Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty but mentally ill of murder and first-degree assault. Appellant received sentences of life in prison for the murder conviction and twenty years in prison for the assault conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) failing to grant Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) instructing the jury that "treatment shall be provided" to a guilty but mentally ill defendant; (3) finding Appellant competent to stand trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury on assault under extreme emotional disturbance; (5) failing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers; and (6) failing to sever the murder charge from the assault charge. View "Keeling v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to enter an order releasing expert witness funds for an evidentiary hearing regarding his post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel motion. The court of appeals denied the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that an expert is necessary to prove that prejudice resulted from his trial counsel's failure to have him evaluated for competency. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' order, holding that Appellant failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of showing a lack of adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise necessary for issuance of a writ. View "Jones v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offense. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred during the guilt phase of his trial by admitting evidence of other acts of drug trafficking. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) evidence alleging Appellant had committed other acts of drug trafficking was admitted in violation of Ky. R. Evid. 404(b), and the Court could not determine with fair assurance that the error did not substantially sway the verdict; and (2) Appellant waived his right to appellate review of the penalty phase jury instructions. View "Graves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Upon the dissolution of the marriage of Rachel Ford and Keith Perkins, the circuit court determined that money held in an individual retirement account (IRA) maintained by Keith was marital property and ordered the funds to be divided equally between Keith and Rachel. The court of appeals agreed that the IRA was marital property but reversed the circuit court on the issue of allocating the asset between the parties equally, and remanded with instructions to award Keith 100 percent of the IRA. The Supreme Court vacated the part of the circuit court's judgment dividing the asset and the opinion of the court of appeals, as the circuit court failed to make necessary findings of fact prior to dividing the asset under Kan. Rev. Stat. 403.190. View "Ford v. Perkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review in two cases to consider related questions concerning the constitutional guarantee to the effective assistance of counsel in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that the guarantee is breached when defense counsel fails to advise his or her noncitizen client that a contemplated guilty plea will subject the client to automatic deportation. The court of appeals held (1) the guarantee is breached when counsel fails to advise her client that the crime to which he is pleading guilty will automatically render him subject to a longer period of parole ineligibility under Kentucky's violent offender statute; and (2) the guarantee is not breached when counsel advises his client of the mandatory sex offender treatment applicable to the crime to which he is pleading but fails to advise him of the effects of that program on parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under Padilla, defendants receive ineffective assistance in cases where the defendant's guilty plea was induced by his attorney's misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of the plea sufficiently punitive, grave, and enmeshed with the plea's direct consequences, and so easily determined from the statutes, as to be deemed like deportation. View "Commonwealth v. Pridham" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a medical negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Hospital after Appellant's husband, who had been admitted to a psychiatric unit in Hospital where suicide precautions were taken, hung himself and died. The circuit court court ordered the disclosure of various documents that Hospital claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court of appeals found the documents were privileged and granted Hospital's requested writ of prohibition stopping the circuit court from order the disclosure of the documents. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' order, holding that the writ was erroneously granted, as Hospital failed to show that the privilege applied. View "Collins v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant challenged the adequacy of the notice of the charges against him, the trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict, and the trial court's attempt to retain jurisdiction to impose court costs and a partial public-defender fee in the future. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions in their entirety but reversed the trial court's decision regarding costs and fees, holding that because the pertinent statutes do not empower the trial court to retain jurisdiction to determine whether Appellant could pay court costs and partial public-defender fees until after Appellant has completed his sentence, the trial court erred in trying to leave its judgment open. Remanded. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Russell Alred, judge of the judicial court, became the focus of a lengthy investigation by the judicial conduct commission culminating in formal charges consisting of twenty allegations of misconduct in office. Following an adversarial hearing on these charges, the commission found official misconduct on nine of the charges and ordered the judge removed from office. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the commission's findings and legal conclusions as clearly erroneous as to Count V, which charged Judge Alred with changing a defendant's bond conditions without a hearing or giving notice to the defendant, because it was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) affirmed the commission's order as to eight counts of official misconduct and the commission's decision to remove Judge Alred from office. View "Alred v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

Ky. Rev. Stat. 189.820 regulates safety on the public highways by requiring slow-moving vehicles to display a particular brightly colored emblem to warn of the vehicles' slow speed. Appellants, all members of the Old Order Swartzentruber Amish, claimed that the requirement that they use the bright orange-yellow and the triangular shaped emblem unconstitutionally violated their freedom to practice their religion because the emblem interfered with their requirement to be plain and brightly displayed the trinity, a symbol not adopted by the Amish. The lower courts established the requisite rational basis for the statute and found that the bright color, reflective edge, and distinct shape of the slow-moving vehicle emblem required by the statute increased the visibility of the intended warning and was superior to the gray reflective tape proposed instead by Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 189.820 is a statute of general applicability, the government need only establish a rational basis for the statute in order to pass constitutional muster; and (2) the statute meets the rational basis standard of review and is thus not unconstitutional. View "Gingerich v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court awarded Appellant $120,864 in his simple negligence action against Appellee, House of Imports, after he fell down a set of stairs at the retailer's business establishment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court committed palpable error in permitting expert testimony of building code violations without instructing the jury as to the applicability of the code. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated that of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not palpably err in admitting expert testimony of building code violations without a concomitant jury instruction as to the applicability of the code. View "Wright v. House of Imports, Inc. " on Justia Law