Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph Lee, a Louisiana resident, sought workers’ compensation benefits for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident during nonworking hours while employed at a construction project in Maysville, Kentucky. Lee was hired by W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Co. (Yates) and temporarily moved to a campground in Ohio near the job site. He was paid a daily per diem but not reimbursed for travel or housing expenses. The accident occurred when Lee was riding his motorcycle to meet a friend for dinner before his night shift.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Lee’s injuries did not occur within the course and scope of his employment, applying the “coming-and-going” rule. The Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Lee appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s decision by a 2-1 vote, finding that Lee’s injuries fell under the “traveling-employee” exception to the “coming-and-going” rule, as his presence in Kentucky was for the benefit of Yates.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirming the Board’s determination. The Court held that Lee was not a “traveling employee” at the time of the accident, as his job did not require travel once he relocated to the job site. The Court also found that Lee’s motorcycle ride to a restaurant was not in furtherance of his employer’s business interests and did not fall under the “service to the employer” exception. Therefore, Lee’s injuries were not compensable under workers’ compensation. View "W.G. YATES & SONS CONSTRUCTION CO. V. HARVEY" on Justia Law

In 2016, Thomas Raider was arrested and charged with multiple drug offenses. He was granted monitored conditional release but failed to comply with its terms, leading to his re-arrest. In 2017, Raider entered a plea agreement that included participation in Drug Court as a condition of his pretrial diversion. Despite multiple sanctions for noncompliance, Raider ultimately absconded from the program and was terminated from Drug Court in 2018. In 2022, after being taken into custody on new charges, the trial court initiated revocation proceedings for Raider's pretrial diversion without a motion from the Commonwealth.The Estill Circuit Court revoked Raider's pretrial diversion and sentenced him to five years in prison, as per his plea agreement. Raider appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the Commonwealth must file a motion to revoke pretrial diversion before the trial court can act.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case to determine whether a trial court can revoke pretrial diversion on its own initiative. The Court held that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 533.256 does not require the Commonwealth to file a motion before a trial court can revoke pretrial diversion. The Court emphasized that the trial court has the authority to notice, schedule, and conduct hearings to revoke diversion if a defendant fails to comply with the conditions of the diversion agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Estill Circuit Court's revocation of Raider's pretrial diversion and subsequent sentencing. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. RAIDER" on Justia Law

In November 2020, John Ray Williams was convicted in Graves Circuit Court for first-degree sexual abuse of his granddaughter, L.W. Shortly after his conviction, Williams sent a postcard to Leslie, his former daughter-in-law and a key witness in his trial, which contained her birth date and social security number, and included a message that Leslie found threatening. Williams was subsequently charged with retaliating against a participant in the legal process and being a first-degree persistent felony offender.The Graves Circuit Court jury found Williams guilty on both charges and recommended the maximum sentence of twenty years, which the trial court imposed. Williams appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to be informed of his prior sexual abuse conviction and that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the retaliation charge.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence of Williams' prior conviction was admissible under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b) because it was relevant to proving his retaliatory intent and was more probative than prejudicial. The court also found that the jury instructions were sufficient and that Williams' conduct threatened damage to Leslie's tangible property, satisfying the statutory requirements for a retaliation conviction. The court concluded that Williams was not entitled to a directed verdict and upheld his conviction and sentence. View "WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 1 (S.B. 1), which restructured the relationship between the Jefferson County Board of Education and its superintendent. The bill required the Board to delegate day-to-day operations to the superintendent, limited the Board's meeting frequency, and granted the superintendent additional administrative powers. The Jefferson County Board of Education filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming S.B. 1 violated Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibit local or special legislation.The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled in favor of the Board, declaring S.B. 1 unconstitutional. The court found that the bill effectively applied only to Jefferson County, thus constituting impermissible local legislation. The court also ruled, sua sponte, that S.B. 1 violated the equal protection rights of Jefferson County residents. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds of Section 59 but did not address the equal protection ruling.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that S.B. 1 did not violate Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court reasoned that the bill's language created an open classification applicable to any county with a consolidated local government, not just Jefferson County. The Court also found that the Board had standing to challenge the bill and that the superintendent was not a necessary party to the action. The Court declined to address the equal protection issue, as it was not properly raised or developed in the lower courts. View "COLEMAN V. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

John Anderson was convicted of failing to make a required disposition of property in the Hickman District Court on August 17, 2020. He failed to appear for sentencing and did not report to jail as ordered, leading to a bench warrant. Despite his fugitive status, Anderson's lawyer filed an appeal to the Hickman Circuit Court, which affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel then sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals while Anderson remained a fugitive. Anderson surrendered to custody after the Commonwealth urged the Court of Appeals to apply the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine (FDD) and deny discretionary review.The Hickman Circuit Court undertook Anderson's appeal despite his fugitive status and affirmed his conviction. Anderson's counsel sought discretionary review before the Court of Appeals, which was initially granted by the motion panel. However, the merits panel of the Court of Appeals later applied the FDD and dismissed Anderson's appeal, reasoning that Anderson sought the benefit of discretionary review while a fugitive.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the FDD should not apply to Anderson's appeal because he surrendered to custody before the Court of Appeals ruled on his motion for discretionary review. The court emphasized that the FDD is intended to prevent fugitives from benefiting from the judicial system while remaining at large, but Anderson's voluntary return to custody negated the need for the FDD's application. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of Anderson's appeal. View "ANDERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Terry Hall worked for BPM Lumber, LLC, and was terminated in 2015 after failing a drug test. In 2018, Hall filed a claim for permanent occupational disability benefits, alleging various health issues due to exposure to a mixture of hydraulic fluid and diesel fuel at work. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed Hall's claim, finding that the medical evidence did not support the work-relatedness of his conditions.Hall appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further explanation regarding the rejection of the University Evaluator’s report on Hall’s respiratory impairment. The ALJ provided additional findings on remand, again dismissing Hall's claims. Hall appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. Hall then sought review from the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s initial July 22, 2022, Order was final and appealable, precluding Hall from raising certain issues again. The court affirmed the Board’s decision on the merits of the remaining issues.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the Board’s July 22, 2022, Order was final and appealable, and Hall’s failure to appeal that order immediately precluded him from raising those issues in a subsequent appeal. The court also noted that the workers’ compensation process does not require exhaustion of all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. View "HALL V. BPM LUMBER, LLC" on Justia Law

