Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jamie Boggs was convicted of several sexual offenses, including sexual abuse, rape, and sodomy, all involving victims under twelve years of age. The abuse occurred between 2011 and 2016 while Boggs was in a relationship with Retta H., who had five children. The victims, Betty and Susan, testified to frequent and severe sexual abuse by Boggs. Retta corroborated some of the abuse and testified to physical abuse by Boggs. Boggs denied all allegations and was sentenced to forty years in prison.The Harlan Circuit Court handled the initial trial, where Boggs was convicted. He appealed, alleging multiple errors, including improper bolstering of the victims' testimony by a forensic interviewer, hearsay statements, improper admission of prior bad acts, and issues with jury instructions related to unanimity and double jeopardy. The trial court's jury instructions were not objected to by Boggs, leading to a waiver of those claims on appeal. The court also admitted evidence of prior bad acts to explain the victims' delayed reporting of the abuse.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The court found that the forensic interviewer's testimony did constitute improper bolstering but deemed it harmless error. The court also found no palpable error in the admission of prior bad acts testimony or hearsay statements. The court concluded that the jury instructions issues were waived and not subject to review. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Boggs' conviction and sentence. View "Boggs v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Christopher Morrow, a sergeant with the Lexington Police Department and a member of the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #4 (the Lodge), was accused of sexual assault by Kellie Jo Bell in 2017. Bell filed a civil complaint against Morrow and the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG), alleging that Morrow assaulted her while on duty. Morrow requested LFUCG to provide legal defense under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which LFUCG did under a reservation of rights.The Lodge and Morrow filed a grievance in 2020, claiming LFUCG intended to withdraw its defense, which LFUCG denied as premature. They then filed a complaint to compel arbitration, and LFUCG counterclaimed for a declaration of its rights under the CBA, asserting no duty to defend Morrow as he was off duty during the alleged assault. The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of LFUCG, ruling that Morrow's actions were outside the scope of his employment and not covered by the CBA or LFUCG’s self-insurance policy. The court also awarded LFUCG attorney’s fees.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, agreeing that the dispute was not arbitrable under the CBA as Morrow was off duty. The Court of Appeals did not address whether LFUCG’s refusal to arbitrate the initial grievance constituted a breach of the CBA.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred by ruling on the merits of the dispute without first determining if the parties agreed to arbitrate it. The court directed that the issue of whether Morrow’s actions were within the scope of his employment under the CBA should be submitted to arbitration, as the CBA required arbitration for any controversy concerning its meaning and application. The court vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment and attorney’s fees award, instructing the lower court to order arbitration on the issue. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #4 v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government" on Justia Law

T-Mobile sought a refund for statutory service fees paid to the Kentucky Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, arguing that the fees did not apply to prepaid cellular customers based on a prior court decision. The Board denied the refund request, leading T-Mobile to file a lawsuit in Franklin Circuit Court. The trial court ruled against T-Mobile, stating that it did not meet the common law refund requirements as outlined in Inland Container Corporation v. Mason County, which necessitates that payments be involuntary or made under misrepresentation.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that T-Mobile's payments were voluntary and not subject to refund. T-Mobile then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The Supreme Court granted review, heard oral arguments, and examined the record.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that T-Mobile was not entitled to a common law refund because the payments were voluntary and not made under misrepresentation. The court emphasized that the payments were not collectible by summary process or fine and imprisonment, and T-Mobile had the opportunity to challenge the fees in court before paying them. Additionally, the court found no evidence of actual misrepresentation by the Board. Therefore, T-Mobile's claim for a common law refund was denied. View "Powertel Memphis, Inc. v. Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board" on Justia Law

