Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Williams pled guilty to possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and loitering. Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the handgun seized from him, asserting that it was the product of an unconstitutional stop and patdown of his person. When police detained Williams, he was among a group of nine people, some of whom the police observed openly engaging in illegal drug activity and some of whom police found in possession of handguns. Williams argued that the group's activities did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity particularized to him to justify a Terry detention. The trial court denied Williams' motion to suppress, finding that Williams was part of a distinct group whose conduct aroused sufficient reasonable suspicion for the officers to detain Williams. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on Williams's suppression motion, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings; and (2) the Terry stop was constitutional because police had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity among the group that justified an investigatory stop of its members. View "Williams v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Stinnett was convicted of murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly failed to dismiss the kidnapping charge pursuant to the kidnapping exemption statute even though the court's analysis in refusing to apply the exemption was flawed; (2) properly instructed the jury on the crime of intentional murder; (3) properly denied Appellant's request to remove his attorneys and allowed him to represent himself; (4) properly denied Appellant's request to compel the attendance at trial of an out-of-state witness, a psychologist who had previously examined Appellant; and (5) did not abuse its discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to use a letter written by Appellant's prior attorney because the letter did not violate the attorney-client privilege, and the hearsay testimony elicited from counsel was harmless error. View "Stinnett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Appellant unsuccessfully sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence at both the state and federal levels. Appellant then pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Ky. Rev. Stat. 422.285 in the circuit court. Appellant came before the Supreme Court seeking additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Commonwealth cross-appealed as to several issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the circuit court, holding (1) the Commonwealth's cross-appeal was without merit; and (2) although Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, the circuit court erred in reading its power to order independent DNA testing to be limited by statute. Remanded. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Jefferson County District Court Judges and Trial Commissioners petitioned the Supreme Court to review Judicial Ethics Opinion JE-212, in which the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary determined that a judge's staff attorney or law clerk could not be appointed to the additional position of trial commissioner even if the time spent in each position would be separately accounted for, or if the staff attorney/law clerk did not work on anything she had worked on as a trial commissioner, and vice versa. The Supreme Court vacated the Opinion, holding (1) in this case there was no violation of the trial commissioner's ethical requirement to give first place to his judicial duties because the position of a trial commissioner is part-time; and (2) although there is a potential appearance of impropriety where a district court trial commissioner also serves as a staff attorney for a court of the same judicial district, the limited situations in which this may arise does not justify the blanket exclusion of all judicial staff attorneys from serving as trial commissioners. View "Dist. Court Judges & Trial Comm'rs v. Ethics Comm." on Justia Law

Travelers Insurance Company brought suit in circuit court alleging that Blackstone Mining Company had underpaid premiums under two separate workers' compensation policies issued by Travelers. Blackstone counterclaimed, alleging that it had overpaid the premiums due under the policies and was entitled to a refund. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Blackstone. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the court of appeals incorrectly applied well-established burden of proof principles applicable to summary judgment motions; and (2) the circuit court correctly determined that Blackstone was entitled to summary judgment. View "Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a surgery at University Hospital, Jennifer Beglin passed away. Appellee, Michael Beglin, brought suit against the Hospital. A jury found that the Hospital, through its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the death of Jennifer. The trial court then entered judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly gave a missing evidence instruction in connection with the unexplained disappearance with an occurrence report because (i) the trier of fact is entitled to such an instruction when it may be reasonably believed that material evidence within the exclusive control of a party was lost without explanation, and the trier of fact may find that the evidence was intentionally and in bad faith destroyed or concealed by the party possessing it, and (ii) the instruction did not unduly affect the general verdict or punitive damages award; but (2) the trial court erred by giving a punitive damages instruction under the circumstances in this case. Remanded. View "Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Beglin" on Justia Law

Shannon Straub was arrested by a police officer, who took her to a hospital emergency department for examination. After Straub became combative, hospital personnel physically restrained Straub, gowned her, applied restraints, drew blood, and extracted a urine sample. After suing unsuccessfully in federal court, Straub brought an action in the state trial court against Defendants, the emergency room doctor, the hospital, its employees, the police officer, and the city. In her complaint, Straub alleged that Defendants violated her rights under the Kentucky Constitution and asserted various common law tort claims. The trial court dismissed before trial Straub's claims that the hospital defendants deprived Straub of her due process interests under the Kentucky Constitution. After a trial, a jury returned a verdict for all Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether an individual can bring a civil action for money damages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 on the basis of an alleged violation of a provision of the Kentucky Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that section 446.070 does not provide money damages for alleged violations of the state Constitution. View "St. Luke Hosp. v. Straub" on Justia Law

In this dissenters' rights action, Shareholder in a closely held corporation withdrew from Company, after which Company tendered to Shareholder $703 per share, equaling $168,840. Shareholder claimed that the fair value of her shares was three times as much. Company sought an appraisal, and the Master Commissioner valued Brown's interest at $353,633. The trial court adopted the Commissioner's report, and both parties appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of the fair value of Shareholder's shares without reference to Company's net asset value and without any discount for lack of marketability. At issue on appeal was what constituted "fair value" under Subtitle 13 of Kentucky's Business Corporation Act. The Supreme Court agreed that the fair value standard applied in this case was erroneous but on partially different grounds, holding (1) "fair value" is the shareholder's proportionate interest in the value of the company as a whole; (2) any valuation recognized in the business appraisal field, including the net asset method employed in this case, can be appropriate in valuing a given business; and (3) when valuing dissenter's shares, the shareholder-level marketability discount is rejected. View "Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant Sean Noakes was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant was not entitled to a complete acquittal on the murder charge, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including the language of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 504.020(2) in its insanity instruction; (3) because Appellant tendered the first-degree manslaughter instruction based on extreme emotional disturbance, Appellant was barred from arguing it as a basis on this appeal to reverse his conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct throughout the trial. View "Noakes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were awarded joint custody of their two children by the family court. The original divorce decree provided that if either party relocated to a different country or state, the parties would move for an order of modification. The children resided primarily with Mother. When Mother sought to relocate and filed a motion to modify the parents' parenting time, the family court judge ruled that the decree would be modified so the children would live primarily with Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the family court's order failed to reflect any consideration of the factors set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 403(2) relating to custody determinations. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed with respect to the inadequacy of the order because of its failure to include written findings in support of its custody determination; (2) concluded that adequate findings were made from the family court bench; but (3) further remanded with specific directions for the entry of a new order that complies with the Court's recent decision in Anderson v. Johnson, which requires that trial court opinions affecting child custody state the court's findings in support of its decision in writing. View "Keifer v. Keifer " on Justia Law