Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jason Lee Mullikan was convicted of several crimes, including wanton endangerment for chasing two men with a Samurai sword. Mullikan raised nine grounds on appeal, and the Supreme Court only found one had merit, the issue of whether testimony in the penalty phase describing facts and circumstances underlying Mullikan's prior convictions was unduly prejudicial and merited a new penalty phase. After acknowledging that it had previously failed to provide a discernable and workable rule of law to follow when introducing evidence of prior crimes at the sentencing stage, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of prior convictions allowable under Kan. Rev. Stat. 532.055(a) is limited to conveying to the jury the elements of the crimes previously committed. Therefore, the Court held that the evidence in this case at the penalty phase was unduly prejudicial because it was not only inadmissible hearsay, but went beyond the statutory language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055(2)(a). The Court affirmed the convictions but remanded for a sentencing trial consistent with this opinion. View "Mullikan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the 1979 robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. Appellant pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Kan. Rev. Stat 422.285 in the circuit court. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion for release of evidence for independent testing, finding that it did not have the authority to grant DNA testing that exceeds the limitations of the statute. On appeal, Appellant sought additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below, or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Supreme Court concluded that (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, but (2) the circuit court erred in reading its power to order certain DNA testing to be limited by statute. The Court also found that Commonwealth's cross-appeal on several issues to be without merit. For those reasons, the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant William Meece appealed from a judgment of the circuit court sentencing him to consecutive twenty-year terms of confinement on two convictions of robbery and burglary and to death for each of three convictions for murder. Meece sought review of forty-five listed issues, some of which were either not raised in the lower court or were not preserved for review. However, where the death penalty was imposed, the Supreme Court reviewed allegations for those quasi errors. The Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the circuit court, holding in part that (1) there was no abuse of discretion regarding the evidence admitted at trial; (2) there was no abuse of discretion regarding excluded evidence; (3) the procedural issues during trial raised by Meece did not involve an abuse of discretion; (4) the trial court's jury instructions were not erroneous and the trial court did not err in connection with the penalty phase instructions; (5) the death penalty is constitutional and appropriate in Meece's case; and (6) Meece received a fair trial and there was no cumulative effect that mandated reversal. View "Meece v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Nathan McDaniel, Jr. was convicted of murder arising from a beating death. During the trial, Appellant moved to strike two jurors for cause. One juror had worked with the victim's wife and the other juror had worked with the victim, and neither juror could say unequivocally that they could be fair and impartial in their deliberations. Appellant's motion was denied. The defense then used one of its peremptory strikes to strike the jurors. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to strike the jurors for cause. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (1) a trial court abuses its discretion when it seats a juror who is truly equivocal with regard to his or her ability to render an impartial judgment; and (2) given the equivocal responses provided by both jurors in this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant's motion to strike for cause. View "McDaniel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether to adopt the "economic loss rule," which prevents the commercial purchaser of a product from suing in tort to recover for the economic losses arising from the malfunction of the product itself. The case involved a claim to insurers for a damaged piece of machinery. The insurers sued the manufacturers to recover the amount paid, claiming several causes of action including negligence, strict liability, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court held the economic loss rule barred the tort claims. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's adoption and application of the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the economic loss rule applies to claims arising from a defective product sold in a commercial transaction, and that the relevant product is the entire item bargained for by the parties and placed in the stream of commerce by the manufacturer; and (2) the economic loss rule applies regardless of whether the product fails over a period of time or destroys itself in a calamitous event, and the rule's application is not limited to negligence and strict liability claims but also encompasses negligent misrepresentation claims. View "Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers" on Justia Law