David Vincent was stopped by Officer David Robertson of the Edmonton Police Department based on a tip from a known informant and an alleged equipment violation. The informant reported that two individuals at a gas station appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Robertson observed a vehicle with red parking lights, which he believed violated a new law that had not yet taken effect. He followed the vehicle, observed no traffic violations, and stopped it. Vincent was found to have a suspended license, and a search of the vehicle revealed drugs and paraphernalia.The Metcalfe Circuit Court denied Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, ruling that the officer's belief about the equipment violation was an objectively reasonable mistake of law. The court also found the informant's tip provided a sufficient basis for the stop. Vincent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the subsequent search was lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the stop was not justified by the equipment violation because the law had not yet taken effect, and the officer's mistake of law was not reasonable. Additionally, the informant's tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for the stop, as it was based on observations that could be explained by innocent behavior and was not corroborated by the officer's own observations. The court remanded the case for the trial court to grant Vincent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop. View "VINCENT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Apren Poore was indicted by a Whitley County Grand Jury on charges of receiving a stolen firearm, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. He entered a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, which included a "hammer clause" that stipulated a harsher sentence if he failed to appear at sentencing. Poore pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted his plea. However, Poore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing due to being detained in another county on shoplifting charges. Consequently, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment as recommended by the Commonwealth.The Whitley Circuit Court initially scheduled Poore's sentencing for April 2023, later rescheduled to May 1, 2023. Poore's counsel filed motions to withdraw as his attorney and to withdraw Poore's guilty plea, citing irreconcilable differences and Poore's admission to a rehabilitation facility. Poore failed to appear for the May 1 hearing, leading to the trial court granting the motion for counsel to withdraw but denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. A bench warrant was issued for Poore's arrest, and he was subsequently sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on June 5, 2023.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and concluded that the trial judge exercised independent discretion in sentencing Poore but improperly imposed court costs. The court affirmed the twenty-year sentence, finding no abuse of discretion in considering the hammer clause. However, it vacated the portion of the judgment imposing court costs and fees, as the installment plan did not comply with statutory requirements. View "POORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A five-year-old child tragically died after being struck by a vehicle driven by an Alltrade employee at an apartment complex owned by Whispering Brook Acquisitions LLC. Alltrade had a commercial general liability policy with Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, while Whispering Brook had a similar policy with First Specialty Insurance Corporation. Both policies contained "other insurance" provisions, which led to a dispute over which insurer was primarily responsible for covering the incident.The Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Alltrade and its employees were insured under First Specialty’s policy. The court found that the "other insurance" provisions in both policies were mutually repugnant excess clauses, meaning neither could claim to be secondary to the other. Consequently, the court ruled that both insurers shared primary liability and must contribute equally to defend and indemnify the insureds. Motorists' argument that First Specialty should be primarily liable due to an indemnification provision in the Service Agreement between Alltrade and Whispering Brook was rejected. First Specialty appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that First Specialty’s provision was a nonstandard escape clause, making Motorists primarily liable.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that both "other insurance" provisions were mutually repugnant excess clauses, requiring Motorists and First Specialty to share primary liability equally. The court also overruled the earlier decision in Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Haddix, which the Court of Appeals had relied upon. Additionally, the court found that Motorists had waived its indemnification argument by not filing a cross-appeal and requesting the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's summary judgment. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. FIRST SPECIALTY INSURANCE CORP." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (the "Cabinet") filed a petition to condemn a 30.366-acre tract of land containing subsurface coal in Floyd County for the construction of a highway. The land was part of a larger mineral parcel owned by several individuals, with Leah Atkinson holding the majority share. The owners had a coal lease with SAS Resources, LLC, which had not yet begun mining the property at the time of the condemnation.The Floyd Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the condemned property. The commissioners concluded that the property had a fair market value of $500 both before and after the condemnation. The court adopted this award, but several owners filed exceptions, leading to a trial to determine just compensation. The Cabinet sought to exclude evidence of anticipated royalty income, but the court denied this motion. At trial, the Cabinet's expert valued the property at $145,600 using a comparable sales approach, while the owners' expert valued it at over $2 million using an income capitalization approach, considering future royalty income.The jury awarded the owners $550,000 as just compensation. The Cabinet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the owners' expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the income capitalization approach was permissible.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony that considered the property's capacity to produce future royalty income. The court found that the testimony appropriately accounted for the contingencies and uncertainties of business, making it relevant and admissible. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS V. ATKINSON" on Justia Law