Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The appellant, a Marine Corps veteran with significant psychiatric disabilities, lived in Knox County, Kentucky, with his children and sister’s family. After separating from his wife, they began to reconcile, and he arranged to lease a second trailer, allegedly through an oral agreement with his landlord. An acquaintance, Deborah Powers, stayed in the trailer, but she claimed to have leased it with her boyfriend, Matthew Welsh. One night, after a party at the trailer, the appellant’s wife alleged she was raped by three men present. Instead of contacting police, the appellant, accompanied by two others, returned to the trailer armed, forcibly entered, and subjected the alleged assailants to threats, violence, and torture. During the confrontation, Welsh stabbed the appellant, who then fatally stabbed Welsh. The appellant was charged with murder, first-degree burglary, and four counts of unlawful imprisonment.The Knox Circuit Court conducted the trial. The appellant’s requests for self-defense and imperfect self-defense jury instructions were denied. The court admitted hearsay testimony regarding a rape kit and allowed a copy of a lease to be introduced over objections concerning the best evidence rule and authenticity. The appellant’s motion for his counsel to withdraw was also denied. The jury convicted him on all charges, and he was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing self-defense instructions, as the appellant’s own actions created the deadly situation. The court found no palpable error in the admission of the rape kit testimony, as the error did not substantially affect the defense. However, it concluded that admitting the copy of the lease without proper foundation was an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal of the burglary conviction. The court affirmed the murder and unlawful imprisonment convictions and the overall sentence, remanding for amendment of the judgment to reflect the reversal of the burglary conviction. View "MASTERS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries.The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

After the owners of a parcel of real property in Manchester, Kentucky, died, no one paid the property taxes, resulting in the issuance of multiple certificates of delinquency for unpaid taxes. Clay County sold the 2011 and 2012 tax liens to third parties: the 2011 lien was eventually assigned to Keith and Jessica Smith, and the 2012 lien was purchased by Apex Fund Services. The Smiths recorded their lien before Apex recorded its own. Both the Smiths and Apex sought to enforce their liens, and Apex initiated a foreclosure action in Clay Circuit Court, naming all lienholders and heirs as defendants. The property was ultimately sold at a master commissioner’s auction, with the Smiths purchasing it for $2,500.The Clay Circuit Court initially ruled that the Smiths’ lien had priority because it was recorded first, applying the “first in time, first in right” doctrine. The court allowed the Smiths to receive a credit against the purchase price for the amount owed to them under their lien, plus costs and attorney fees. Apex appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that all tax liens were of equal rank and that the proceeds from the sale should be distributed pro rata among all tax lienholders, including the county.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, under Kentucky statutes, tax liens held by the state, county, city, or third-party purchasers are of equal rank and are not subject to the common law “first in time, first in right” rule. Instead, when the proceeds from a foreclosure sale are insufficient to pay all tax liens and associated costs, the proceeds must be distributed pro rata among all tax lienholders. The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine the amounts owed and to distribute the proceeds accordingly. View "SMITH V. APEX FUND SERVICES AS CUSTODIAN FOR CERES TAX RECEIVABLES, LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Brandon Waddles and his three-year-old daughter, were killed in their home. The prosecution alleged that the defendant orchestrated the crime by having his girlfriend lure Waddles to the door, after which the defendant, driven to the scene by another accomplice, shot both victims. The defendant was indicted on two counts of murder, first-degree burglary, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the testimony of the accomplices, both of whom had entered plea agreements in exchange for their cooperation.The case was tried in the Jefferson Circuit Court. During the trial, after one accomplice testified, the trial judge, outside the jury’s presence but in front of the media, ordered the witness taken into custody for perjury, stating that the witness had lied under oath. This event was reported by the media, and a juror saw the report, subsequently informing the rest of the jury. During deliberations, a juror reported being unable to decide the case truthfully after learning of the arrest. The defense moved for a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion, instead excusing one juror and instructing the remaining jurors to disregard the information. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of both murders and burglary, and he was sentenced to life without parole.