Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Judicial Conduct Commission finding misconduct on the part of Judge Dawn M. Gentry and ordered that she be removed from office as a circuit judge for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Fifth Division, a Family Court division serving Kenton County, holding that there was no error warranting reversal of the Commission's final order.The Commission brought a twelve-count formal proceeding against Judge Gentry alleging that she had used her judicial role to coerce attorneys who served as guardians ad litem in her court to support her campaign, had asked in the courtroom for a yard sign placement, and had utilized court staff to perform campaign work during work hours. Ultimately, the Commission entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order finding that Judge Gentry had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in the misconduct alleged in ten of the twelve counts charged and determining that removal was the appropriate sanction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on Judge Gentry's numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and her misconduct in office, the sanction of removal was appropriate. View "Gentry v. Judicial Conduct Commission" on Justia Law

In this case heard after the Kentucky Medical Review Panel Act (MRPA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 216C.005 et seq., was declared to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding the complaint to be untimely and dismissing this case, holding that the complaint was timely as to the individual defendants.Plaintiffs filed a complaint against advanced Practice Registered Nurse Wynetta Fletcher, Dr. Amjad Bkhari, Dr. James Detherage under the MRPA. After the claims made their way through the medical review panel process, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the same defendants and the entities that allegedly employed them. After Plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018), wherein the Court declared the MRPA unconstitutional, was finalized. Thereafter, Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the claims were untimely and that Plaintiffs could not rely on the tolling provision of the MRPA to extend the deadline. The circuit court dismissed the suit as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.270 applied to Plaintiffs' claims; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims were timely filed under section 413.270 but saved only those claims that were filed with the medical review panel. View "Smith v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order issuing a public reprimand against Beth Lewis Maze, Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, Second Division, holding that the Judicial Conduct Commission appropriately issued a public reprimand.Judge Maze inappropriately intervened in her ex-husband's criminal case and then self-reported to the Commission. Ultimately, Judge Maze was criminally indicted for two counts of forgery and one count of tampering with public records, and the Commission brought six counts of judicial misconduct against her. After a hearing, the Commission found that Judge Maze violated SCR 4.020(1)(B)(i) and that her acts constituted misconduct in office and violated SCR 4.300, Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court held that the Commission appropriately issued a public reprimand under the circumstances. View "Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree and second-degree arson and six counts of attempted murder, of which four were charged as hate crimes, holding that Defendant was denied a fair trial when the Commonwealth, aware of Defendant's intoxication during her arrest, opposed the intoxication defense instructions and implied to the jury that Defendant was not intoxicated.On appeal, Defendant argued that six trial errors required reversal, either individually or cumulatively. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutorial misconduct was flagrant enough to render the trial fundamentally unfair, simultaneously leading the jury to conclude facts contrary to the known facts and depriving Defendant of an ability to present her defense. The Court held that this one error was enough to require reversal but also addressed Defendant's remaining allegations of error, concluding that there were multiple errors in this case. View "Brafman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of four counts of first-degree assault and other crimes and sentencing him as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) to forty years' imprisonment, holding that any error was harmless.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the trial court (1) did not err when it allowed into evidence a Facebook video from an anonymous tipster allegedly depicting the shooting; (2) did not commit palpable error when it allowed the testimony of Detective O'Daniel, who narrated surveillance video footage; (3) properly allowed Aleisha Courtney's prior identification of Defendant; (4) properly allowed another detective's prior identification of Defendant; (5) improperly excluded evidence of a civil suit by the victims against Defendant, but the error did not likely affect the outcome of the trial; (6) properly allowed Defendant's prior felony convictions at trial and at sentencing; and (7) properly allowed a summary sheet of Defendant's prior convictions that was prepared with certified records. Further, there was sufficient evidence of Defendant's prior felony convictions to support his conviction for possession of a handgun. View "Mattingly v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Louisville Metro Government (LMG) and its employees are cloaked in sovereign immunity and qualified official immunity for an alleged violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 71.040 and that money damages are unavailable because Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 does not waive immunity.James Hatcher died within twenty-four hours of entering the custody of the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC). Plaintiffs filed suit alleging a violation of section 71.040. Plaintiffs alleged multiple torts and constitutional violations, seeking compensatory and punitive damages from LMG, the LMDC director, and six LMDC guards. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that LMG was immune from a claim for money damages, and that immunity was not waived. View "A.H. v. Louisville Metro Government" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals vacating and remanding the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to modify the terms of his probation to remove a restriction prohibiting him from having access to the internet during his probationary period, holding that Defendant's failure to challenge the probation restriction prohibiting all access to the internet at the time the restriction was imposed was fatal to Defendant's request to relief.In vacating the probation restriction, the court of appeals concluded that the complete ban on internet access under the facts of this case was impermissibly vague and overly burdensome on Defendant's right to free speech. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not object to the restriction, the court of appeals should not have entertained this challenge, and its decision on the merits was in error. View "Commonwealth v. Jennings" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's summary judgment dismissing Mary Wilson's Kentucky Whistleblower Act (KWA) claims against Northern Kentucky Area Development District, Inc. (NKADD), holding that NKADD is one of the Commonwealth's political subdivisions, making it a KWA-covered employer and thus potentially liable for Wilson's claims.Wilson brought her KWA claim in circuit court against NKADD, her former employer, alleging that NKADD retaliated against her after she reported a co-worker's fraudulent billing practice by forcing her resignation. The trial court concluded that NKADD was not a KWA-covered employer and granted NKADD's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that NKADD is not a political subdivision of the state because it does not serve an integral function of government; and (2) therefore, NKADD was not subject to the KWA as a political subdivision and was therefore not subject to Wilson's claims under the KWA. View "Northern Kentucky Area Development District v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals that the term "person" in Kentucky's Loss Recovery Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Chapter 372, is limited to a natural person, holding that the Commonwealth had standing to bring this suit.The Commonwealth, through the Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, filed the underlying complaint seeking to recover under statutory treble damages for money lost by its citizens playing real-money poker on an illegal internet website called PokerStars, which was owned by Defendants (collectively, PokerStars). The court entered partial summary judgment against Defendants based on the actual amount Kentucky players lost on PokerStars' websites. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commonwealth lacked standing because it did not qualify as "any other person" under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth qualified as a "person" under the Act; (2) the Commonwealth had standing to bring this lawsuit; and (3) the manner in which the trial court calculated damages in this case was proper. View "Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Big Sandy Area Development District, Inc. (BSADD) in this negligence and wrongful death action, holding that BSADD did not have governmental immunity but that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's claims against BSADD.BSADD arranges for assistants to visit elderly clients in their homes on a regular basis. After Emma Jean Hall died of the effects of sepsis that developed from a bed sore on her lower back, Plaintiff, in her capacity as the executrix of Hall's estate, brought this action alleging that Hall's condition could have been found and remedied had BSADD's home care aid not been negligently attentive. The trial court granted BSADD's motion for summary judgment, concluding that BSADD enjoyed governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) BSADD did not have governmental immunity because it did not perform an integral state function; and (2) BSADD was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the substance of the negligence claim because it did not breach of standard of care to Hall. View "Howard v. Big Sandy Area Development District, Inc." on Justia Law