Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from an order denying its petition for a writ of prohibition where appellant sought to prohibit appellee, a Jefferson Circuit Court judge, from referring its default judgment motion to the circuit court Master Commissioner for certain factual determinations. At issue was whether appellants were entitled to a writ where appellants alleged that the Jefferson Circuit Court's routine practice of referring default judgments to the commissioner did not comport with the role of commissioners as contemplated by the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and that the Jefferson Circuit Court's alleged practice was unique among Kentucky's circuit courts and was at odds with the equal protection guarantees of both the Kentucky and United States Constitutions. The court held that appellant was not entitled to a writ prohibiting the reference to the commissioner because appellant could obtain ordinary appellate review of its objection.

Claimant alleged a work-related cumulative trauma injury to his neck and was initially awarded workers' compensation benefits on March 28, 2002. Claimant moved to reopen the award after undergoing surgery and the administrative law judge ("ALJ") rendered another award to claimant on July 19, 2004. On March 3, 2009, claimant filed a motion to reopen. At issue was whether the ALJ properly denied as untimely the claimant's motion to reopen in order to correct a mistake of law in his workers' compensation award and denied as unauthorized his motion to reopen under CR 60.01 and CR 60.02 for the correction of a clerical error in the award. The court concluded that, although KRS 342.125(1)(c) permitted an award to be reopened based on a mistake in applying the law as it existed at the time of the award, KRS 342.125(3) limited the period for such a reopening to four years after the original award or order granting or denying benefits. The court also concluded that the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings before an administrative agency only to the extent provided by regulation and neither Chapter 342 or 803 KAR 25:010 adopted Cr 60.01 or CR 60.02 with respect to workers' compensation proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant was convicted of multiple sex crimes against his daughter which occurred over the course of fifteen years. Appellant raised numerous issues on appeal. The court held that appellant's conviction on Count 6 was reversed where the Commonwealth conceded that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the rape described due to the absence of testimony that sexual intercourse had begun by that point. The court also held that all other convictions were affirmed and the case was remanded for modification and re-entry of judgment.

Appellant Troy Tunstull appeals his conviction on four counts of second-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender, for which he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant was tried on five counts of first-degree robbery in connection with five bank robberies in the Louisville area between April and October, 2006. The trial court granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on one of the five counts, and rejected his request for jury instructions to support lesser charges. The jury was ultimately instructed on lesser charges for several of the robberies, and convicted Appellant of second-degree robbery on four counts, and acquitting him of the fifth. On appeal, Appellant alleges a number of trial errors. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. View "Tunstull v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

In the underlying cases, the respective property owners failed to satisfy their debt obligations to professional lending institutions, which precipitated foreclosure proceedings. The Commonwealth intervened, seeking to block the foreclosures pending resolution of the tax liens. In both cases, the lenders brought suit to assert that their respective mortgages were superior to the general tax liens filed pursuant to the state recording statutes. Kentucky is a "race-notice" state in that a mortgage, deed or deed of trust takes effect at the time it is recorded. In both cases, the tax liens superseded the lenders' liens; but the lenders argued that state law provided super priority for ad valorem taxes, not general tax liens, therefore their purchase money mortgages superseded the Commonwealth's liens. Disagreeing with the lenders' characterization of the tax liens, the Supreme Court held that the tax liens took priority over the lenders' liens, and should be afforded no special priority.

Appellant Prince Wilbert Woolfolk was convicted of first-degree rape. On the jury's recommendation, he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. In 1984, the victim was seventeen years old and an active member in her church's choir. On the date of the crime, the victim learned from her mother that Appellant, the pastor of the church, had called to say he would pick her up from school and take her to church, presumably for a choir activity. According to the victim, Appellant took her to his office and raped her. Twenty-three years later, the victim attempted suicide. Believing that the rape may have played a part in the attempt, the victim's mother contacted police about the 1984 incident. On investigation, Appellant admitted to police that a sexual encounter with the victim occurred. In 2008, Appellant was indicted for first-degree rape. During a lunch break at trial, Appellant's defense counsel conferred to discuss how to best cross-examine the victim about her claim; to counsel's surprise, and contrary to all prior statements Appellant had made on the subject, Appellant told his counsel he raped the victim. Counsel became concerned on his ethical duty to the court should Appellant take the stand and deny the rape. Counsel contacted the Kentucky Bar Association and requested an ex parte in camera conference with the court. Counsel moved the court to order a competence examination of Appellant, and to delay proceedings pending such an examination. The court denied both requests. On appeal, Appellant claims: that the trial court erred by discouraging Appellant from exercising his constitutional right to testify; that the trial court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation; and that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial because of the twenty-four year lapse of time between the crime and the bringing of the indictment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing; and though constitutional error occurred in the trial court's effort to discourage Appellant from testifying falsely, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the lower court's conviction and sentence.

