Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing this tort action with prejudice under CR 41.02(1), holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice.Plaintiff commenced this tort action alleging violations of various laws relating to occupational safety. Defendant filed a notice for independent medication examination (IME), but Plaintiff did not appear. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded that dismissal was warranted in part because Plaintiff violated court orders by failing to appear for mediation and the IME. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to the extent Plaintiff violated any court orders, those violations were insufficient to warrant the extreme remedy of dismissal with prejudice. View "Jones v. Pinter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing this action brought by Charmin Watson alleging that Dr. Amberly Kay Windisch failed to obtain Watson's informed consent prior to surgical placement of a mid-urethral sling, holding that the trial court did not err.Watson brought this lawsuit alleging that Dr. Windisch had failed to obtain informed consent by failing to explain to her the specific risk of injury due to erosion or migration of the mesh sling. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Windisch. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a medical malpractice claim based upon lack of informed consent must be specifically pled; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Windisch on the issue of informed consent. View "Watson v. Landmark Urology, P.S.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to overturn a final order of the Secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services dismissing an administrative action against Appalachian Hospice Care, Inc., holding that there was no error.At issue on appeal was whether the Secretary erred in concluding that a non-lawyer's request for an administrative hearing on behalf of a corporate entity constitutes the unauthorized practice of law requiring dismissal of the administrative action. The lower courts answered the question in the negative. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no unauthorized practice of law in this case. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. Appalachian Hospice Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the Workers' Compensation Board's decision reversing a decision by the Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) denying Carlye Harper's motion to reopen her workers' compensation claim to seek vocational rehabilitation benefits, holding that there was no error.Harper suffered a work-related injury to her back and lower extremities. After a hearing, an ALJ awarded permanent partial disability income benefits. Approximately sixteen months later, Harper sought to file an application for vocational rehabilitation services pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.710. The CALJ overruled the motion to reopen. The Board reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended section 342.710(3) to provide an independent ground for reopening, and claim preclusion did not bar adjudication of Harper's claim. View "Kindred Healthcare v. Harper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of homeowners in this complaint brought against them and their attorneys for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process, holding that the case must be remanded for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.At issue was the proposed development by Bardstown Capital Corporation of Jefferson County residential property into a commercial center. The proposed development was ultimately approved, despite opposition by neighboring homeowners. The homeowners appealed, arguing that the rezoning ordinance was invalid due to, among other things, inadequacy of notice of the various zoning hearings. After the appeal was denied, Bardstown Capital brought this action against the homeowners. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the homeowners. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Noerr-Pennington doctrine afforded the homeowners immunity from claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings; and (2) the trial court properly applied the Doerr-Pennington doctrine and, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Seiller Waterman, LLC v. Bardstown Capital Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction and sentence and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a proposed witness, Alvin Couch, was available for trial.Defendant was convicted of several drug-related offenses and sentenced him to a total of ten years' imprisonment. During trial, Defendant sought to introduce a certified video record of Couch's plea of guilty to manufacturing the drugs at issue. During trial, Defendant represented that he had subpoenaed Couch to testify at trial, but the trial court found no order existed compelling Couch's attendance at trial, and therefore, Couch did not qualify as an unavailable witness under Ky. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that defense counsel's representation that a subpoena had been delivered was sufficient to demonstrate a good faith effort had been made to procure Couch's presence at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Couch was available for trial. View "Commonwealth v. Roark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court opining on the constitutionality of the Governor's 2021 COVID-19 legislation and enjoining the Governor from interfering with Plaintiffs' business operations, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action.In its 2021 regular session, the General Assembly passed three bills amending the Governor's emergency powers under Ky. Rev. Stat. 39A. Plaintiff, a business, sought to enjoin the Governor from any action contrary to the 2021 legislation. The circuit court entered an amended judgment declaring the constitutionality of the 2021 COVID-19 legislation, holding any orders to the contrary imposed by the Governor unconstitutional, and prohibiting the three named defendants from enforcing any emergency order, decree or regulation in conflict with the 2021 legislation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff plainly had no standing to bring this action, and the circuit court had no jurisdiction. View "Beshear v. Ridgeway Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing order of the circuit court denying the motion of Legacy Health Services, Inc. Cambridge Place Group, LLC, and Cambridge Place Properties, LLC (collectively, Defendants) to dismiss or stay this lawsuit and compel arbitration of the medical malpractice claims brought by Christopher Jackson, as guardian for Christine Jackson, his mother, holding the court of appeals erred.At issue was whether Christopher possessed the authority, as his mother's guardian, to enter a voluntary arbitration agreement that was not a prerequisite to the provision of care or services to his ward. The circuit court concluded that Christopher did not have that authority. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a guardian's authority to enter into contracts generally is within the ambit of what is reasonably inferable from the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) guardians have the authority to bind their wards to contracts that limit or deprive the civil rights of their wards only to the extent necessary to provide needed care and services to the ward; and (2) because the arbitration agreement was not necessary to provide care or services to Christine, Christopher lacked the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. View "Jackson v. Legacy Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the opinion of the court of appeals vacating the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of temporarily total disability (TTD) benefits and affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion vacating the award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement, holding that the court of appeals erred in part.Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury while working for Defendant. An ALJ awarded Plaintiff TTD benefits, PPD benefits, and medical benefits. The ALJ applied the two-times multiplier from Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)2 to Plaintiff's PPD benefits. The court of appeals vacated the ALJ's award of TTD benefits and vacated the award of PPD benefits insofar as it applied to the enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in awarding Plaintiff TTD benefits; and (2) the ALJ erred in enhancing Plaintiff's PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier. View "French v. Rev-A-Shelf" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Austin Ellison's workers' compensation claim and awarding him disability benefits, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions.Ellison, who was employed by Dee Whitaker Concrete as a general laborer, was leaving a job site and traveling back to Whitaker Concrete's premises when he was injured in an automobile accident. Whitaker Concrete denied Ellison's workers' compensation claim on the ground that injuries sustained while going to or returning from the workplace are not compensable. The ALJ ruled that Ellison's injuries were compensable, finding that Ellison fell within the traveling employee and the service to the employer exceptions to the going and coming rule. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ellison's status as a traveling employee qualified as an exception to the going and coming rule. View "Dee Whitaker Concrete v. Ellison" on Justia Law