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial after the jury became aware that a key prosecution witness had been arrested for perjury at the judge’s direction. The court found that this extrajudicial information tainted the jury and constituted a structural error, depriving the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. The court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LAWLESS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Judy Howell suffered a work-related back injury in 1993 while employed by the Floyd County Board of Education and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, including future medical expenses. For nearly thirty years, she was prescribed Hydrocodone for pain management. In 2022, the employer sought to reopen the claim, contesting the compensability of Hydrocodone based on Kentucky’s adoption of the Official Disability Guidelines (ODG), which do not recommend long-term opioid use. Medical experts for the employer opined that Hydrocodone was not medically reasonable or necessary under the ODG, while Howell’s treating physician supported continued use.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Hydrocodone prescription non-compensable, citing the ODG and the lack of evidence showing significant benefit from continued use. The ALJ allowed for a reasonable weaning period. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed, but reasoned that applying the ODG’s presumption of non-compensability to Howell’s longstanding award was a substantive change that could not retroactively reduce her vested rights. However, the appellate court still upheld the denial of Hydrocodone because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, but clarified that the adoption of the ODG and its rebuttable presumption regarding certain treatments is a remedial, not substantive, change. The Court held that the ODG’s application does not violate due process or equal protection, nor does it retroactively impair vested rights. The main holding is that the ODG creates a rebuttable presumption regarding medical necessity, and substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Hydrocodone was not compensable for Howell’s work injury. View "HOWELL V. FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by a city in Kentucky worked a rotating schedule of 36 and 44 hours per week, but was paid for 40 hours each week without overtime for hours worked beyond 40 in a given week. After a state audit revealed the city’s payroll practices violated overtime requirements, the city issued back pay to affected employees and revised its procedures. The officer, believing the back pay was insufficient and that certain categories of compensation were miscalculated, rejected the payment and filed suit for unpaid overtime, vacation, and sick leave, as well as liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. The relevant period for the claim was limited by statute to the officer’s last three years of employment.The Bullitt Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the city liable for unpaid overtime and vacation pay, but denied liquidated damages and retirement hazardous duty pay, and initially awarded sick leave. Upon the city’s motion to amend, the trial court corrected calculation errors, eliminated the sick leave award based on a city ordinance, and reduced the overtime award. The court also awarded only $2,500 in attorney’s fees, far less than the amount requested and supported by detailed billing records. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of liquidated damages, sick leave, and retirement hazardous duty pay, but reversed and remanded for reconsideration of statutory interest and attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals in full. It held that the trial court properly amended its judgment to correct errors based on evidence presented at trial, that liquidated damages under the wage statute are discretionary when the employer acts in good faith, that statutory interest applies from the date of judgment, and that the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily reducing attorney’s fees without explanation. The case was remanded for proper calculation of interest and attorney’s fees. View "WHEELER V. CITY OF PIONEER VILLAGE, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Ava Creech, a 62-year-old woman with severe scoliosis, was found dead in her Lexington apartment in October 2020, bound and gagged in a closet. The investigation revealed that William P. Brown, who had been staying with Creech, was the last person seen with her. Evidence linked Brown to Creech’s stolen car and necklace, both of which he possessed or pawned after her disappearance. Brown’s fingerprints and DNA were found on items in the apartment, and he was later arrested in possession of Creech’s pill bottles. At trial, Brown testified, offering alternative explanations for his possession of Creech’s property and his presence in her apartment.The Fayette Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, where Brown was convicted of murder, receiving stolen property, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The jury recommended a life sentence, which the trial court imposed. Brown appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, raising several issues including prosecutorial misconduct, discovery violations, and Confrontation Clause errors.The Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose recorded jail phone calls between Brown and his sister constituted a discovery violation. The Court held that this nondisclosure may have substantially impacted Brown’s defense strategy and presentation, warranting reversal. Additionally, the Court identified errors in the prosecutor’s comments regarding Brown’s decision to testify and the admission of hearsay testimony about a Post-It note’s authorship, which violated Brown’s Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the judgment and sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court