Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jeremy Lawton was convicted of escape in the second degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charge of second-degree escape, (2) whether the instruction for second-degree escape was flawed and constituted palpable error, and (3) whether the evidence presented supported an instruction for third-degree escape. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals on the issues of the motion for directed verdict and the instruction for third-degree escape, but (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for second-degree escape because an essential element was missing from the jury instruction for second-degree escape such that it actually established a different, uncharged crime, and therefore, the instruction constituted palpable error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Lawton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Charles Rawlings suffered injuries as he was rolling straps beside his tractor-trailer while it was being unloaded. Thirteen months after the accident, Rawlings filed an action against Defendants, his employer and the companies involved in loading and unloading the trailer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the action based on the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.140(1)(a). The court of appeals reversed, applying the two-year statute of limitations in the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. At issue on appeal was whether Rawlings was in fact unloading his truck at the time of the accident, which would determine whether the one- or two-year statute of limitations applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rawlings's activity in releasing the straps and rolling them qualified him as a participant in the unloading process; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly applied the one-year personal injury statute of limitations found in section 413.140(1)(a). Remanded. View "Interlock Indus., Inc. v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Christopher Chavies of manufacturing methamphetamine, receipt of stolen property, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Chavies was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld Chavies's convictions and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Chavies's motions to suppress evidence seized during a search of his vehicle; (2) the trial court did not err by denying a directed verdict for the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of Chavies's amended and dismissed charges in the penalty phase of the trial, but the erroneous introduction of the charges did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding and therefore did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Chavies v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a motion to hold Renee Ivy in contempt after Ivy fell behind in her child support payments. At the hearing on the motion, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income was a federal benefit under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). The trial court reduced Ivy's support obligation and held her in contempt for having failed to pay the past due amount. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the contempt finding and the order to pay even reduced child support could not stand because evidence showed Ivy did not have the ability to pay. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' decision to the extent that it suggested that a SSI recipient-parent's present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support; (2) vacated the existing order and remanded for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be unjust or inappropriate pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.211(2); and (3) affirmed the holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate here where there was essentially uncontroverted evidence that Ivy's failure to provide child support stemmed only from her inability to do so. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Ivy" on Justia Law

Appellant Peter Bard was charged with murder but was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. Appellant was involuntarily institutionalized for treatment for a total of 1,449 days while he was charged. After he had regained competency, Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter. The circuit court imposed a twenty-year sentence after addressing Appellant's presentencing custody credit, which was calculated at 3,086 days. Six years later, Appellant was released from custody but reincarcerated after the Department of Corrections (Department) discovered the alleged error in the calculation of Appellant's custody credit and concluded that Appellant should not have been discharged. The circuit court judge then approved and signed an amended time credit sheet prepared by the Department that reduced Appellant's presentencing custody credit to 1,449 days. Appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court deem the judgment against him satisfied. The court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to modify Appellant's presentencing custody credit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Appellant in the trial court's sentence because the alleged error in this case was judicial. View "Bard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose from a consolidated appeal. In the underlying cases, the respective property owners failed to satisfy their debt obligations to professional lending institutions, which precipitated the foreclosure proceedings. In both cases, the professional lenders asserted that their respective mortgages were superior to the general tax liens filed pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 134.420(2). The circuit court entered a judgment granting the professional lenders' liens priority over the other liens. The court of appeals determined that the circuit court had erred in reordering the priorities and reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) the prior-recorded section 134.420(2) tax liens enjoyed priority pursuant to the long established first-to-file doctrine; and (2) the doctrine of equitable subrogation does not act to relieve a professional lender of a negligent title examination. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions. View "York v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ronny Walker was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a participant in the legal process, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of Walker's entire interrogation video, including Walker's statements to an investigator and the investigator's questions and comments, did not amount to palpable error in the absence of specific objections; (2) the trial court did not palpably err in advising the jurors prior to the attorneys' opening statements how the jurors might go about assessing the credibility of witnesses; and (3) the burglary instruction did not allow for a non-unanimous verdict. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Linvil Turpin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Turpin contended that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to his offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence meted out in the case did not run afoul of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as it was within the range authorized by the General Assembly for three-time offenders and was neither so long as to be deemed extreme nor so harsh in the context of a third offense as to be deemed grossly disproportionate. View "Turpin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Scott Stanton pled guilty to first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Staton's guilty plea, in which he admitted anal intercourse with his stepson, was conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two statements he gave to law enforcement officers. Stanton maintained that the officers coerced him to make the incriminating statements by representing that his two children could be removed from the family home pursuant to a court order if he failed to cooperate with the investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found from the totality of the circumstances that Stanton was not coerced to make the challenged statements. View "Stanton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law