Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Anderson was convicted of failing to make a required disposition of property in the Hickman District Court on August 17, 2020. He failed to appear for sentencing and did not report to jail as ordered, leading to a bench warrant. Despite his fugitive status, Anderson's lawyer filed an appeal to the Hickman Circuit Court, which affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel then sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals while Anderson remained a fugitive. Anderson surrendered to custody after the Commonwealth urged the Court of Appeals to apply the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (FDD) and deny discretionary review.The Hickman Circuit Court undertook Anderson's appeal despite his fugitive status and affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals, which was initially granted by the motion panel. However, the merits panel of the Court of Appeals later applied the FDD and dismissed Anderson's appeal, reasoning that Anderson sought the benefit of discretionary review while a fugitive.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the FDD should not apply to Anderson's appeal because he surrendered to custody before the Court of Appeals ruled on his motion for discretionary review. The court emphasized that the FDD is intended to prevent fugitives from benefiting from the judicial system while remaining at large, but Anderson's voluntary return to custody negated the need for the FDD's application. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Anderson's appeal. View "ANDERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Terry Hall worked for BPM Lumber, LLC, and was terminated in 2015 after failing a drug test. In 2018, Hall filed a claim for permanent occupational disability benefits, alleging various health issues due to exposure to a mixture of hydraulic fluid and diesel fuel at work. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Hall's claim, finding that the medical evidence did not support the work-relatedness of his conditions.Hall appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further explanation regarding the rejection of the University Evaluator’s report on Hall’s respiratory impairment. The ALJ provided additional findings on remand, again dismissing Hall's claims. Hall appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. Hall then sought review from the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s initial July 22, 2022, Order was final and appealable, precluding Hall from raising certain issues again. The court affirmed the Board’s decision on the merits of the remaining issues.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the Board’s July 22, 2022, Order was final and appealable, and Hall’s failure to appeal that order immediately precluded him from raising those issues in a subsequent appeal. The court also noted that the workers’ compensation process does not require exhaustion of all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. View "HALL V. BPM LUMBER, LLC" on Justia Law

David Vincent was stopped by Officer David Robertson of the Edmonton Police Department based on a tip from a known informant and an alleged equipment violation. The informant reported that two individuals at a gas station appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Robertson observed a vehicle with red parking lights, which he believed violated a new law that had not yet taken effect. He followed the vehicle, observed no traffic violations, and stopped it. Vincent was found to have a suspended license, and a search of the vehicle revealed drugs and paraphernalia.The Metcalfe Circuit Court denied Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, ruling that the officer's belief about the equipment violation was an objectively reasonable mistake of law. The court also found the informant's tip provided a sufficient basis for the stop. Vincent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the subsequent search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the stop was not justified by the equipment violation because the law had not yet taken effect, and the officer's mistake of law was not reasonable. Additionally, the informant's tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for the stop, as it was based on observations that could be explained by innocent behavior and was not corroborated by the officer's own observations. The court remanded the case for the trial court to grant Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop. View "VINCENT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Apren Poore was indicted by a Whitley County Grand Jury on charges of receiving a stolen firearm, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. He entered a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, which included a "hammer clause" that stipulated a harsher sentence if he failed to appear at sentencing. Poore pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted his plea. However, Poore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing due to being detained in another county on shoplifting charges. Consequently, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment as recommended by the Commonwealth.The Whitley Circuit Court initially scheduled Poore's sentencing for April 2023, later rescheduled to May 1, 2023. Poore's counsel filed motions to withdraw as his attorney and to withdraw Poore's guilty plea, citing irreconcilable differences and Poore's admission to a rehabilitation facility. Poore failed to appear for the May 1 hearing, leading to the trial court granting the motion for counsel to withdraw but denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. A bench warrant was issued for Poore's arrest, and he was subsequently sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on June 5, 2023.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and concluded that the trial judge exercised independent discretion in sentencing Poore but improperly imposed court costs. The court affirmed the twenty-year sentence, finding no abuse of discretion in considering the hammer clause. However, it vacated the portion of the judgment imposing court costs and fees, as the installment plan did not comply with statutory requirements. View "POORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A five-year-old child tragically died after being struck by a vehicle driven by an Alltrade employee at an apartment complex owned by Whispering Brook Acquisitions LLC. Alltrade had a commercial general liability policy with Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, while Whispering Brook had a similar policy with First Specialty Insurance Corporation. Both policies contained "other insurance" provisions, which led to a dispute over which insurer was primarily responsible for covering the incident.The Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Alltrade and its employees were insured under First Specialty’s policy. The court found that the "other insurance" provisions in both policies were mutually repugnant excess clauses, meaning neither could claim to be secondary to the other. Consequently, the court ruled that both insurers shared primary liability and must contribute equally to defend and indemnify the insureds. Motorists' argument that First Specialty should be primarily liable due to an indemnification provision in the Service Agreement between Alltrade and Whispering Brook was rejected. First Specialty appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that First Specialty’s provision was a nonstandard escape clause, making Motorists primarily liable.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that both "other insurance" provisions were mutually repugnant excess clauses, requiring Motorists and First Specialty to share primary liability equally. The court also overruled the earlier decision in Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Haddix, which the Court of Appeals had relied upon. Additionally, the court found that Motorists had waived its indemnification argument by not filing a cross-appeal and requesting the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's summary judgment. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. FIRST SPECIALTY INSURANCE CORP." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (the "Cabinet") filed a petition to condemn a 30.366-acre tract of land containing subsurface coal in Floyd County for the construction of a highway. The land was part of a larger mineral parcel owned by several individuals, with Leah Atkinson holding the majority share. The owners had a coal lease with SAS Resources, LLC, which had not yet begun mining the property at the time of the condemnation.The Floyd Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the condemned property. The commissioners concluded that the property had a fair market value of $500 both before and after the condemnation. The court adopted this award, but several owners filed exceptions, leading to a trial to determine just compensation. The Cabinet sought to exclude evidence of anticipated royalty income, but the court denied this motion. At trial, the Cabinet's expert valued the property at $145,600 using a comparable sales approach, while the owners' expert valued it at over $2 million using an income capitalization approach, considering future royalty income.The jury awarded the owners $550,000 as just compensation. The Cabinet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the owners' expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the income capitalization approach was permissible.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony that considered the property's capacity to produce future royalty income. The court found that the testimony appropriately accounted for the contingencies and uncertainties of business, making it relevant and admissible. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS V. ATKINSON" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether an insurance policy issued by State Auto Property and Casualty Company to Greenville Cumberland Presbyterian Church covered the collapse of the Church’s roof. The Church's roof, part of a one-story sanctuary building, was around 120 years old. In September 2019, during a roof replacement project, a significant section of the roof dropped overnight. An engineer, Harold Gaston, found that the roof trusses had decayed due to long-term water infiltration, causing the roof to collapse. The Church filed a claim with State Auto, which was denied on the basis that the damage did not constitute a collapse under the policy.The Muhlenberg Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Auto, ruling that there was no collapse as defined by Kentucky precedent in Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtsinger and Thiele v. Kentucky Growers Ins. Co. The court held that the roof's condition did not meet the "rubble on the ground" standard for collapse.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the roof had indeed collapsed under the Curtsinger definition, which does not require the building to fall to the ground. The court also found the policy ambiguous and ruled in favor of the Church.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the policy provided coverage for the actual collapse of any part of the building, including the roof. The court found that the roof had indeed collapsed due to hidden decay and insect damage, and that the Church had taken reasonable steps to mitigate further damage. The court vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment in favor of State Auto and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Church on its breach of contract claim, and for further proceedings on the Church’s extra-contractual claims. View "STATE AUTO PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY V. GREENVILLE CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH" on Justia Law

