Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant and her boyfriend, Roy Rankin, were prosecuted for the death of a six-month-old. The trial court instructed the jury on one count of first-degree criminal abuse as to Defendant, but the instructions covered two different theories of how Defendant allegedly committed the crime. The first instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she intentionally abused Cecilia. The second instruction allowed the jury to find Defendant guilty if she had intentionally permitted Rankin to abuse Cecilia. The jury found Defendant guilty under the first instruction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the Commonwealth's proof was sufficient under at least one theory of first-degree criminal abuse, Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of criminal abuse; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to direct abuse by Defendant, and the resulting jury verdict under that instruction was erroneous; and (3) Defendant may nevertheless be retried under the alternative theory of permitting the abuse because the jury never reached that question, and Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. View "Acosta v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Assurance Company of America a "builder's risk" insurance policy and contracted with Wehr Constructors for installation of subsurfaces and floors as part its project. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface done by Wehr was damaged. Hospital sought recompense under the builders risk policy. Assurance denied the claim. Meanwhile, Wehr and Hospital settled on Wehr's breach of contract claim. As part of the settlement, Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim Hospital had against Assurance arising out of the policy. Wehr, as Hospital's assignee, then sued Assurance in federal district court. Assurance moved for judgment on the pleadings, invoking the policy's anti-assignment provision and arguing that it had not consented to the assignment. The district court requested certification to answer a question of Kentucky law. The Supreme Court concluded that under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

In March 1991, Appellee's predecessor corporation obtained a default judgment against Appellant for over $13,000. To collect on the judgment, Appellee caused a writ of execution to issue against Appellant in April 1991. Appellee also filed judgment liens, initiated garnishment proceedings, most recently in 2005, and undertook post-judgment discovery examinations. In 2008, Appellant filed a declaration of rights action, contending that Appellee could no longer recover on the judgment against him because the fifteen-year limitations period had expired. The trial court ruled that any enforcement activity by a judgment creditor, including judgment liens and garnishments, keeps a judgment alive for purposes of the statute of limitations, and therefore, limitations did not bar Appellee's attempts to collect on the judgment. The court of appeals (1) upheld the circuit court's rulings with regard to garnishments, finding that the definition of "execution" in Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.090(1) includes a garnishment; and (2) did not reach the question of whether judgment liens are also executions for purposes of the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that garnishment proceedings and the filing of judgment liens toll the fifteen-year statute of limitations. View "Wade v. Poma Glass & Specialty Windows, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, an adult citizen, filed a petition for a declaration of rights seeking a declaration that the statutory and regulatory provisions associated with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and its sub-unit the Department of Community Based Services' (DCBS) process for investigating allegations of child abuse were unconstitutional. Appellant also challenged the constitutionality of the Cabinet's administrative process. The underlying administrative action was held in abeyance pending the conclusion of the present proceeding. The circuit court denied the petition, finding the challenged processes to be constitutional, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the declaratory action was not ripe for review, as the administrative proceedings being held in abeyance were not available to contextualize the operations of the statutory and regulatory process as it functions in day-to-day practice. Remanded with directions that the court hold this action in abeyance until the conclusion of the underlying administrative proceedings. View "W.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants Marcus Swan and D'Andre Owens were convicted of multiple crimes related to a violent home invasion they carried out. The Supreme Court affirmed Swan's judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety, and affirmed in part and reversed in part Owens's judgment, although his overall sentence was unaffected, holding that the trial court (1) correctly admitted into evidence the guns used in the crime; (2) properly failed to dismiss the indictment because of the destruction of other guns found in the victim's house; (3) did not err in failing to hold a hearing on Swan's right to proceed pro se or with hybrid counsel; (4) properly allowed a witness to testify in the penalty phase after having been present in the courtroom during guilt-phase testimony; (5) did not commit reversible error by evaluating the competency of a child witness in a short fashion and in the presence of the jury; (6) erred in failing to give an instruction on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense; and (7) erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree wanton endangerment relating to Latonia Lumpkins. Accordingly, Owens's convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree wanton endangerment of Lumpkins were reversed. Remanded. View "Swan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of wanton murder and initially sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing phase. At Appellant's second sentencing phase trial, Appellant was represented by a public advocacy attorney that had represented Chris Eapmon, who had been jointly indicted with Appellant during his negotiations for a plea deal. Eapmon eventually pled guilty in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's twenty-eight year prison sentence, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer any identifiable prejudice arising out of counsel's representation; (2) the successive representation here did not violate Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.30; and (3) Appellant's confrontation rights were not violated at his second sentencing phase due to the use of videotaped testimony from the guilt phase of his trial. View "Steward v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. After Defendant's conviction was affirmed, Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking relief from the circuit court's judgment. The matter was allowed to lie dormant for four years until counsel filed an amendment to Defendant's original motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that counsel's amendment was untimely and that on the merits the claims in Defendant's original motion were refuted by the record. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, although its reasoning differed from the lower court's, holding that to the extent the amended motion sought to raise a new, factually independent claim, it was subject to dismissal as untimely, and Defendant's timely claims were facially without merit. View "Roach v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a licensed attorney, was found in criminal contempt by the circuit court for failing to appear at a client's arraignment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant argued on review (1) he was under no duty to appear at the arraignment because he had withdrawn from representing the client, and (2) even if he had a to duty to appear there were insufficient grounds upon which to find him in criminal contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant had a duty to appear at his client's arraignment; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant's failure to appear at the arraignment to be criminally contemptuous. View "Poindexter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

While Brenda Osborne was at home alone, an airplane pilot crashed his airplane into Osborne's home. Osborne subsequently hired Attorney to assist her recovering her losses from the pilot, but when the lawsuit was finally filed, the federal court dismissed the action as barred by limitations. Osborne filed this action against Attorney asserting breach of contract, legal malpractice, and fraud and deceit. A jury found in favor of Osborne, resulting in a judgment against Attorney in excess of $5 million. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in part but vacated a large portion of the damage award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly tried this case using the suit-within-a-suit method but erred when it failed to instruct the jury on Pilot's negligence, thus resulting in Osborne's failure to establish that Attorney's malpractice proximately caused her loss; (2) emotional-distress plaintiffs must first satisfy the elements of a general negligence claim; and (3) punitive damages are not recoverable against an attorney in a legal malpractice case. View "Osborne v. Keeney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty years in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it allowed into evidence the fact that Appellant owned two guns with the same model number as the weapon used in the murder crime, though neither weapon was used to commit the crime, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay testimony regarding the victim's request to borrow money from his wife, but the error was harmless in the context of this case; and (3) the trial court properly refused to allow Appellant to inform the jury he had already been tried twice for these charges and the prior two juries deadlocked. View "Harris v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law