and remanded the case for a new trial. View "BROWN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of two counts of murder following the deaths of his aunt and cousin, who were found shot in the aunt’s home. The investigation revealed that the defendant had previously lived at the home, and evidence such as spent shell casings, a magazine, and drug paraphernalia was found at the scene and in his apartment. The defendant was located in California days after the murders, having left Kentucky and nearly emptied his bank account. He was apprehended and questioned by law enforcement, during which he made statements about the case.The Trigg Circuit Court conducted an eight-day trial, during which the defendant raised several objections. He challenged the inclusion of certain jurors for cause, the admission of evidence regarding prior drug use and related activities under Kentucky Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the admission of statements made after he referenced wanting a lawyer during police questioning. He also objected to the conduct of a law enforcement officer at trial, alleging that the officer’s nonverbal reactions could have influenced the jury. After the jury found him guilty and recommended life without parole, the trial court denied his motion for a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed each of the defendant’s claims. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the challenged jurors for cause, admitting the contested 404(b) evidence, or admitting the defendant’s statements made before an unequivocal request for counsel. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial based on the officer’s conduct, as there was insufficient proof of jury influence. The court further held that the cumulative error doctrine did not apply, as no individual errors were found. The judgment of the Trigg Circuit Court was affirmed. View "STINSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses, including first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, distribution of obscene material to a minor, use of a minor in a sexual performance, first-degree sexual abuse, and sixty-eight counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The charges arose from incidents in which the appellant, while babysitting two children, sexually abused an eight-year-old girl and, over a period of time, also abused a boy who lived with him. The investigation began after the girl disclosed the abuse to her mother, leading to police involvement, the seizure of the appellant’s cellphone, and the discovery of child pornography, including images of the boy.The Madison Circuit Court denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone, finding that the warrantless seizure was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was reasonable. At trial, the court admitted images of child pornography extracted from the cellphone, over the appellant’s objections regarding authentication and Confrontation Clause rights. The jury convicted the appellant on all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions. The Court held that raw, machine-extracted data from the Cellebrite forensic tool is not testimonial hearsay and does not implicate a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, as such data is not a statement by a person. The Court also found that the photographs were properly authenticated, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and there was no double jeopardy violation in convicting the appellant for both use of a minor in a sexual performance and possession of the same image. The Court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the rape conviction and found no cumulative error. View "BALDWIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A fatal motor vehicle accident occurred after a patron, Bailey, was served alcohol at two establishments, including one operated by the appellants. Bailey drove the wrong way on an interstate, resulting in a collision that killed himself and five members of the Abbas family. The Abbas family’s estates sued the restaurant operators (collectively “Roosters”) for dram shop liability and negligent training. At the time, Roosters held both a businessowners policy (BOP) and a commercial umbrella policy (CUP) with Grange Insurance Company. The BOP provided $1,000,000 in liquor liability coverage, which was undisputed. The dispute centered on whether the CUP also provided liquor liability coverage, particularly in light of an endorsement (CU 47) that replaced the liquor liability exclusion in the CUP.The Fayette Circuit Court found the language of the CUP and CU 47 ambiguous when considered alongside the BOP, reasoning that umbrella policies are intended to supplement underlying coverage. The court granted summary judgment to Roosters, holding that the CUP provided additional coverage. Grange appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding CU 47 unambiguously replaced the liquor liability exclusion and precluded coverage under the CUP. The appellate court remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment in Grange’s favor.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case de novo. It held that CU 47 unambiguously replaced the liquor liability exclusion in the CUP, leaving no basis for additional coverage. The court enforced the policy as written, declining to consider extrinsic evidence or arguments not preserved below. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the commercial umbrella policy does not provide liquor liability coverage for the claims at issue. View "GEORGETOWN CHICKEN COOP, LLC V. GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law