Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Mother and Father were the natural parents of Child. Child was removed from home in 2004 and committed to the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Human Services after an abuse petition was filed. The district court adjudicated that physical abuse and neglect had occurred. Child was returned to his parents' home on certain conditions but was later removed. The district court once again adjudicated that Child had been physically abused. At a termination hearing, the trial court declined to terminate parental rights to the child, finding that the Cabinet had not met its burden of proving that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of Child and that there was no evidence Child would be abused in the future. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision; and (2) in reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. View "D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Claimant filed an application for workers' compensation, alleging injuries while working for Employer as a roofer. Having become a party because Employer was uninsured, the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) denied the claim and stated that claimant's average weekly rate was unknown. Claimant asserted that his average weekly wage must be calculated under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(1)(e) because he had worked for less than thirteen weeks when the injury occurred. The ALJ applied section 342.140(1)(e) and determined that Claimant's weekly wage was $400 per week. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the average weekly rate calculation because the record contained insufficient evidence to apply section 342.140(1)(e) properly. The Board then remanded the claim for additional proceedings to include the taking of additional proof. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its authority under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.285(2)(c) by remanding the claim in order to provide Claimant with a second opportunity to meet his burden of proof. View "Commonwealth, Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Citizen Plaintiffs gave notice of their intent to sue Frasure Creek Mining and another coal mining company pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. At the close of the statutory sixty-day notice period, the state Energy and Environment Cabinet brought an enforcement action against Frasure Creek and thus invoked the statutory bar to Plaintiffs' suit. Together with its complaint, the Cabinet filed a proposed consent judgment. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiffs' motion to intervene to allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to voice their objections to the proposed consent judgment. The Cabinet and Frasure Creek sought extraordinary relief against the circuit court, petitioning the court of appeals for writs forbidding the intervention and compelling entry of the consent judgment. They argued that the trial court's intervention order ran counter both to jurisdictional limits imposed by Congress and to state law rules and standards for granting intervention and approving consent judgments. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was proceeding within its jurisdiction and that the Cabinet and Frasure Creek had an adequate remedy by appeal for the errors they alleged. View "Commonwealth, Energy & Env't Cabinet v. Circuit Court (Shepherd)" on Justia Law

After Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services found Appellee Patrick O'Conner's children in filth, unsanitary living conditions, and misery in Appellee's home, Appellee was indicted by a grand jury for three counts of first-degree criminal abuse. Specifically, the grand jury charged that Appellee intentionally abused his three children, each of which were under the age of twelve at the time, by placing them in a situation that could have caused physical injury or which was cruel confinement or cruel punishment. Appellee was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed, declaring there was insufficient evidence to indicate that Appellee's criminal actions were intentional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals did not properly defer to the jury its proper fact-finding role in this case, as the jury had sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that Appellee was guilty of first-degree criminal abuse. Remanded for reinstatement of the trial order and judgment. View "Commonwealth v. O'Conner" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Appellant Raymond Clutter was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and was found to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Clutter appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it permitted a witness to testify about information provided by Clutter's then-attorney in pre-trial discussions with a law enforcement agent for the Commonwealth, arguing that the information constituted statements made during plea discussions and thus was inadmissible under Ky. R. Evid. 410(4). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, as Rule 410(4) did not apply to bar the admission of the testimony. View "Clutter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Patricia Buster entered a conditional guilty plea to four counts of complicity to first-degree rape. Appellant's conditional guilty plea preserved her right to appeal the adverse ruling of the trial court on her motion to suppress her written confession given to police officers. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress and vacated her conviction, holding that Appellant did not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, as the police officers did not respect Appellant's invocation of her rights under the analysis set forth in Michigan v. Mosley. Remanded so that Appellant could withdraw her guilty plea. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant Derryl Blane guilty of several drug-related offenses and of being a first-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more, holding that the trial court erred when, after granting Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in marijuana within 1,000 yards of a school, it permitted the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to trafficking in marijuana, eight ounces or more; (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree PFO as to Count I of the indictment, as the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count I were incapable of being proved; (3) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions; and (4) remanded for a new penalty phase, as the penalty phase introduction of the original dismissed charges from Appellant's prior convictions was erroneous. View "Blane v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellees conducted a renovation project near Appellant's place of work. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, alleging that Appellees negligently caused her to have occupational asthma and other injuries arising out of the renovation work. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, after which Appellants filed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). The trial court granted the motion and then "re-granted" summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals granted Appellees' motions to dismiss Appellant's appeal as untimely, finding that the trial court improperly granted Appellant's Rule 60.02 motion, and thus, the appeal became untimely because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal ran from the initial summary judgments rather than the latter summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a Rule 60.02 order granted under subsections (a)-(e), such as this one, may be considered in a motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Rule 60.02 relief to Appellant. Remanded for consideration of the merits of the summary judgment rulings. View "Younger v. Evergreen Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After Michael Beglin's wife, Jennifer, died during surgery at University Hospital, Michael sued the hospital. The jury found that the hospital, through its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the death of Jennifer and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Michael. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment awarding compensatory damages and determined that the trial court properly gave a missing evidence instruction, but (2) vacated the punitive damages award, holding that the trial court erred in giving a punitive damages instruction under the circumstances of this case, and the court of appeals erred in affirming the judgment for punitive damages. Remanded for entry of a new judgment. View "Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Beglin" on Justia Law

Appellant, TECO Mechanical Contractor, Inc., filed a complaint and petition for declaration of rights against the Labor Cabinet, asserting that Kentucky's prevailing wage law (1) violated due process by authorizing the Cabinet to assess back wages and civil penalties without a hearing; and (2) failed to specify how workers should be classified and, as a result, improperly delegated legislative or judicial authority to the Cabinet. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Cabinet, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law did not violate the state or federal Constitutions, as (1) TECO failed to establish that the Cabinet's actions under the prevailing wage law deprived it of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause; and (2) the law prescribes sufficient standards to prevent the Cabinet from abusing any legislative or judicial authority granted to it under the prevailing wage law. View "Teco Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law