Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants were convicted of a 1992 murder based on highly circumstantial evidence. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. Now represented by The Innocence Project, Appellant sought the release of certain physical evidence recovered from the crime scene - namely, unidentified hairs found in the victim's hand - for DNA testing. The circuit court denied Appellants' request to release the evidence for DNA testing, finding that the evidence would not likely change the outcome of the trial with a reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion because Appellants had shown the DNA testing might lead to the prosecution and conviction of a person heretofore uncharged and now at large. View "Hardin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 530.064(1) and sentenced to ten years in prison. The convictions stemmed from Defendant's inducement of the fourteen-year-old daughter of a recently deceased family friend to have sexual intercourse with him. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 530.064 does not apply unless the perpetrator induces the minor to commit a crime. Defendant contended that because the minor involved here was allegedly induced to submit to a crime but not to commit one, Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the section 530.064 charge. The court of appeals panel agreed with Defendant's reading of section 530.064 but affirmed his conviction pursuant to Young v. Commonwealth, in which the Supreme Court rejected a claim similar but not identical to Defendant's. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of the charge of unlawful transaction with a minor because section 530.064 is not limited to instances where the defendant has induced a minor to commit a crime but applies as well to inducements to engage in sexual activity made illegal by the minor's incapacity to consent to it. View "Hale v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Christina Wittich. Wittich's parents brought a wrongful death action against Appellant on behalf of their daughter's estate (Estate) and obtained a multi-million dollar jury verdict. Appellant appealed, naming only "the Estate of Christina Wittich" as a party to the appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to name the co-administrators of the Estate. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that Appellant's error in the notice of appeal as not fatal to the appeal, as naming "The Estate of Christina Wittich" provided sufficient notice to the co-administrators of the Wittich Estate, conferred jurisdiction over the co-administrators, and identified the proper party to the appeal. View "Flick v. Estate of Wittich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of county employees who were members of the County Employee Retirement System, which was administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS). Plaintiffs sued KRS and the Commonwealth, alleging that Ky. Rev. Stat. 637(1), which states that a retiree who is reemployed by the state or county shall have his retirement payments suspended for the duration of reemployment, was unconstitutional and asking for a declaration of their rights under the statute. The Commonwealth moved for dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion, holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment action because such an action does not result in a loss of public funds or property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state cannot be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity in a declaratory immunity action; and (2) nevertheless, separately naming the Commonwealth was not necessary because the interests of the state were adequately represented by KRS. View "Commonwealth v. Ky. Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation, alleging that he sustained injuries while working for Restaurant. Employee gained employment with Restaurant through a staff leasing company (Company). Employee agreed to a settlement of his claim. Later, Employee moved to re-open the workers' compensation award and to join the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) as a party, asserting that Restaurant and Company were no longer available to pay for his continuing medical expenses. The ALJ subsequently joined the UEF. The ALJ found Employee's condition to have worsened so he was totally disabled and that the UEF was responsible for all benefits for which Employee was entitled. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the portion of the ALJ's opinion regarding the amount of benefits Employee would receive and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee's claim was properly reopened and the UEF joined as a party; (2) Employee presented sufficient evidence to show that his condition had worsened since the entry of his original workers' compensation award; and (3) although the original settlement agreement only listed Employee's lower back injury as compensable, Employee was not barred from raising a claim for his thoracic spine injury upon reopening. View "Commonwealth v. Allen" on Justia Law

After an administrative hearing by a Fayette County Public Schools tribunal, Appellee, an elementary school teacher of twenty-two years, was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and was suspended without pay from her employment for a period of time. The circuit court reversed. Appellants, the superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools and the County Board of Education, appealed, arguing that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by substituting its own judgment of the facts for the tribunal's findings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" lodged against Appellee was not sustained by the evidence and was not supported by the tribunal's findings; and (2) remand to the tribunal for further adjudication was not appropriate where the Court accepted in full the facts found by the tribunal. View "Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards" on Justia Law

Matthew Stanford volunteered with the US Army Cadet Corp. (USACC). Stanford also participated in a program administered by Bluegrass Area Development District (Bluegrass). While accompanying the USACC cadets on a field trip, Stanford fell from a zip line and suffered a permanent injury that rendered him a quadriplegic. An ALJ granted Stanford benefits, finding Stanford was primarily an employee of USACC, who served as a subcontractor for Bluegrass, and accordingly, Bluegrass would be responsible for the payments because USACC did not carry workers' compensation insurance. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded (1) Bluegrass could not be held responsible for paying Stanford's benefits, and instead, USACC was liable, and (2) Stanford was working as a USACC employee at the time of the accident. The court of appeals affirmed and ordered the Uninsured Employers' Fund to reimburse Bluegrass for the medical expenses Bluegrass paid on behalf of Stanford. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bluegrass shared responsibility with USACC as Stanford's employer and may be held responsible to pay his workers' compensation benefits. Remanded for a recalculation of which employer - Bluegrass or USACC - was liable for what proportion of Stanford's benefits. View "Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Stanford" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree riot and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) did not violate Appellant's due process rights by replaying witness testimony during the jury's deliberations in Appellant's absence; (2) did not violate Appellant's right to conflict-free counsel by permitting Department of Public Advocacy Attorneys to engage in multiple representation of him and other defendants involved in the same events; (3) did not violate Appellant's speedy trial rights; and (4) did not deny Appellant a fair trial by permitting four of Appellant's witnesses to testify in shackles and prison garb. View "Stacy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of sodomy against his step-daughter. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was entitled to a mistrial for an alleged Brady violation and that the trial court erred in excusing a juror. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying a mistrial, as the prosecution did not violate Defendant's due process rights by failing to disclose material evidence to the defense in violation of Brady; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in designating the questionable juror as an alternate and excusing him from deliberating in the case. View "Nunley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a Walgreens Pharmacy and requested Oxycontin. The pharmacist alleged Appellant told him he had a gun. The police subsequently apprehended Appellant, whom they discovered to be highly impaired. A jury subsequently found Appellant guilty of burglary in the first degree. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a direct verdict of acquittal because the Commonwealth failed to prove he remained unlawfully in the Walgreens Pharmacy. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a judgment of not guilty to be entered, holding that the Commonwealth failed to prove the necessary elements of burglary, as Appellant's license to remain in the pharmacy was not explicitly or implicitly revoked the evening of the events at issue. View "Lewis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law