Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of tampering with physical evidence, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal littering, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The court of appeals reversed and remanded Defendant's criminal littering conviction but otherwise affirmed. Defendant sought discretionary review, challenging the constitutional validity of the initial traffic stop, the pat-down of his person, and the vehicle search which led to the evidence supporting his convictions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) Defendant was arrested after the officer conducted an unlawful Terry pat-down of his person, resulting in the discovery of a bag of marijuana; and (2) therefore, the vehicle search incident to the unlawful arrest was also unlawful. View "Frazier v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Brian and Lori Peay purchased a home manufactured by Energy Homes, Division of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (SEHI). At closing, SEHI offered the Peays certain warranties on the home in exchange for the Peays' agreement that any disputes over the home would be submitted to binding arbitration. Brian Peay accepted the warranties and signed the arbitration agreement. After discovering flaws in the home, the Peays filed suit against SEHI, among other defendants. SEHI moved to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, (1) the arbitration agreement was not prohibited by the merger and integration clause of the purchase contract; (2) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable; and (3) Lori Peay was bound to the arbitration agreement even though she did not sign the agreement. Remanded. View "Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. Defendant was placed on probation, which was later revoked due to Defendant's noncompliance with the terms of the county's drug court program. Defendant appealed both his burglary conviction and his probation revocation. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta v. California hearing to inquire into Defendant's desire to serve as his own attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Defendant did not unequivocally request to dispense with counsel and to proceed pro se, the trial court was under no obligation to engage Defendant in a Faretta colloquy. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant pled guilty to illegal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. In 2010, Defendant filed a motion to void her felony conviction, which the circuit court granted. Thereafter, Defendant moved to expunge the newly voided felony conviction. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, asserting that neither Ky. Rev. Stat. 431.076 nor Ky. Rev. Stat. 431.078 provide for expungement of a voided conviction. The trial court expunged Defendant's record pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f), which permits a court to relieve a party from its final judgment for any reason of an extraordinary nature that justifies such relief. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that Defendant's voided conviction amounted to the underlying charge being dismissed with prejudice, thereby qualifying for expungement under section 431.076. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court lacked authority under section 431.076 to expunge Defendant's newly voided conviction, as voiding Defendant's conviction was not the same as her charges being dismissed with prejudice; and (2) the use of the catch-all provision found in Rule 60.02(f) was error. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

The City of Fort Thomas, through its police department, denied a request by the Cincinnati Enquirer to inspect and copy the entire police file generated during a homicide investigation. In denying the request, the City relied on the law-enforcement exemption to the Kentucky Open Records Act (Act). The circuit court upheld the City's denial of the Enquirer's request. The court of appeals reversed, thereby rejecting the City's claim of a blanket exemption for its investigatory file, and remanded with instructions that the file be parsed into exempt and non-exempt portions of the investigatory file, with the non-exempt portions to be released to the newspaper. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly determined that the law enforcement exemption does not create a blanket exclusion from the Act's disclosure provisions for all law enforcement records pertinent to a prospective law enforcement action; and (2) to invoke the exemption, the City must show the disclosure of such records would harm or interfere with a prospective enforcement action in some significant and concrete way. Remanded. View "City of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati Inquirer" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to four counts of complicity to rape (victim under twelve years of age) and one count each of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and first-degree sexual abuse pursuant to a conditional guilty plea. Appellant subsequently appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to a social worker on the grounds that Appellant was not provided with Miranda warnings. The trial court determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not entitled to Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda, and therefore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Buster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of second-degree burglary, as Defendant did not request a lesser included offense of criminal trespass; and (2) Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly imposed court costs in its oral ruling at sentencing failed because the written order did not impose court costs. View "Brock v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

This case arose after the settlement of Guard v. American Home Products, Inc., which was brought by Kentucky residents who had taken the diet drug known as Fen-Phen. Each Appellant was a plaintiff in the Guard case and was represented under a contingent fee contract by Appellees, a team of four attorneys. Appellants filed a complaint alleging that Appellees breached their fiduciary duties by wrongfully retaining or improperly disbursing a portion of the Guard case settlement money that should have gone to Appellants. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Appellants, finding three of the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case against the three attorneys for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion regarding the issue of the three attorneys' breach of fiduciary duty and reinstated the partial summary judgment entered against them, holding, primarily, (1) the facts established a breach of fiduciary duty that entitled Appellants to summary judgment on the three attorneys' liability as a matter of law; and (2) the court of appeals did not err by declining to review the trial court's denial of summary judgment against the fourth attorney, as the order was not appealable. View "Abbott v. Chelsea " on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for unexcused absences, chronic tardiness, and leaving work without providing a reason. Employee filed for unemployment benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance granted benefits, determining that Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. The Unemployment Appeals referee disagreed and set aside the decision. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission reversed. Employer appealed by filing a complaint against the Defendant and Employee. Because Employee never responded, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Employee and simultaneously entered an order affirming the decision of the Commission. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Employee was not required to answer Employer's complaint, default judgment was not proper under these circumstances; (2) the evidence established that Employee knowingly violated Employer's attendance policy, and thus, Employee should have been disqualified from benefits on this basis. Remanded. View "W. Ky. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Runyon" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP), second offense, pursuant to a plea agreement and received a five-year pretrial diversion. At the time Appellant entered into the diversion, the penalty for second offense PDP, a felony, was one to five years in prison. The statute was amended in April 2010, however, making the penalty for a second or subsequent offense of PDP, now a misdemeanor, ninety days to twelve months in jail. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to DUI. At her sentencing hearing, Appellant requested that the trial court continue her diversion, given that second offense PDP was now a misdemeanor, or apply the new sentence for second offense POP. The trial court voided the diversion agreement and sentenced Appellant to felony time in accordance with the prior law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion agreement, the court was vested with the authority to void the contract in its entirety; but (2) because there was no final judgment entered when Appellant violated the terms of her diversion, any law that had gone into effect that would mitigate Appellant's sentence should have been applied. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law