Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of intentional murder and sentenced to death. The deaths occurred as a result of a shooting during which Appellant claimed he was acting in self-defense. Defendant appealed, raising multiple issues in support of reversal of his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in (1) admitting testimony from a policy detective that Appellant's behavior after the shooting was inconsistent with someone who had actually acted in self-defense, thereby implying that from his experienced observations Appellant had fabricated his self-defense claim; (2) admitting evidence of Appellant's post-arrest invocation of his right to remain silent; (3) failing to strike for cause a potential juror who was the sibling of the victim's advocate directly connected to the case; and (4) excluding evidence of the victims' statements immediately before the shooting. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ordway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of numerous counts of incest, rape, and sodomy for his sexual relationships with his two minor stepdaughters, M.P. and C.P. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Appellant's incest convictions as to victim M.P., and vacated all imposed court costs and the partial public-defender fee, holding (1) ex post facto principles, which impact due process, required resentencing for Appellant's incest convictions as to victim M.P.; and (2) the trial court erred in levying court costs and partial public-defender fees on Defendant because he was indigent, and the court erred in ordering a review of court costs and public defender fees upon his release from prison. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor and probated for the two-year statutory maximum on the condition that he attend counseling recommended by the Office of Probation and Parole. The Office recommended that Appellant enroll in the state's three-year sex offender treatment program. At a hearing, the trial court ordered briefing on the question of whether probation could be extended beyond the two-year limit for misdemeanors. The court then extended Defendant's probation until he completed the sex offender treatment program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendant could not be required to complete a program that extended beyond his period of probation; (2) because Defendant completed his probation, he was discharged from it as a matter of law; and (3) to the extent the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether Defendant's probation should be revoked, its judgment was reversed. View "Miller v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose from the sale of a truck by Appellant to Appellee. The parties executed a document titled "customer sales order" formalizing the deal that contained a binding arbitration provision. The provision failed to require the arbitration to be held in Kentucky but stated that the Federal Arbitration Act (Act) governed its interpretation and enforcement. After the truck was delivered, Appellee filed suit against Appellant, alleging fraud and intentional misrepresentation. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Kentucky courts have no jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement unless the agreement provides that the arbitration will occur in Kentucky. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant made a prima facie showing of an agreement requiring arbitration of the dispute between the parties; and (2) because that agreement stated that the Act controls, the circuit court had jurisdiction to enforce it, unless Appellee could meet its burden to show there was no valid agreement. View "MHC Kenworth-Knoxville/Nashville v. M & H Trucking, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years imprisonment and imposed a $200 public defender fee and $180 in court costs. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the judgment imposing a public defender fee and court costs, holding that the trial court did not err in assessing the costs and fee against Defendant, but it erred in ordering review of Defendant's ability to pay upon release, as the decision to impose costs and fees based on a defendant's ability to pay must be made by the trial court upon sentencing; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Goncalves v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed the felonies, and because the offenses involved a firearm, Defendant was automatically transferred to the circuit court as a youthful offender to be tried as an adult. The trial court determined Defendant should be granted probation on his ten-year sentence. The trial court subsequently revoked Defendant's probation and sentenced him to the Department of Corrections (DOC) to serve his sentence. The DOC classified Defendant as a violent offender, a status that restricted Defendant's parole eligibility. Defendant filed a declaration of rights action, arguing that the DOC erred in classifying him as a violent offender because he was a youthful offender. The circuit court agreed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Violent Offender Statute applied to youthful offenders for purposes of parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parole-eligibility limitations of the Violent Offender Statute apply to youthful offenders; and (2) therefore, the DOC correctly classified Defendant as a violent offender subject to that statute's parole-eligibility restrictions. View "Edwards v. Harrod" on Justia Law

Appellee filed suit in the circuit court against Tammie and Brooksie Horn to obtain a judgment securing his right to an easement on property owned by the Horns and property owned by Appellant. Appellant was added as a defendant to the suit. The trial court granted Appellee a sixteen-foot easement over Appellant's and the Horns' property. Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because Appellant had failed to name two indispensable parties - Brooskie and Tammie Horn - in his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Brooksie and Tammy Horn were each an indispensable party to the appeal; and (2) Tammie Horn was not named a party of Appellant's appeal. View "Browning v. Preece" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The victim of Appellant's alleged crimes was his step-granddaughter. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from the victim's mother and father regarding changes in the child's behavior, which the mother implied were symptomatic of child sexual abuse based upon discussions she had with a clinical psychologist. Appellant alleged that this testimony amounted to inadmissible evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was not admissible for the purpose of proving that the victim was sexually abused, but Appellant was not entitled to a reversal of his convictions because (1) the trial court sustained Appellant's objection to the specific testimony at issue and granted all of the relief he requested concerning the evidence; and (2) Appellant withdrew his motion for a mistrial with regard to the mother's testimony and failed to move for a mistrial as a result of the father's testimony, and therefore, Appellant's argument that he should have received a mistrial as a consequence of the evidence was not properly preserved. View "Blount v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder for the murders of his four children and the attempted murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. At the trial, Appellant presented an insanity defense supported by expert testimony, and the Commonwealth provided an expert rebuttal witness. Appellant appealed, claiming that once he presented evidence that he was insane, the burden of disproving his insanity defense shifted to the Commonwealth, and because the Commonwealth did not meet this burden, the trial court erred in convicting him. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that Appellant's introduction of evidence of mental illness sufficient to raise the issue of insanity as a defense did not require the Commonwealth to then disprove mental illness, and therefore, the burden of proving insanity rested on Appellant. View "Biyad v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose after a person house sitting the home of her friends found an intruder in the house. Later it was discovered that twenty pieces of jewelry were missing from the master bedroom. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted guilty of second-degree burglary and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no palpable error in the pre-trial procedure that resulted in the identification of Defendant as the perpetrator or in the in-court identification made at trial; and (2) based upon the testimony that the jury actually heard in this case, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding fingerprints pulled off evidence and regarding the thoroughness of the investigation. View "Barnes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law