Earl K. Johnson was convicted by a jury in Logan Circuit Court on four counts of complicity to traffic in methamphetamine, one count of engaging in organized crime, and one count of complicity to murder. The jury found him to be a persistent felony offender and recommended a life sentence, which the court imposed. Johnson appealed, arguing several trial errors, including a violation of his right to confrontation when a key witness, Pam Wetton, testified remotely due to health concerns.The Logan Circuit Court allowed Pam to testify via Zoom based on a letter from a physician’s assistant stating that travel would be difficult for her. Johnson objected, arguing that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The trial court overruled his objection, and Pam testified remotely. Johnson was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that allowing Pam to testify remotely violated Johnson’s right to confrontation. The court held that the Commonwealth failed to establish that remote testimony was necessary to further an important public policy and that the reliability of the testimony was assured. The court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the complicity to traffic convictions, as Pam’s testimony was crucial to those charges. Therefore, the court reversed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for complicity to traffic in methamphetamine.However, the court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for engaging in organized crime and complicity to murder. The court found that Pam’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for these charges due to the overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s guilt presented by other witnesses. The court also addressed and dismissed Johnson’s other claims of trial errors, including improper admission of other crimes and bad acts, hearsay statements, and the denial of a mistrial. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Bradley Williams, an inmate, filed a Notice of Appeal from the Hardin Circuit Court's dismissal of his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence. He claims to have filed the notice and subsequent responses on time under the Prison Mailbox Rule, but the Court of Appeals did not receive them timely, leading to the dismissal of his appeal. Williams did not receive the dismissal order until months later, after the deadline for filing a motion for discretionary review had passed. He then filed a motion for reconsideration and two CR 60.02 motions, all of which were returned for various procedural deficiencies.The Hardin Circuit Court dismissed Williams' RCr 11.42 motion on November 28, 2023. Williams filed his Notice of Appeal on December 20, 2023, but it was not received until January 9, 2024, and filed on January 17, 2024. The Court of Appeals issued a show cause order on January 22, 2024, and dismissed the appeal on March 6, 2024, for untimeliness. Williams filed a motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2024, which was returned, as were his subsequent CR 60.02 motions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and denied Williams' petition for a writ of mandamus, stating that he has an available remedy at the Court of Appeals. The court held that Williams could file a motion to reinstate his appeal, demonstrating compliance with the Prison Mailbox Rule through prison mail logs. The court emphasized that the Court of Appeals should determine whether Williams complied with the rule and may conduct a hearing or delegate the matter to the trial court. The writ of mandamus was denied, but Williams was allowed to seek reinstatement of his appeal. View "WILLIAMS V. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

Alyssa Baum and Justin Aldava have a child, H.A., born in Texas in June 2019. Baum and H.A. moved to Kentucky in November 2020 to escape domestic violence from Aldava. Baum filed for an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) and temporary custody in Jefferson Family Court, recounting an incident of domestic violence in October 2020. The court granted the EPO and later a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) after a hearing, despite Aldava not being served until April 2021. Aldava filed for custody in Texas, but the Texas court did not assert jurisdiction.The Jefferson Family Court held a hearing in April 2021 and issued a DVO, granting Baum temporary custody and prohibiting Aldava from contacting Baum and H.A. Aldava later moved to dismiss the DVO for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the family court denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over Aldava and that the DVO could not impose affirmative relief, such as temporary custody or firearm restrictions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky courts could issue DVOs protecting petitioners and their children from domestic violence, even without personal jurisdiction over non-resident respondents. The court affirmed that Kentucky had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to grant temporary custody. The court also ruled that the DVO's restrictions on Aldava's firearm possession within Kentucky were valid and that entering the DVO into the Law Information Network of Kentucky (LINK) did not violate due process.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the family court's DVO in part, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BAUM V. ALDAVA" on Justia Law