Donna Miller Bruenger, the ex-wife of the late Coleman Miller, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Courtenay Ann Miller, Coleman’s daughter, seeking entitlement to Coleman’s Federal Employee’s Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) benefits. Coleman had failed to designate a beneficiary for his FEGLI benefits before his death, and MetLife distributed the benefits to Courtenay. Bruenger argued that Coleman’s legal obligation under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to assign her the benefits should prevail.The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled against Bruenger, concluding that federal law precluded her claim because Coleman’s employer did not receive the QDRO before his death. Bruenger’s subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as untimely, and the court also imposed sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. Bruenger then sought relief under CR 60.02, which the trial court granted, allowing her to refile the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the refiled appeal as frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to Courtenay.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the CR 60.02 relief. The Supreme Court held that RAP 11(B) authorizes the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for frivolous appeals but found that the imposition of sanctions in this case violated due process because Bruenger was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but reversed the sanctions imposed by the Court of Appeals. View "BRUENGER V. MILLER" on Justia Law

Brandon Woodside was convicted by a Hardin County jury of first-degree burglary and being a persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Woodside broke into an occupied motel room in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, assaulted the occupant, Marvin, and fled the scene. Marvin and a witness provided consistent testimony about the incident. Woodside's defense was voluntary intoxication due to methamphetamine use, and he testified about his drug use and the events leading up to the assault.The Hardin Circuit Court allowed the defense to ask Marvin if he was receiving any benefit for his testimony but limited further questioning about his immigration status unless Marvin indicated he was receiving a benefit. Marvin testified that he had not received any benefit related to his participation in the case. Woodside argued that the trial court erred by not allowing him to question Marvin about his immigration status and potential bias related to a U visa application, which could have affected Marvin's credibility.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Hardin Circuit Court's judgment. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of Marvin regarding his immigration status. The court found that the trial court reasonably allowed questioning about any benefits Marvin might have received but did not permit a speculative inquiry into his immigration status without evidence of a benefit. The court also noted that the defense did not present any post-trial evidence of Marvin receiving a benefit or engaging in conduct probative of untruthfulness. The trial court's decision to limit the cross-examination was deemed appropriate and within its discretion. View "WOODSIDE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Officer Henry Volentine, a deputy of the Hardin County Office of Sheriff (HCOS), initiated a traffic stop of Maurice Green on October 14, 2014, after noticing Green's vehicle had an expired license plate belonging to a different vehicle. Green initially pulled over but then drove off, prompting Volentine to pursue him. During the pursuit, Volentine believed Green had committed assault and wanton endangerment by nearly hitting two pedestrians. The pursuit ended in a head-on collision with Susan Sheehy’s vehicle, leading to the present litigation.The Hardin Circuit Court denied Volentine’s and HCOS’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified and governmental immunity. The court found that Volentine did not have a reasonable basis to believe a violent felony had occurred to justify the pursuit and that his actions were not in good faith. The court also determined that Volentine violated ministerial duties by failing to terminate the pursuit when it posed an extreme safety hazard and by not obtaining approval from a supervisor to continue the pursuit.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Volentine was entitled to qualified official immunity and that HCOS was entitled to governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Volentine’s belief that he witnessed a felony was reasonable and that his actions during the pursuit were discretionary.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that Volentine was not entitled to qualified official immunity because he failed to abide by ministerial duties and lacked good faith in exercising his discretion to initiate the pursuit. Consequently, HCOS’ governmental immunity was waived by operation of KRS 70.040. The case was remanded to the Hardin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "SHEEHY V. VOLENTINE" on Justia Law