Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of complicity to attempted murder, complicity to second-degree assault, and tampering with physical evidence and his sentence of twenty years' imprisonment, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the complicity to attempted murder charge, the complicity to second-degree assault charge, or the tampering with physical evidence charge; (2) the trial court properly denied a mistrial; (3) Defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on menacing; and (4) the trial court properly excluded irrelevant evidence during the penalty phase. View "Stieritz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and his sentence of thirty years' imprisonment, holding that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to present victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of Defendant's trial, and the error affected Defendant's substantial rights.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the admission of testimony about how the alleged sexual assaults affected the victims in the merits phase constituted impermissible victim impact testimony, and this error impacted Defendant's substantial rights, requiring remand for a new trial. View "Alderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals in this case involving the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350 is applicable only in instances in which a party has pled voluntary waste.Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350, a life tenant who commits waste against the corpus of an estate shall "lose the thing wasted and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed." At issue was when the statute of limitations began to run in this case, a question that required resolution of the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, which required the Supreme Court either to affirmed its longstanding distinction between voluntary and permissive waste or to collapse the two categories into simply "waste." The Supreme Court held (1) long-standing case law continues to be accurate statements of the law of waste as it exists in Kentucky, therefore, section 381.350 continues to apply only to claims of voluntary waste; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff in this case stated claims for voluntary waste. View "Ferrill v. Stock Yard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals that because an insurance company's coverage under its policy had never been finally adjudicated, a third-party claimant's bad faith claim was premature, holding that the court of appeals erred.Relying on Pryor v. Colony Insurance Co., 414 S.W.3d 424 (Ky. App. 2013), the court of appeals held that the circuit court improperly allowed Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Pryor should not be construed as requiring a final judicial determination of coverage prior to filing a third-party tort claim against an insurer, and instead, this Court continues to apply the requirements of Wittmer v. Jones; and (2) the court of appeals erred concluding that the circuit court improperly permitted Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims in violation of Pryor because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. View "Estate of Bramble v. Greenwich Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of theft by unlawful tasking, burglary in the third degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, and imposing a total sentence of twenty years in prison, holding that the trial court erred in part.The Supreme Court vacated the conviction as a persistent felony offender and remanded this action, holding (1) the instructions given in this case were erroneous because it could not be determined whether the jurors were unanimous in concluding that Defendant committed a single act satisfying the instruction, but the error was not palpable; (2) there was palpable error in Defendant's conviction as a persistent felony offender; and (3) Defendant's motion for directed verdict was properly denied. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or greater offense and its sentence of twenty-seven years in prison, holding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him by permitting three witnesses to testify via Zoom and erred by permitting the Commonwealth to join three indictments for trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it joined the three indictments for trial; and (2) erred when it permitted three witnesses to testify remotely, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Spalding v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession of heroin, holding that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's admission of certain evidence and by affirming the trial court's decision allowing a certain witness to testify.Here, the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable test for determining whether the warrantless search of a parolee's vehicle is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, as announced in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and overruled its decision in Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014) to the extent it held that the conditions of parole imposed by state law are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court also held that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his truck; (2) erred by affirming the trial court's admission of evidence of methamphetamine for which Defendant had been acquitted and evidence of marijuana for which he had been found guilty; and (3) erred in affirming the trial court's decision to allow a witness to testify regarding events he did not perceive in real-time. View "Gasaway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding evidence of a guardianship order in a prior criminal prosecution against Defendant for custodial interference and other related charges, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the proper Ky. R. Evid. 403 analysis.Defendant allegedly broke into a residence where her child lived with the child's father and his girlfriend, assaulted the girlfriend, and fled with the child. Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the guardianship order at issue, asserting that it would be unduly prejudicial. The trial court granted Defendant's motion and excluded the guardianship order. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in determining that evidence in the guardianship order would unduly prejudice Defendant by confusing the jury and that the guardianship evidence was vital to the Commonwealth's case. View "Commonwealth v. Melton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to utilize Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.02(3) to assess attorney's fees against a non-party after the non-party failed to obey an order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, holding that the plain language of CR 34.07(3) applies only to parties to an action.Plaintiffs brought two actions related to an automobile collision against their insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, among others. Allstate disputed the charges assessed by Dr. David Megronigle for his chiropractic treatment to Plaintiffs, alleging that they were not properly compensable. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Megronigle. Thereafter, Allstate filed a motion for attorney's fees under CR 37.02(3). The court granted the motion and ordered Megronigle to pay Allstate the amount of $816. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of CR 37.07(3) applies only to parties to an action; and (2) Megronigle was not a party to the underlying action because he was involved solely by virtue of the subpoenas served upon him by Allstate. View "Megronigle v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Secura Supreme Insurance Company as the underinsured motorists' (UIM) carrier for Viviane Renot, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. David Porta to testify about medical questions beyond his qualifications.Renot was allegedly injured in a vehicle collision and brought this action against Secura as her UIM carrier. During trial, Secura called Porta, a biomechanics expert, to testify regarding his biomechanics and anatomical opinions relative to the mechanism of injury in the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Secura, finding that the collision had not been a substantial factor in Renot's injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. Porta to invade the exclusive province of medical doctors in determining medical causation, and the error required a new trial. View "Renot v. Secura Supreme Insurance Co." on Justia Law