Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a mortgage lienholder has standing to an agreed judgment between the property owner and the purchaser of the property owner's delinquent property tax liens. The court of appeals determined that the mortgage lienholder in this case (Appellee, Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company) did have standing to contest the agreed judgment between the property owner (Appellee, Teretha Murphy) and the owner of the owner's delinquent property tax liens (Appellant, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Commonwealth Bank had standing to contest the monetary amount awarded in the agreed judgment. View "Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were tried and convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out in 2008 in which they stole money and threatened to kill the home's inhabitants, two of whom they ultimately shot and one of whom they threatened to rape and sodomize. Appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, some in common and other independently. The Court (1) affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety; and (2) affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding (i) the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree assault, and therefore, Ownens's convictions for first-degree assault must be reversed; and (ii) the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment of one of the victims, and thus this conviction was reversed. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant raised sixteen issues on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not giving full consideration to Appellant's claim of juror misconduct, which was founded on a question of first impression alleging that jurors may have lied during voir dire and juror bias through the use of social media websites, namely Facebook. Remanded to the circuit court to hold a hearing on whether the jurors answered voir dire questions truthfully, and, if not, the extent of exposure the jurors had to the Facebook account of the victim's mother, and whether that exposure, if any, tainted the jurors to such extent that it was a miscarriage of justice to allow them to participate as jurors in Appellant's trial. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants and Appellees were adjoining landowners who disputed the rights to the use and maintenance of a road or access easement across Appellees' property. The circuit court ordered Appellees to permit Appellants to use the road for the purpose of the Appellants' personal, non-commercial access to part of their property but allowed Appellees to maintain the gate and to keep the gate locked at all times. The trial court further adjudged that Appellants had a duty to maintain the road for the purpose of making it passable for vehicles and farm equipment but barred them from paving or otherwise materially changing the current condition of the roadway. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants had an express easement to the road, without any reservations or restrictions, and therefore, (1) the trial court's judgment that Appellees could maintain a gate on the road was erroneous; and (2) the trial court's restriction limiting Appellants' use of the road to personal use and prohibiting Appellants from paving or rocking the road was unreasonable. View "Sawyers v. Beller" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant subsequently filed in the trial court a pro se motion seeking relief from the court's judgment. Defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing and assistance from the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA). The trial court granted the latter request, and a DPA attorney entered his notice of appearance on Defendant's behalf. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for more than four years, when counsel finally filed his amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely - both outside the three-year statute of limitations and barred by laches - and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him, following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree. Defendant was found guilty of having robbed at gun point the manager of a cash advance store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in prison enhanced to thirty years by virtue of Defendant's status as a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to suppression of the eyewitness identifications; (2) the trial court correctly limited penalty-range voir dire to unenhanced penalties for the indicted offense; (3) errors by the prosecutors were appropriately addressed by the trial court and did not render the trial unfair; and (4) the penalty phase mistrial did not require a new trial of Defendant's guilt but only a new penalty phase. View "Jacobsen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The parents of fourteen Jefferson County schoolchildren brought this action claiming Ky. Rev. Stat. 159.070 grants their children a statutory right to attend the public school nearest their home. The Jefferson County Board of Education and the Kentucky School Boards Association asserted the student assignment within a school district in Kentucky was a matter that the legislature has committed to the sound discretion of the local school board. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ruling of the circuit court, holding that Kentucky public school students have no statutory right to attend a particular school. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice claim for the wrongful death of Rosalie Stamper. At issue on appeal was a discovery violation question about the use of deposition testimony of a treating physician, who was originally a defendant in the case but was dismissed prior to trial. The trial court allowed the physician's deposition to be played to the jury, including a portion about Defendant's compliance with the standard of care, even though Plaintiff argued that the physician had not been identified as an expert witness and no Ky. R. Civ. P. 26 information had been provided about his testimony. The jury found for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, finding the Defendant had not complied with the language or spirit of Rule 26. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court erred when in admitting the testimony without considering the effect of the requirements of Rule 26 and without considering the admissibility of the proposed "expert" testimony as to standard of care; but (2) the error was harmless. View "Hashmi v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) while the trial court erred by admitting two handguns Appellant owned, which were similar to the murder weapon but were not used to commit the crime, the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony, specifically the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of the case; and (3) the trial court did not err when it refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had been tried twice previously for this offense and both prior juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law