Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Timothy and Theresa LaMarre and their two children filed a personal injury action against Michael and Kimberly Plummer and the Fort Mitchell Country Club after a golf cart Mr. Plummer was driving accelerated while Mr. LaMarre was attempting to take his seat, resulting in serious injuries to Mr. LaMarre. The suit alleged the Club was liable for Mr LaMarre's injuries as a result of Mr. Plummer's negligence in driving a golf cart while intoxicated. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Club, finding that the Dram Shop Act applied and shielded the Club from any liability in the matter. The court of appeals reversed. The Club sought discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court's summary judgment order, holding that because the Club held an alcohol license under Kan. Rev. Stat 243.030, it was not liable for Mr. Plummer's negligence unless one of the stated exceptions under the Act was met, and none of the exceptions were met in this case. View "Fort Mitchell Country Club v. LaMarre" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with assault in the fourth degree. Before Appellee was arrested but after an arrest warrant was issued, Appellee's attorney made an ex parte request to a different district court judge from the one who issued the arrest warrant, seeking to set the warrant aside and issue a summons. The warrant was withdrawn and a summons issued instead. The Commonwealth's request for the reinstatement of the arrest warrant was denied. Appellee later pled guilty to the charge. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the Commonwealth to answer a question of law and answered that Kentucky law does not authorize an ex parte motion by a criminal defendant to vacate or set aside a warrant for his or her arrest with no notice or opportunity for the Commonwealth to be heard. View "Commonwealth v. Minton" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for being a persistent felony offender (PFO) 2. The PFO 2 count was based on an earlier conviction for which Defendant was granted diversion. Defendant was still on diversion when the grand jury indicted him for the later offenses. Upon Defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the PFO 2 count because Defendant had not been finally sentenced on the previously diverted felony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for which a defendant is currently on diversion cannot be used to indict that defendant as a PFO 2 when he commits a subsequent felony offense; and (2) the sentence on the prior felony must be imposed at the time the defendant commits the subsequent crime in order for the conviction to support a PFO 2 charge. View "Commonwealth v. Derringer" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of attempted murder and one count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). For these crimes, Appellant received a fifty-year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony identifying Appellant as a former inmate to be presented to the jury; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence that he threatened a prison guard during apprehension to be presented to the jury; (3) the Commonwealth impermissibly exceeded the scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.055 when it told the jury about Appellant's prior convictions, and accordingly, the Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase; and (4) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the PFO charge. View "Webb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court convicting him of attempted murder, two counts of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant's conviction for first-degree assault, holding (1) in light of the particular facts of this case, Appellant's convictions for both attempted murder and first-degree assault for the same shooting resulted in a double jeopardy violation; and (2) none of Appellant's remaining arguments alleging prosecutorial misconduct established reversible error. Remanded for entry of a new judgment that excluded the reversed conviction. View "Kiper v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. For these crimes, Appellant received a thirty-five year prison sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when allowing the introduction of Appellant's pre-arrest silence during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting the introduction of an accident scene video; (3) the trial court properly admitted a 911 recording; (4) any potential error that arose out of the admission of Appellant's post-collision use of profanity was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not commit palpable error in permitting the introduction of Appellant's misdemeanor theft by deception conviction during the sentencing phase of her trial. View "Baumia v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A circuit court jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment and fined Appellant $600. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, holding that the trial court's jury instruction on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) held that the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant after previously finding him to be indigent and therefore vacated those portions of his sentences imposing fines. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Insurer a "builders risk" insurance policy which included a provision requiring Hospital to obtain Insurer's written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss. Hospital contracted with Constructors for floors and subsurface work, which was later damaged. Hospital claimed a loss and sought recompense under the builders risk policy, but Insurer denied the claim. Hospital later assigned Constructors any claim or rights Hospital had against Insurer arising out of the insurance policy. Constructors, as Hospital's assignee, brought suit in federal court against Insurer seeking to recover payment due under the builder's risk policy. The Supreme Court granted the certification request of the federal court to answer a question of state law and concluded that, under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider how to interpret Kentucky's grandparent-visitation statute consistently with the constitutional principles articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Troxel v. Granville, and whether the trial court in this case appropriately interceded to grant the grandmother visitation with the child despite the objection of the child's mother. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant, holding (1) a grandparent petitioning for child visitation contrary to the wishes of the child's parent can overcome the presumption that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of the child only with clear and convincing evidence that granting visitation to the grandparent is in the child's best interest; and (2) the trial court here, in granting visitation to the grandmother, relied on pre-Troxel case law that inappropriately placed grandparents on equal footing with parents when determining visitation. Remanded. View "Walker v. Blair" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice action brought by the administrator of the Estate of Mindi Tucker, who died of complications from an infection that developed after a caesarian delivery of her child. Her obstetrician was Dr. Susan Brunch, a member of Women's Care Physicians of Louisville, P.S.C. (collectively, Defendants). The claim of medical negligence centered on the failure to administer the antibiotic Cefotan during the delivery process, which the Estate alleged would have prevented the infection. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in not allowing expert testimony on the meaning of the doctor's standing order regarding the antibiotic, and whether the Estate should have been allowed to impeach the doctor's expert witness with the deposition of another physician. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) not allowing the expert testimony; and (2) not allowing impeachment of the doctor's expert witness by the use of the other physician's deposition, as the deposition did not impeach the expert. View "Tucker v. Women's Care Physicians of Louisville, P.S.C." on Justia Law