Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The underlying case here was a divorce action between Appellant John Lee and Jill Stanley. Judge Stephen George of the family court heard the divorce proceedings. Because of Appellant's pattern of litigation, Stanley filed a motion to require Appellant to post a bond prior to any future motions being called. The court agreed and issued an order imposing a bond. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition asking the court of appeals (1) to order Judge George to disqualify himself because he had not acted impartially and (2) to disqualify Stanley's counsel and the guardian ad litem because they had engaged in fraudulent activity and nefarious conduct. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a writ was not an available remedy for Appellant's claims that the trial court was biased against him and that the court erred in refusing to disqualify the guardian ad litem and opposing counsel; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a writ regarding the bond order because Appellant did not clearly state the relief he was requesting and the grounds for that relief with sufficient specificity. View "Lee v. Family Court (George)" on Justia Law

Appellant Kenneth Hudson was convicted of murder as an accomplice by the circuit court. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in declining to instruct the jury on theories of accomplice liability for first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and reckless homicide, and (2) by admitting irrelevant evidence concerning a shooting in Tennessee and Appellant's gang activity, asserting that the prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Appellant's requested instructions on the lesser included homicide instructions; and (2) the evidence of the Tennessee shooting and Appellant's gang activity was properly admitted. View "Hudson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether Appellee, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) had "good cause" for failing to timely release a satisfied real estate lien it held on Gary and Sharon Hall's property. The circuit court concluded that the Halls were not entitled to statutory damages because, although MERS filed a release referencing the wrong mortgage, the Halls provided insufficient notice to MERS of the release's actual deficiency. Thus, the court found MERS had "good cause" not to file a new release once it checked and found it had already filed one. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MERS satisfied the "good cause" requirement under these particular circumstances. View "Hall v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional plea to first-degree possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of her apartment. The court of appeals affirmed the conditional plea of guilty. Appellant appealed, complaining that the court of appeals' analysis incorrectly found a reasonable suspicion to justify the protective sweep of her apartment following Appellant's consent to officers entering her apartment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the law, as is stated in this case, is that consent by the owner for the police to enter his home does not extend to the entire house, even for a protective sweep; and (2) the motion to suppress should have been granted because the protective sweep was illegal and the contraband discovered was the result of this unlawful invasion as fruit of the poisonous tree. View "Guzman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Elery was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and violating a protective order and sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of probation or parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding, inter alia, (1) the jury was improperly allowed to hear evidence of an uncharged crime, but the error was harmless; (2) any error in the trial court's instructions to the jury was not prejudicial to Appellant; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking a juror for cause; (4) certain victim impact testimony was properly admitted; and (5) the exclusion of a portable breathalyzer test was error, but the error was harmless. View "Elery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a district court acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction when it issued an order requiring a guardian to provide all financial records related to a court-ordered accounting and to make restitution to a guardianship account. The circuit court denied a petition for writ of prohibition prohibiting the district judge from enforcing his orders. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court and remanded the case back for entry of a writ of prohibition, opining that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the charge was one of mismanagement of funds and beyond the scope of the court's powers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court's order requiring the circuit court to enter a writ of prohibition was improper, as the district court is granted exclusive jurisdiction to manage and settle guardianship accounts and was acting soundly within its jurisdiction in this case. View "Dist. Court (Karem) v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Appellants Tanya and Jeffrey Childers filed this action against Appellees, Dr. Sandra Geile and Marshal Emergency Services Associates, PSC, claiming severe emotional distress caused by the outrageous and intentional or reckless conduct of Dr. Geile when she told them Tanya had miscarried their child when in fact she had not. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether summary judgment for Appellees was proper because a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress cannot be maintained when the same facts support a traditional tort claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress did not apply to these facts, and summary judgment was proper because the doctor's conduct was properly the subject of a traditional tort claim. View "Childers v. Geile" on Justia Law

This case presented the question of whether an automobile insurance policy's permissive user step-down provision was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed whether the particular provision at issue was sufficiently conspicuous, plain, and clear to satisfy the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, declaring the permissive user step-down provision enforceable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy's permissive user step-down provision was insufficiently plain and clear to defeat the reasonable expectations of the insureds, and therefore, the provision violated the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Remanded. View "Bidwell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. The Supreme Court held that (1) landlord can be the owner of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances, but any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (2) for that reason, the landlord in this case could not be liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

When calculating the income benefit for he claimant's work-related injury, the ALJ apportioned sixty-three percent of the twenty-one percent permanent impairment rating that existed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) to a pre-existing active condition, which was non-compensable. The court of appeals affirmed the workers' compensation board's decision to vacate the calculation on the ground that the ALJ should have subtracted the pre-existing active impairment rating that existed immediately before the injury from the impairment rating that existed at MMI and based the income benefit on the remainder. The employer appealed, arguing that nothing prevented the ALJ from apportioning the impairment rating at MMI based on permissible inferences drawn from the medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board and court of appeals applied the correct methodology for determining the impairment rating upon which to base income benefits. View "Audi of Lexington v. Elam" on Justia Law