Elvis Wynn was convicted by a Knox County jury of first-degree bail jumping and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) after failing to appear at an October 2022 sentencing hearing for previous charges. The Knox Circuit Court sentenced him to twenty years of imprisonment based on the jury's recommendation. Wynn appealed the convictions.Previously, in September 2022, Wynn had pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, operating a motor vehicle under the influence, and second-degree PFO. He was released on home incarceration and ordered to appear for sentencing in October 2022, which he failed to do. Consequently, he was indicted on new charges of first-degree bail jumping and first-degree PFO. After being arrested in February 2023, he received a seven-year sentence for the original charges. In September 2023, a jury trial was held for the new charges, resulting in his conviction and the twenty-year sentence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed Wynn's appeal, where he argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior felony charges and that his twenty-year sentence violated the statutory sentencing cap. The court found that while the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the video of Wynn's prior court appearance, this error was harmless given the nature of the charges and the compelling evidence against him.Regarding the sentencing issue, the court distinguished Wynn's case from Kimmel v. Commonwealth, noting that Wynn's sentences arose from separate indictments and trials. Therefore, the statutory sentencing cap did not apply, and the trial court correctly ordered the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence exceeding twenty years. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Knox Circuit Court. View "WYNN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Darryl Ellery pled guilty to first-degree assault and was sentenced to five years in prison, probated for five years, with a restitution order of $305.14 to be paid monthly. In January 2017, a probation officer recommended revoking Ellery’s probation for absconding, and a warrant was issued. The warrant was served in October 2021, and at a November 15, 2021, hearing, the court granted a continuance but did not extend Ellery’s probation. At a subsequent hearing, Ellery argued the court lost jurisdiction as his probation expired in June 2021 without extension. The court rejected this and revoked his probation.Ellery appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the trial court lost jurisdiction when it failed to extend Ellery’s probation at the November 15, 2021, hearing. The court also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument to adopt the fugitive tolling doctrine, citing separation of powers and lack of legislative enactment.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. The Commonwealth argued for reinstating the revocation, suggesting the court should adopt the fugitive tolling doctrine or reinterpret KRS 533.020(4). Ellery countered that the appeal was moot as he completed his sentence and argued against adopting the fugitive tolling doctrine.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the appeal was not moot under the public interest exception. The court reaffirmed its interpretation of KRS 533.020(4) from Commonwealth v. Tapp, which requires a duly entered court order to extend probation. The court declined to adopt the fugitive tolling doctrine, citing legislative intent and separation of powers. The court concluded that the circuit court lost jurisdiction when it failed to extend Ellery’s probation at the November 15, 2021, hearing, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ELLERY" on Justia Law

Jason Earlywine was employed as a teacher by the Board of Education of Paris Independent School District (BEP) from August 2007 to June 2019. In 2011, a student accused him of inappropriate conduct, leading to his placement on paid administrative leave, which was later changed to unpaid leave. He faced a criminal charge of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, but the trial court granted him a directed verdict in January 2015, and the charge was expunged. Earlywine was reinstated in February 2015 but was terminated in 2019 for unspecified reasons. In 2020, he sued BEP to recover lost wages during his unpaid leave.The Bourbon Circuit Court initially handled the case, determining that BEP was within the waiver of immunity under KRS 45A.245(1) but transferred the case to Franklin Circuit Court due to venue appropriateness. BEP appealed, arguing governmental immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals ruled that BEP's immunity was waived under KRS 45A.245(1) but concluded that Earlywine's failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, affirming that BEP is subject to the waiver of immunity under KRS 45A.245(1). However, it reversed the Court of Appeals' conclusion regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, stating that this issue is subject to exceptions and should not have been addressed on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to Franklin Circuit Court for further proceedings, allowing Earlywine to argue any applicable exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. View "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PARIS, KENTUCKY V. EARLYWINE" on Justia Law

Jennifer Albright, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased son David Albright, filed a lawsuit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) following David's death. David was swept into a drainage pipe in their backyard during a rainstorm and subsequently died from his injuries. The drainage system, including the pipe, was owned by MSD. Albright alleged that MSD was negligent in maintaining the drainage system and failing to warn of its dangers, particularly by not installing a grate over the pipe entrance.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of MSD, finding that MSD was entitled to municipal immunity under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA). The court reasoned that MSD's decision not to install grates was a discretionary act protected by CALGA. Albright appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that MSD was not entitled to immunity under the facts of the case.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that MSD, while subject to CALGA, was not entitled to immunity because the alleged negligent acts were ministerial in nature, not discretionary. The court emphasized that municipalities have a ministerial duty to non-negligently maintain and repair their sewer systems. The court also found that MSD's decision not to install a grate or warn of the pipe's dangers did not arise from its legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT" on Justia Law