Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a guilty verdict, Defendant was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) there was insufficient proof to support a charge of murder because the Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was not privileged to act in self-defense; and (2) certain conduct of the Commonwealth attorney during his cross-examination of Appellant amounted to reversible prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Appellant guilty of murder; but (2) the prosecutor's conduct in certain instances was improper, and the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was reversible error. View "Caudill v. Kentucky" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several offenses. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges, and the district court set his bail at $10,000. At the preliminary hearing, the district court made a finding of probable cause and then increased Defendant's bail to $100,000. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court, arguing that his bond was increased without the benefit of a formal hearing as required by statute. The circuit court granted the petition, ordering that Defendant's bond be reduced to $10,000 unless the district court held a hearing or the case was transferred to circuit court. After the director of metro corrections filed an appeal, the grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant on the charges, and the circuit court set Defendant's bond at $10,000 in an arraignment order. The court of appeals then dismissed the director's appeal as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case was not moot because the issue was one capable of repetition yet evading review; and (2) the district court may increase the amount of a defendant's bail following a preliminary hearing, where the only change in circumstances is the court's finding of probable cause. View "Bolton v. Irvin" on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. In this case the attack occurred across the street from the rented property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landlords under Ireland v. Raymond, which held that a landlord's liability for attacks by a tenant's dog does not extend to attacks that occur off the leased premises. The court of appeals affirmed, also relying on Ireland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord can be an "owner" of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances; (2) any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (3) for that reason, the landlord in this case was not liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

Appellants, attorney Barbara Bonar and her law firm, claimed entitlement to a portion of the attorney's fees awarded in a class action settlement. Bonar and Appellees, a law firm and attorneys, initiated the class action as co-counsel. Before the settlement was negotiated, Bonar withdrew. Bonar claimed she was forced to withdraw. Following a bench trial, the circuit court concluded Bonar was not entitled to any of the attorney's fees because her withdrawal was voluntary. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the weight of the evidence supported the conclusion that Bonar withdrew from the case voluntarily, and therefore, Bonar was not entitled to any portion of the attorney's fees awarded to class counsel; (2) the trial court did not improperly limit discovery; and (3) the trial court did not violate Bonar's right to a fair trial by commenting on Bonar's conduct. View "B. Dahlenburg Bonar, P.S.C. v. Waite, Schneier, Bayless & Chesley Co., LPA" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law

Russell D. Alred, judge of the 26th judicial circuit of Kentucky, became the focus of a lengthy investigation by the judicial conduct commission, culminating in formal charges consisting of twenty allegations of misconduct in office. Following an adversarial hearing on these charges, the commission found official misconduct on nine of the charges and ordered Judge Alred removed from office. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the order of the commission as to eight counts of official misconduct and the commission's decision to remove Judge Alred from office, holding that there was good cause to remove Judge Alred from his judicial office for misconduct; but (2) reversed the commission's findings and legal conclusions as to Count V, holding that the commission's findings regarding Count V were not supported by sufficient evidence. View "Alred v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment in a partition action for the sale of jointly owned real estate, having found that the statute of frauds prevented enforcement of an alleged oral "buy/sell" agreement between the parties. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Appellants, as the party attempting to force the sale, were impermissibly using the statute of frauds as a "sword" and not a "shield" and because "no action" was brought by Appellees that might trigger the application of the statute. The court therefore remanded the matter for a determination as to whether the oral buy/sell agreement existed and its effect on the disposition of the property at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that because there was no signed writing in this case, and because there was no evidence that the agreement was not reduced to writing because of fraud at the time of omission or evidence that the application of the statute of fraud would result in Appellants being unjustly enriched, summary judgment was proper. View "Smith v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant Travis Smith was convicted of first-degree burglary by complicity, first-degree robbery by complicity, and second-degree assault by complicity and was sentenced to a total of twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction but remanded for further proceedings on the question of the imposition of court costs, holding (1) Appellant's claims of instructional error were not properly preserved, but upon palpable error review the jury was adequately instructed upon the necessary elements of accomplice culpability, and therefore the jury instructions did not amount to palpable error; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing court costs against Appellant without determining if he was a "poor person." View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Brian McGuire appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of first-degree manslaughter and unlawful possession of a weapon on school property and sentencing him to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not deny Appellant's constitutional right to present a defense based on his assertion that the public school system interfered with his efforts to interview witnesses employed by the school system, as the effect of any troublesome conduct of school officials was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence concerning Appellant's stressful personal life during its case in chief; (3) erred by admitting victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of the trial, but no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the improperly admitted evidence; (4) did not err in the penalty phase by disallowing mitigation testimony from Appellant's father; and (5) erred by permitting the jury to rehear a witness's testimony outside of Appellant's presence, but the error was not palpable. View "McGuire v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This matter involved the ability to recover attorney's fees based on a contingency fee arrangement when an attorney withdraws from representation of the client for what the lawyer believes is a valid cause. The district court found Attorney was not entitled to recover his attorney's fees based on a quantum meruit claim but awarded him funds to cover calculated expenses from his representation of Appellee in a personal injury case with a contingency fee contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a disagreement with a client over whether to accept a settlement offer is not good and sufficient cause for an attorney to withdraw with expectation of a quantum meruit fee. View "Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers, Inc." on Justia Law