Roger Elliott, who served as a district court judge for almost twenty-five years and who was a member of the Senior Status Judge Program, was indicted on one count of theft of labor already rendered. Elliott entered an Alford plea to the charge. The circuit court entered an order granting Elliott a pretrial diversion. The judicial conduct commission then issued an order of public reprimand. As a condition of the reprimand, Elliott agreed to resign from the judge program and not seek to re-enter it. As a follow-up to resolve the temporary suspension of his bar license, Elliott and the office of bar counsel agreed to a negotiated sanction. Elliott requested that the Supreme Court enter an order suspending him from the practice of law for two years with one year probated and one year to serve, effective from the date of the order, on conditions that Elliott continue compliance with the terms and provisions of his pretrial diversion contract and that he incur no new disciplinary charges during the probationary period. The Court concluded that the sanctions were appropriate. View "Elliott v. Ky. Bar Assoc." on Justia Law

Appellant Sarah Dudley filed suit against real parties in interest Erdagon Atasoy, M.D., and Kleinert Kutz and Associates for alleged negligent diagnosis, care, and treatment related to Dudley's adverse reaction to an injection in her shoulder. In a discovery request, the real parties in interest sought appellant's medical records, including her psychiatric records. Appellant filed a motion for a protective order to prevent her psychiatric records from being subject to discovery. Judge Olu Stevens denied appellant's motion, finding that her physical and mental condition was at the heart of her claims. Appellant then filed for a writ of prohibition against Judge Stevens to prevent the discovery of her psychiatric records. The court of appeals denied appellant's petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that her records were subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Ky. R. Evid. 507(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellant waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege because she asserted her mental condition as part of her claim and that Judge Stevens did not err by denying appellant's motion for a protective order. View "Dudley v. Jefferson Circuit Court (Stevens)" on Justia Law

Appellant Adam Barker was found guilty in the circuit court of manslaughter in the second degree. Barker appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a provocation qualifier of the self-defense instruction because there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. The Supreme Court failed to reach the merits of Barker's argument because the Court found the language of the provocation instruction constituted palpable error in this case. According to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.060(2), a person forfeits his right to the defense of self-protection when the defendant has the intention of causing death or serious physical injury to the victim and the defendant actually provokes the victim to use physical force. Because the instruction given in this case required the victim, Zachary Scarpellini, or the victim's friend, Shawn Reilly, to have had the intent to cause death or serious injury to Barker, the instruction was fatally flawed as it failed to properly set out the elements of the statute. The Court held that because there was a substantial possibility there would have been a different verdict with a proper instruction, a manifest injustice occurred. The Court reversed Barker's conviction for manslaughter and remanded the case. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a mother of an infant child, appealed a decision denying her petition for a writ of prohibition where she sought the writ to bar appellee from proceeding with the adjudication of an action filed in family court by real party in interest, C.H.E., to determine the paternity of the child. At issue was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought under KRS Chapter 406 to establish the paternity of a child born to a married woman and conceived while she maintained sexual relations with her husband. The court held that the allegations of C.H.E.'s pleadings were supported as a preliminary matter by evidence that satisfied the jurisdictional threshold of KRS Chapter 406 and vested him with standing as a putative father under KRS 406.021 with the right to plead and an opportunity to prove that he was the father of the child. The court also held that the trial court was acting within its subject matter jurisdiction and properly denied appellant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition.

Appellant appealed a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR 60.02 when he was convicted of killing and robbing two victims. At issue was whether a special judge was unconstitutionally appointed to preside over his case and alternatively, appellant was not given proper notice of the appointment. Also at issue was whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel and in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel. Further at issue was whether there were reasons of an extraordinary nature to justify post-conviction relief under CR 60.02. The court held that the chief justice properly delegated his appointive authority as it related to the Senior Status Judge Program to a chief senior status judge and the chief senior status judge properly exercised his authority in appointing the senior status judge. Because the court fully considered the constitutional issue raised by appellant and he obtained the relief he requested under his lack of notice argument, the court did not reverse the judgment merely upon lack of notice. The court also held that the trial court properly denied appellant's claim based upon the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel where appellant was barred from prosecuting his claim under CR 60.02. The court also declined to revisit the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel of RCr 11.42 counsel in light of Hollon v. Commonwealth. The court further held that, upon the merits, appellant was not entitled to CR 60.02 relief on the remaining grounds of his motion where the CR 60.02 motion was an impermissible successive RCr 11.42 motion.