Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder and one count of first-degree arson. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded the matter for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court committed reversible error in denying Defendant's motion to designate a particular juror as an alternate, thus effectively failing to remove the juror from the panel, because the court failed to properly determine whether the juror was, in fact, impartial; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Jackson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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A tractor trailer owned by Fuel Transport and driven by its employee, Troy Vanderpool, overturned on a highway. Roger Russell was driving his vehicle with Topsie Gibson as his passenger when he collided with the truck and trailer. Gibson subsequently died from her injuries. Gibson's estate (Estate) sued Vanderpool for ordinary negligence and Fuel Transport for vicarious liability in negligent entrustment and gross negligence for failing to properly maintain the truck involved in the accident. A jury found in favor of the Estate and awarded compensatory damages against both defendants and punitive damages against Fuel Transport. The court of appeals set aside the award of punitive damages, finding that the record did not support the finding of gross negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that Fuel Transport's negligent maintenance of the truck caused the accident. The Court also found Fuel Transport's contentions on cross-appeal to be without merit. View "Gibson v. Fuel Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. The jury that found Defendant guilty of the offense had only eleven members because one of the jurors had broken her ankle during an overnight recess. The court of appeals and remanded for a hearing on whether Defendant had waived his right to a twelve-person jury. The Supreme Court affirmed and declared that Defendant's conviction by a facially unconstitutional jury must be vacated, as (1) a twelve-person jury is a fundamental right in the Commonwealth, and any waiver of that right must be knowingly and voluntarily made by the defendant personally, not by his counsel unilaterally; and (2) where, as in this case, counsel has stipulated to proceeding with less than twelve jurors and the defendant has seemingly acquiesced, the trial should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to that decision. The Court directed that if, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court finds that Defendant validly waived his right to a twelve-person jury, the judgment of conviction shall be reinstated. Otherwise, the judgment shall stand reversed, with Defendant subject to retrial. View "Commonwealth v. Simmons" on Justia Law

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Without a search warrant, police walked onto Appellee's property and into an area near his home late at night to search trash in closed trash containers that had not been put out on the street for trash collection. The containers ended up containing evidence of drug trafficking. The trial court denied suppression of the evidence, concluding that Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash cans or their contents. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to all the charges, reserving his right to appeal the suppression question. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant had a constitutionally recognized expectation of privacy in his trash at the time of the searches that required suppression of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the police retrieved Defendant's trash from the curtilage of his home without a search warrant, the search violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and Defendant was entitled to have the evidence obtained suppressed. View "Commonwealth v. Ousley" on Justia Law

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Appellant was convicted of perjury for lying in a criminal complaint and theft by deception for obtaining the discharge of a vehicle loan by lying to the finance company about whether her name had been forged on the loan documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the theft charge, as the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; but (2) the trial court erred in preventing Defendant from inquiring upon cross-examination as to the complaining witness's prior convictions for possession of forged instruments and giving police a false name, and because the error preventing Appellant from establishing her defense, disallowing the proof as to the witness's prior dishonest conduct was not harmless. View "Allen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree fleeing or evading police, fourth-degree assault, possession of marijuana, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and was fined $600. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's convictions and sentences for first-degree fleeing or evading and first-degree PFO, as the trial court's jury instructions on the fleeing or evading charge were erroneous; and (2) vacated the portions of Defendant's sentences for fourth-degree assault and possession of marijuana imposing fines, as the trial court erred by imposing fines upon Appellant. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Appellee, an owner of a condominium managed by the Coach House and a member of a condominium association, requested that the Board of Directors of the Coach House allow him access to the financial records and minutes of the Board's meetings spanning a two-year period. Appellant, the attorney for the Board, refused Appellee's request. Thereafter, Appellee wrote of the attorney general's (AG) office asking that it prosecute the matter involving his records request. Appellant responded by sending a letter to the AG explaining the reasons restrictions were placed on the records, including some reasons unflattering to Appellee. Appellee subsequently filed suit against Appellant for defamation. The trial court granted Appellant's motion for summary judgment, determining that Appellant's letter to the AG was a direct response to an appeal for prosecution and was thus part of a judicial proceeding. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the communications made to the AG's office were not part of a judicial proceeding and thus were entitled to only a qualified privilege. View "Stigler v. Flint" on Justia Law

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Appellant, the representative of a decedent's estate, hired attorneys David Mushlin and William Nefzger and their law firm to pursue a medical negligence claim against a hospital and several physicians. The trial court later disqualified Mushlin on the ground that Mushlin's prior representation of the hospital was sufficient to create a conflict of interest or at least the appearance of impropriety. The court also noted that Nefzger and the entire firm were conflicted because Mushlin could not effectively be screened from the case and there was a great likelihood of his having constant contact with the other attorneys who would be working on the case in his stead. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show she would suffer great injustice and irreparable injury from the trial court's order disqualifying her lawyer and his law firm from representing her. View "Robertson v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

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Joshua Peacher and Nereia Allen appealed from judgments of the circuit court following a joint trial in which both were convicted of murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree criminal abuse from their mistreatment of Allen's two-year-old nephew, Christopher, resulting in serious physical injuries and his death. The couple was also convicted of abuse for their mistreatment of Allen's other two-year-old nephew, Wyatt. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments in both cases, holding (1) both Defendants received a fundamentally fair trial; (2) neither Defendant was entitled to relief because the trial court erred slightly in defining complicity for the jury; (3) Peacher was not entitled to relief because he was tried jointly with Allen; (4) neither Defendant was prejudiced by the jury instructions pertaining to murder and first-degree assault of Christopher; and (5) Allen was not entitled to a directed verdict or to the dismissal of any of the charges against her. View "Peacher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Appellant and Appellees were engaged in a commercial real estate transaction. Appellant was unable to secure adequate financing to close the transaction, and Appellees retained his earnest money deposit. Appellant filed suit, and the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) given that there was an ambiguity in the language of the contract regarding whether the earnest money clause constituted a proper liquidated damages provision, summary judgment in this case was inappropriate; (2) there was a question of genuine fact as to whether the amount of the earnest money deposit was reasonable or so unreasonably large that it was unenforceable on the grounds that public policy would deem it to be a penalty; and (3) if the deposit is deemed to be an unenforceable penalty, a constructive trust should have been established in order to protect the funds. View "Patel v. Tuttle Props., LLC" on Justia Law