removed it from his pocket. The court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that additional findings were unnecessary. View "Osborne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioners, T.S. and G.G., an unmarried couple, sought to jointly adopt T.S.'s biological granddaughter, for whom they have had permanent custody since 2017. They filed a petition in the Jackson Circuit Court, Family Division, with the biological mother's consent. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services issued a report stating that Kentucky statutes do not allow unmarried couples to jointly adopt, leading the family court to dismiss the petition.The family court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the statutes do not permit joint adoption by unmarried couples. The court noted that either petitioner could adopt the child individually or they could marry to jointly adopt her. Petitioners then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 199 prohibits unmarried couples from jointly petitioning to adopt. The court held that the statutes do not bar such adoptions. The court interpreted "any person" in KRS 199.470(1) to include unmarried couples, based on statutory construction principles and the precedent set in Krieger v. Garvin. The court also noted that the Cabinet's regulations cannot contravene the adoption statutes.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Jackson Circuit Court, Family Division, instructing the Cabinet to investigate and report on the adoption petition as required by KRS 199.510. View "G.G. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services" on Justia Law