Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from an opinion of the court of appeals which affirmed an order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for review of a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC). In addition to denying Appellant unemployment benefits, the KUIC ordered Appellant to reimburse $12,785 in benefit payments he had already received. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition for review because it did not comply with the verification requirement contained in Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.450(1), and thus the court concluded that its jurisdiction was not invoked within the twenty-day limitations period provided for filing such an action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant failed to comply with the verification provision of section 341.450(1), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy; and (2) Appellant did not comply with the verification requirement, as his attorney's signature on the petition did not constitute "certification." View "Taylor v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to, among other offenses, five counts of first-degree robbery. First-degree robbery is a "violent offense" under Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401, and under that statute, a person convicted of a violent offense does not become eligible for parole until he has served the lesser of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed or twenty years. Appellant moved for relief from his guilty plea, claiming he was not apprised of the parole ramifications of his sentence. The trial court summarily denied Appellant's motion, and an unanimous panel of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) counsel renders deficient assistance under Commonwealth v. Padilla and Strickland v. Washington when his guilty plea advice does not accurately reflect the parole consequences under the violent offender statute; but (2) the deficient performance alleged in this case did not entitle Appellant to relief because it could not have resulted in any prejudice. View "Stiger v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner's second trial on charges of capital kidnapping, attempted murder, arson, and receiving stolen property ended when the trial court declared a mistrial for the Commonwealth's violation of a pretrial order. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from retrying him, arguing that a retrial would violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. Although Petitioner would not suffer irreparable injury if the retrial were to proceed, Petitioner argued that the administration of justice would suffer great and irreparable injury if the retrial took place. The Supreme Court declined to issue the writ, holding that the writ of prohibition was not an available remedy, as Petitioner offered nothing to persuade the Court that he would suffer any injury that could not be corrected on appeal. View "St. Clair v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The circuit court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) granting a continuance was a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (2) the trial court did not err by not permitting Appellant to cross-examine the victim regarding her failure to appear on the first trial date; (3) the trial court did not err by permitting the victim to testify concerning her fear of contracting a disease from Appellant; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial; (5) Appellant was correctly found competent to stand trial; (6) no error resulted as a result of the prosecutor's comments; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a juror for cause. View "Slone v. Commonwealth " on Justia Law

This case began when Appellants brought an action against Appellee, a medical center, alleging medical malpractice in a surgical procedure. The first trial ended in a verdict favorable to Appellants. The trial court denied Appellee's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) but granted Appellee's request for a new trial. The second trial resulted in a verdict even more favorable for Appellants. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed Appellants' claim, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to grant Appellee's motion for JNOV and granting the new trial instead. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered the new trial and denied Appellee's request for JNOV. View "Savage v. Three Rivers Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Appellant was tried on two counts of first-degree sodomy and was convicted of one count. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty-five years incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying an independent psychological evaluation or competency hearing of the alleged victim; and (2) the hearing conducted by the trial court to determine if various allegations of prior sexual conduct made by the alleged victim were admissible was insufficient, and the trial court erred in ruling that several of the allegations were not demonstrably false without reviewing all of the evidence. View "Perry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.050, which provides civil and criminal immunity to the reporters of suspected child dependency, neglect, and abuse. On the basis of that immunity, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, Norton Hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, and Dr. Ketan Mehta, in a civil suit filed by Brandi Peyton for medical malpractice, negligence, and emotional distress, among other claims. Peyton alleged negligence in generating, interpreting, and reporting toxicology reports that showed Peyton had a high blood alcohol concentration the evening before giving birth to a baby. The court of appeals reversed, opining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to who initiated the toxicology screening, which, in the court's view, affected the availability of immunity under sections 620.050(1) and 620.050(14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Appellants acted in good faith under Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.030 in reporting the toxicology reports; and (2) Appellants were therefore entitled to immunity under section 620.050(1) as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Appellant's spouse under Ky. R. Evid. 504(c)(2)(A), an exception to the spousal testimonial privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit for different reasons, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony based on the Court's interpretation of Rule 504(c)(2)(A); but (2) the trial court's decision to permit the spouse to testify was harmless error. View "Meyers v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant shot and killed Christopher Tolliver. At trial, the defense argued that Appellant was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) at the time of the shooting. The trial court ruled that Dr. Peter Shilling, who diagnosed Appellant with PTSD, could not testify unless Appellant testified because his testimony would include Appellant's hearsay statements regarding the EED. Appellant ultimately testified in order to offer Dr. Shilling's testimony. The jury rejected Appellant's claim of EED and found him guilty of intentional murder, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, Appellant argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by the trial court's ruling with respect to Dr. Shilling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant's testimony was required in order to admit Dr. Shilling's testimony; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Lasure v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Employee's employment was terminated by Employer after Employee refused to sign an agreement acknowledging her repeated tardiness violated Employer's code of conduct. Employee subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which was denied on grounds that Employee's discharge was for work related misconduct. A referee with the division of unemployment insurance reversed the determination. The unemployment insurance commission reversed the referee's decision, concluding that Employee was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was fired for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the commission's conclusion that Employee was not terminated for tardiness but, rather, for refusing to sign the agreement was clearly erroneous; (2) there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that Employee was repeatedly tardy; and (3) therefore, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.370(6), the commission did not err in denying unemployment insurance benefits. View "Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil" on Justia Law