Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was the question of an agent's authority to bind his or her principal to an arbitration agreement presented with other documents upon the principal's admission to a long-term care facility. Agent in this case was the daughter and executrix of the deceased Principal. Agent brought a claim for negligence against the long-term care facility where Principal spent the last years of her life. Invoking an arbitration agreement executed in conjunction with Principal's admission to the nursing home, Defendants moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Agent, who executed the admissions agreement on behalf of Principal, had no authority to agree to arbitration. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the optional arbitration agreement Agent purported to execute on Principal's behalf was beyond the scope of Agent's authority and was therefore unenforceable. View "Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his convictions in two separate cases. In the first case, Appellant was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, feeing or evading, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). In the second case, Appellant was convicted of escape, trafficking, and PFO. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance, vacated his sentence for that conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that Appellant's waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore, the trial court erred by denying his request to proceed pro se; and (2) affirmed Appellant's remaining convictions and corresponding sentences. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2003, for which he was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits followed by 425 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. In 2007 Claimant sustained another injury. After finding the effects of the 2003 injury caused Claimant's 2007 injury, an ALJ increased Claimant's partial disability benefit at reopening and tripled the entire income benefit awarded for his injury. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the finding of increased impairment as well as the finding that Claimant lacked the physical capacity at reopening to perform the type of work performed at the time of his injury; and (2) the combined effects of the impairment present at the time of the initial award and the additional impairment present at reopening entitled Claimant to triple benefits based on the whole of his disability for the balance of the compensable period. View "James T. English Trucking v. Beeler" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by denying Defendant's motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence; (2) by not allowing Defendant during voir dire to inform the jury of the potential range of PFO enhanced penalties; (3) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when, during voir dire, the Commonwealth suggested that Defendant had concealed evidence of the crime; (4) by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial when the Commonwealth referred to scientific studies of which there was no evidence; and (5) by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, not just a new penalty phase, when during the original penalty proceedings, an improper argument by the Commonwealth necessitated a mistrial. View "Jacobsen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

An ALJ determined that Claimant sustained a work-related hearing loss and that Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.7305(4) placed the entire liability for income and medical benefits with Appellant, the last employer with whom Claimant was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained substantial evidence that testing revealed a pattern of hearing loss compatible with that caused by hazardous noise exposure and contained substantial evidence that Claimant sustained repetitive exposure to hazardous noise in the workplace, including his final employment with Appellant; and (2) Kan. Stat. Rev. 342.7305(4) does not permit apportioning liability among employers in such cases. View "Greg's Constr. v. Keeton" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 and three counts of first-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence but vacated the trial court's amended judgment and remanded to the trial court to reinstate the final judgment as originally entered, holding (1) Defendant's convictions did not violate double jeopardy; (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay restitution that exceeded $100,000 because the $100,000 statutory cap was not applicable to the trial court's restitution order; but (3) the trial court lacked authority to amend the final judgment more than ten days after its entry. View "Fagan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court in this case granted review to decide whether the City of Florence violated the Open Meetings Act when it agreed in private discussions to settle a pending lawsuit in a zoning matter when the settlement itself was voted on in an open meeting. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Open Meetings Act specifically allows for private discussions of pending or proposed litigation, the City did not violate the Open Meetings Act, where the final, binding vote on the settlement was conducted at a public meeting. View "Cunningham v. Whalen" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, whereby he agreed to a sentence of five years' imprisonment. In addition, the circuit court imposed a $1,000 fine, which the Commonwealth later conceded was improper because Defendant was indigent. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment imposing the fine. The court of appeals reversed the fine but left the five-year plea agreement intact. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the fine may be properly vacated while letting the plea agreement stand. The Court affirmed, holding that the fine in this case may be reversed without invalidating the plea agreement because the imposition of the fine was not part of the agreement but was instead left to the discretion of the circuit court. View "Commonwealth v. Reed" on Justia Law

Several weeks after Defendant was convicted of first-degree sodomy he moved for a new trial based upon an unsworn, unauthenticated note purportedly written by a member of the jury panel that convicted him. The note stated that the jury had been influenced by information not presented in evidence and that the writer had been pressured into voting to convict. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing to ascertain the validity of the claim, and if true, whether the prejudicial effect of the occurrence would entitle Defendant to a new trial. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding (1) an unauthenticated and unsworn letter from a lone juror, without more, is insufficient to trigger the process for further inquiry into the validity of a jury verdict by motion for a new trial; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Abnee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of eight counts of first-degree sodomy, one count of use of a minor in a sexual performance, and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, for which he received a total sentence of seventy years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth introduced an egregious amount of inadmissible character evidence in this case that was meant to prejudice the jury against Defendant; (2) the Commonwealth improperly bolstered the alleged victims' testimony; and (3) the cumulative effect of these prejudicial errors rose to the level of palpable error and deprived Appellant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Chavies v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law