Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The decree dissolving the Howards' marriage provided for the joint custody of their minor child, with the Wife serving as primary residential custodian. The decree stated that the Husband was voluntarily unemployed. The trial court divided the parties' marital property and determined which marital debts each party had to pay. Fifteen months after the decree, the Husband filed a motion with the trial court seeking a reduction in his child support obligation because of a change in his material circumstances retroactive to the date of his motion. At the hearing of this motion, the Wife brought her own motions, seeking to have her ex-Husband held in contempt of court for failure to pay some of the marital debts he agreed to in the divorce decree. The court found the Husband in contempt for failing to pay the agreed-to marital debts, and denied his motion to reduce his child support. The Husband appealed all of the trial court's rulings, and the appellate court affirmed them. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on all issues.

While incarcerated in different penal systems, Appellants Joe Jones and Michael Hallum each filed RCr 11.42 motions for post-conviction relief. Following denial of these motions by the trial court, each Appellant filed a notice of appeal along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The appellate court dismissed both appeals due to each Appellant's respective failure to file the motion within the mandatory 30-day time period. Appellant Joe Jones placed his notice and motion in the prison mail system three days prior to the deadline; the motion was not filed nor the notice marked tendered until a day after the deadline. Appellant Michael Hallum placed his notice and motion in the prison mail system three days prior to the deadline; the motion was filed and notice marked tendered eight days after the deadline. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, consolidated Appellants' cases and reversed the appellate courts' decisions. State law codifies a "prison mailbox rule" in RCr 12.04(5): if an inmate files a notice of appeal in a criminal case, the notice shall be considered filed if its envelope is officially marked as having been deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. RCr 12.04(5) was not in effect at the time Jones or Hallum delivered their motions to prison officials. The Supreme Court in its reversal of the appellate courts' decisions retroactively applied the prison mailbox rule, and remanded the cases to the trial courts for further proceedings.

Appellant Douglas Hall appeals his conviction of second-degree manslaughter, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery and a sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. Contending that various errors occurred from the indictment stage through the penalty phase of trial, Appellant argues that his convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant's first-degree assault conviction due to the lower court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on facilitation of assault, but held that Appellant is not entitled to any further relief for other alleged errors as he "received a fundamentally fair trial with any [other] errors being so minor that even their cumulative effect does not demand reversal."

Appellant-Defendant Ronald Birdsong received a twelve-year sentence following a jury conviction for robbery, second-degree and first-degree persistent felony offender. At trial, Appellant did not assert an innocence defense; rather, he argued that he did not use force or threaten the use of force during the crime to any person as required by law. Appellant moved for a directed verdict; the trial court denied it. On appeal, Appellant argued that he injured no one, and his physical aggression toward inanimate objects were not a "threat to use physical force against another person." On review, the Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide whether aggression against objects is sufficient force to constitute second degree robbery. Finding it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant threatened the use of force against others, the Court upheld Appellant's convictions.