The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed a decision in which the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Appellant's work-related injury was only partially disabling. The appellate court denied Appellant's motion for an enlargement of time in which to file a petition for review. The court rejected Appellant's argument that CR 76.25 permits time for filing a petition for review to be enlarged before it expires. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter back to the appellate court, holding that CR 76.25 "serves two functions. It is both the document for invoking the court's jurisdiction to consider an appeal, and the document for stating the petitioner's grounds for seeking appellate relief."

Carol Forte taught elementary school in the Nelson County Public School System. She was killed as she was leaving the school grounds when an unsecured pole gate blown by the wind hit her car and struck her in the head. Her husband Gene first filed a tort claim in the Nelson Circuit Court against the County Board of Education. Being aware of the Board's defense of governmental immunity, Forte filed a "protective" claim with the Board of Claims, raising the same issues in his tort action in the circuit court, asking the Board of Claims to hold its action in abeyance until the circuit court decided on the immunity issue. The Board of Education responded to the claims by arguing that the Board of Claims had sole jurisdiction in the matter, and that the action was time barred and should be dismissed. Forte then filed a new action in the circuit court for review of the Board of Claims order, asking that that order be set aside. Before a response was filed, Forte filed a supplemental memorandum specifically raising the state "saving statute." The Board of Education responded with the same arguments it made before the Board of Claims. The circuit court entered an opinion vacating the Board of Claims order, and remanding the matter back the Board of Claims for a decision on the abeyance. The Board of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. After the appeal was filed, the circuit court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment on the grounds it had governmental immunity. On review of the record of the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that the Board of Claims did not have jurisdiction over the claim brought before it, and Forte's claim made there was premature. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision on that matter and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court affirmed the appellate court's affirmation of the motion for summary judgment acknowledging its governmental immunity.

Paul and Pat Nash own twenty-eight acres in Campbell County. Clifford and Toby Torline own thirty-five acres. Both Nash and Torline wished to divide their parcels into tracts of five or more acres each for agricultural uses. Nash and Torline see the five-acre plots as mini-farms, but the County views the plots as residential subdivisions with large lots. The County Clerk petitions the court for guidance as to whether or not he should accept the deeds of the five-acre divisions for recording. The County maintains that two of its ordinances prohibit any division until the property owners prove to the Planning Commission that the divisions were for agricultural purposes. Nash and Torline take exception to having the burden placed on them, and argue that the County must prove the divisions were not exempt from subdivision regulations. The trial court agreed with Nash and Torline, and held that the County's ordinances violated the agricultural supremacy clause and were therefore unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed the lower court and ordered summary judgment on behalf of the County. The Supreme Court accepted discretionary review, affirmed in part the lower court's decision, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the County. The Court found that the five-acre plots were subdivisions that required planning commission approval before recording.

Appellant GMAC Mortgage Corporation, through its attorneys Appellants Morgan & Potter, Attorneys, P.S.C. filed a disciplinary complaint against Appellee Noel Botts. Botts had represented GMAC's successor-in-interest in a foreclosure action. The trial commissioner conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately determined that the Kentucky Bar Association failed to prove by a preponderance, that Botts committed any of the acts or omissions charged. The Board of Governors accepted the trial commissioner's determination, and charges against Botts were ultimately dismissed. Subsequently Botts filed suit against GMAC and Morgan & Pottinger in circuit court, requesting relief from pecuniary and professional harm he allegedly suffered as a result of the disciplinary complaint. In his suit, Botts alleged wrongful use of civil proceedings, defamation and slander, abuse of process, fraud and outrageous conduct. Appellants filed numerous motions to dismiss based on claims of immunity, all of which were denied. Because Appellants claimed immunity as the basis for their motions, the order is appealable. Because the claim raises an issue of statewide importance, the Supreme Court granted Morgan & Pottinger's motion to transfer. State law holds that any statement made in the institution of, or during the course of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, is privileged so long as it is material, pertinent and relevant to that proceeding. Even if it patently fails or is entered with malice, the Kentucky "judicial statements" privilege is absolute and would still apply. The Court noted that Botts' allegations of wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process, fraud and outrageous conduct are not based singly on Appellants' statements contained in the Bar Association complaint, but also on the act of filing the complaint. Whether the "judicial statements" privilege encompasses the act of filing the complaint is a matter of first impression. The Court decided that any communication or statement made to the Bar Association during the course of a disciplinary hearing or investigation, including the contents of the complaint initiating such proceedings, are absolutely privileged and extend to the act of filing the complaint. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for additional fact finding to address the basis of Botts' claims for fraud, defamation and slander.