Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1988, Gregory Wilson was convicted of, inter alia, murder and kidnapping and received the death sentence. In 2010, Wilson moved the trial court to prohibit execution of the death sentence because of his mental retardation and to compel DNA testing of hairs and semen found in the victim's automobile and used by the prosecution in his trial. The trial court denied both motions without holding an evidentiary hearing on either motion. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's ruling on Wilson's motion denying DNA testing of the hairs; (2) vacated the trial court's order to the extent that it failed to rule on whether Wilson was entitled to DNA testing of the semen and remanded this issue to the trial court for a ruling; and (3) vacated the trial court's ruling on the mental retardation motion and remanded this issue to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Wilson was exempt from execution because he was a mentally retarded offender. View "Wilson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(6) entitled UPS Airlines to receive credit against its liability under section 342.730(1) for the payment of loss of license benefits that were the product of a collective bargaining agreement between UPS Airlines and the Independent Pilots Association (IPA), of which Claimant was a member. Claimant, a UPS pilot, sustained a work-related injury and underwent surgery. UPS paid the entire premium for the loss of license insurance plan. UPS subsequently sought leave to credit Claimant's loss of license benefits against its liability for income benefits. Reversing an ALJ's decision, the workers' compensation board found that section 342.730(6) did not entitle UPS to a dollar-for-dollar credit against Claimant's past due and future income benefits for all benefits paid under the loss of license plan. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed to the extent that UPS was not entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit; but (2) reversed with respect to the conclusion that loss of license benefits were not funded exclusively by the employer for the purposes of section 342.730(6) because they were bargained-for benefits, holding that section 342.730(6) does not entitle UPS to credit the overpayment of voluntary benefits against future income benefits. Remanded. View "UPS Airlines v. West" on Justia Law

William Louis Rogers was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance and one count of possessing a controlled substance. The charges for which Rogers was indicted - three counts of trafficking - arose after he twice allegedly sold small amounts of cocaine to a confidential informant and after police, acting pursuant to a search warrant, found more cocaine and drug paraphernalia secreted in his garage. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by denying Rogers' motion to suppress the garage evidence as the fruit of an illegal search; (2) by refusing to sever the trafficking charge based on the garage evidence from those based on the alleged sales to the confidential informant; and (3) by limiting Rogers' cross-examination of a forensic chemist, who tested various seized items for the presence of cocaine. View "Rogers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Daniel Newman was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and one count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse. The jury recommended a life sentence for each of the sodomy convictions, and Appellant was sentenced in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (a) the trial court did not err by introducing other crimes evidence, and (b) questions by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Appellant were improper but did not rise to the level of palpable error; but (2) vacated Appellant's life sentence, holding that the jury was improperly instructed as to the sentencing range. Remanded for a new penalty phase. View "Newman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case presented the question of whether the doctrine of equitable subrogation may be used to reorder the priority of a mortgage lien where the mortgage holder had constructive but not actual knowledge of a pre-existing lien when it paid off an earlier mortgage as part of a refinancing deal and there was no fraud or other misconduct that would have prevented the discovery of the lien. The trial court applied the doctrine to reorder the priority of liens. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the doctrine did not apply under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because equitable subrogation is not available to a lienholder who has actual or constructive knowledge of a preexisting lien, the court of appeals was correct in concluding that the remedy was not available to the mortgage holder. View "Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Appellant Lloyd Hammond was convicted by a jury of three counts of murder, one count of first-degree burglary, one count of first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and retaliating against a participant in the legal process. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) Appellant was deprived of a fair trial when one of the murder charges was improperly joined for trial with the other charges; and (2) admission of hearsay statements of a material witness under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was not based upon substantial evidence. Remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. View "Hammond v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, an ALJ determined that injuries Claimant sustained in an automobile accident while returning to Kentucky from yearling sales held in New York came within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. Gaines Gentry appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by awarding benefits because Claimant's injury was not work-related under the dual purpose, positional risk, or traveling employee doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ reasonably found that Gaines Gentry instructed Claimant to travel to New York in a van with its yearlings in order to attend to them; and (2) the ALJ properly concluded under he circumstances that an accident that occurred while Claimant was returning to Kentucky to resume his usual duties for Gaines Gentry was work-related. View "Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds, LLC v. Mandujano" on Justia Law

The family court granted the petition of Appellant, Samantha Daugherty, and issued a domestic violence order (DVO) against Appellee, John Telek, to remain in effect for three years. Telek appealed. The court of appeals held that the family court lost jurisdiction to issue the DVO because it failed to conduct the DVO hearing within fourteen days after the issuance of an emergency protective order as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.740(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court did not lack jurisdiction to issue the DVO and that it properly followed statutory requirements for the issuance of the DVO. Remanded. View "Daugherty v. Telek" on Justia Law

After serving eighteen months as the superintendent of Bourbon County public schools, Appellant Arnold Carter transferred into the position of consultant to the school district pursuant to an "exit strategy." The details of Carter's resignation and consulting contract were discussed and determined in a closed session during a meeting of the Bourbon County Board of Education. Appellee Jamie Smith, a parent and concerned citizen, challenged the Board's actions as violative of Kentucky's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court found Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.801(1)(f) permitted the Board's closed session discussion of Carter's resignation but not its discussion of Carter's consulting contract and consequently voided the consulting contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Board violated the Act when it discussed Carter's resignation and consulting contract in closed session; and (2) Carter's consulting contract was voidable as a matter of law and was properly voided by the circuit court. View "Carter v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Bowling petitioned for a declaratory judgment seeking to challenge the implementation of his two twenty-two year-old death sentences upon the grounds that he was mentally retarded. Appellant had previously challenged his sentences upon the same grounds, and the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant had procedurally defaulted by waiver any challenge to his death sentences upon the grounds of mental retardation because he failed to raise the issue at trial, on direct appeal, or in any of his subsequent collateral attacks on his judgment on sentence. In the instant case, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) it was the law of the case that Appellant had procedurally defaulted on his mental retardation claim and that he failed to demonstrate adequate cause for his default; and (2) it was the law of the case that Appellant could not make a prima facie showing that he was able to meet the statutory definition for mental retardation. View "Bowling v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law