Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether a state employee, after receiving notice of her employer's intent to dismiss her, waived her right to a pre-termination hearing by repeatedly engaging in conduct that delayed the hearing. The Kentucky Personnel Board concluded that the employee did not waive her right to a pre-termination hearing, and that her dismissal therefore violated her right to due process. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employee was not deprived of her constitutional rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to her dismissal, as the employee constitutionally waived her right to a hearing by applying for FMLA leave in a deliberate attempt to delay the pre-termination hearing, after previously postponing the hearing twice, which constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that hearing. View "Dep't of Revenue v. Wade" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Defendant was arrested, Defendant's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the warrant, requesting to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the county attorney to answer a question of law surrounding the practice of ex parte communications by criminal defense lawyers with judges after warrants have been issued. The Court then certified the law to state that Kentucky law does not authorize as ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Appellee pled guilty to fraudulent insurance acts by complicity. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the circuit court sentenced Appellee to a five-year probated sentence and ordered restitution to Amica Mutual Insurance Company in the amount of $48,597 - the full amount distributed by Amica after Appellee's house burned down. The court of appeals vacated the order of restitution and remanded to the trial court to make specific findings of the monetary damages suffered as a result of the insurance fraud, without regard to the proceeds distributed as a result of the property damage or alternate housing and living expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a trial court is authorized to order restitution for damages not suffered as a direct result of the criminal acts for which the defendant has been convicted when, as part of a plea agreement, the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to the restitution condition; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Appellee to reimburse Amica for the entire $48, 597. View "Commonwealth v. Morseman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of two probation revocation cases to consider whether the trial court may proceed to hold evidentiary hearings to revoke or modify probation when the grounds for revocation or modification are new, unresolved criminal charges against the probationer. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court is not required to delay probation revocation or modification hearings awaiting resolution of the criminal charges that arise during the probationary period; (2) when the probationer is faced with probation revocation or modification and a criminal court trial based on the same conduct that forms the basis of new criminal charges, the probationer's testimony at the probation revocation hearing is protected from use at any later criminal trial in Kentucky state courts; and (3) the probationer's testimony at the revocation hearing can be used for impeachment purposes or rebuttal evidence in the trial of the new charges. View "Barker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured during the course of his employment. When his workers' compensation benefits ceased, Appellee applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission determined that Kan. Rev. Stat. 341.090, which permits the use of an "extended base period" that captures earnings leading to equitable unemployment benefits, required that the extended base period may include only the four calendar quarters that immediately precede the base period. Pursuant to this extended base period, Appellee was awarded benefits of $149 per week. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the extended base period need not be limited to the four quarters that immediately precede the base period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute in calculating Appellee's unemployment benefits. View "Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law

This case presented two constitutional questions related to Kentucky's prevailing wage law. The first question was whether the law violates procedural due process by failing to afford contractors a hearing before the Labor Cabinet assesses back wages and civil penalties and demands their payments. The second question was whether the law improperly delegates legislative or judicial authority to the Labor Cabinet by failing to define the categories of workers to which it applies. The circuit court found that the law does not violate due process or improperly delegate legislative or judicial authority. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage law does not violate either the Kentucky or U.S. Constitutions. View "Teco Mech. Contractor, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the home's inhabitants must be reversed, as (i) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants James Baldwin and Ronda Reynolds allegedly sustained injuries in separate highway incidents after objects came loose from unidentified vehicles and collided with their vehicles. Both Appellants sought uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for hit-and-run accidents through their automobile insurance policies. Baldwin's State Farm policy provided coverage when an uninsured motor vehicle "strikes" the insured vehicle, and Reynolds's Safeco policy covered damages when an uninsured motor vehicle "hits" the insured vehicle. The Supreme Court accepted review in these consolidated cases to focus on whether Appellants' accidents satisfied the impact requirements contained in the UM clauses of their insurance policies. The Supreme Court held that the impact requirements of the UM clauses of Baldwin's and Reynolds's insurance policies were not met, and therefore, UM coverage was not applicable to Appellants' hit-and-run accidents. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Appellants, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against their Internet service providers (Providers). Providers' Internet service agreement contained an arbitration clause that required customers to submit damage claims against Insight to arbitration, and it barred class action litigation against Providers by their customers. The circuit court determined the class action ban was enforceable and dismissed Appellants' complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the contractual provision under which Appellants waived their right to participate in class action litigation was enforceable under federal law; (2) the service agreement's choice of law provision was not enforceable; (3) the service agreement's general arbitration provision was enforceable; and (4) the provision imposing a confidentiality requirement upon the litigants to arbitration proceedings was void and severable from the remaining portions of the agreement. Remanded for entry of a final judgment. View "Schnuerle v. Insight Commc'ns Co., LP" on Justia Law