Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant appealed, alleging several errors that were not preserved for appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) Appellant's allegations of error in the jury instructions were foreclosed and not subject to appellate review; (2) the trial court erred in introducing evidence during the penalty phase that included references to prior charges that were dismissed or amended to lesser offenses, but the error was not palpable; and (3) improper statements made during the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument were not palpable error. View "Martin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was conviction of wanton murder, three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree, criminal mischief, and assault in the fourth degree. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) Appellant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to excuse a juror for cause on the basis of a lack of impartiality was unpreserved for appellate review; and (2) the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion for directed verdict as to Appellant's wanton murder and wanton endangerment charges, as it was not unreasonable for the jury to convict Appellant of the charges. View "Hurt v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of trafficking in marijuana over five pounds and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of Appellee's prior bad conduct in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 404(b); and (2) the prosecutor improperly misstated the facts during closing arguments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the admission of the prior bad act evidence was proper; and (2) the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence in his closing argument was a harmless error because his correction of his misstatement cured any prejudicial effect that might otherwise have arisen. View "Commonwealth v. Tramble" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers apprehended Defendant's friend, Justin Masengale, Susan Martin identified Masengale as one of two assailants who grabbed her purse and struck her in the face. Masengale was then transported to the police station, where he identified Defendant as the other assailant. Masengale moved to suppress the out-of-court identification by Martin, arguing that it was tainted by pre-identification actions by the police. Defendant joined in Masengale's motion, arguing that Masengale's identification of him was tainted because Martin's identification of Masengale was tainted. The trial court denied the motions to suppress after a hearing at which Martin did not testify. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to determine that Martin's out-of-court identification of Masengale was reliable absent Martin's testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding (1) the circumstances surrounding the show-up identification by Martin were unduly suggestive; but (2) Martin's show-up identification of Masengale was reliable. View "Commonwealth v. Parker" on Justia Law

Appellee was indicted for murder for the shooting death of her husband. Appellee admitted that she killed her husband but claimed she was acting in self-defense. The jury acquitted Appellee of the murder charge but found her guilty of the lesser offense of reckless homicide. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the conviction, determining that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a reckless homicide conviction and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on that offense. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the reckless homicide instruction was properly given in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Hasch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to a total sentence of fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Appellant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the identification made during a photo lineup and the in-court identification made at trial were impermissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in the pre-trial identification procedure or in a witness's identification of the Appellant in trial; and (2) the testimony given about the fingerprints lifted off a piece of evidence was not erroneously admitted. View "Barnes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, first-degree criminal mischief, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and being a persistent felony offender. Defendant requested that he represent himself in the jury trial. The trial court appointed standby counsel for Defendant despite his objection. At trial, the court restricted the range of Defendant's self-representation by barring him from all bench conference and allowed only standby counsel to participate. After the trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's restriction of standby counsel at bench conferences in lieu of Defendant himself or hybrid counsel violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by leaving Defendant unrepresented at these critical stages in the trial proceeding. View "Allen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ky. Rev. Stat. 386.180 mandated that testamentary trustees make a choice of compensation between either an annual fee or a fee at the termination of the trust. Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of testamentary trusts managed by Trustees. The Caperton Trust, managed by PNC Bank, operated under a termination-fee compensation option, and the Jarvis Trusts, managed by National City, operated under an annual-fee option. After the General Assembly repealed section 386.180 in 2008, the Trustees brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of whether the repeal of the statute affected their compensation, where the two trusts at issue were in existence for many years before the statute was repealed. The trial court granted the Trustees' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the repeal of section 386.180 eliminated all restrictions on the calculation of trustee fees. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the repeal of section 386.180 was complete and unlimited, and therefore, trustees of testamentary trusts could collect reasonable fees on trusts that predated the repeal of the statute. View "Jarvis v. Nat'l City" on Justia Law

Appellants, several individuals, contended that a Robertson County passway was a private drive, and Appellees, Robertson County, the County Fiscal Court, and an individual (collectively, Fiscal Court), argued that the passway was a part of the formal county road system of the County. Appellant asked the Fiscal Court to acknowledge there had never been a formal adoption of the passway into the official county road system, but the Fiscal Court declined. Appellants subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the passway was not a lawfully adopted county road. The trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment. The Fiscal Court appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by treating the case as an original action pursuant to the declaratory judgment statute instead of an appeal from an action of the County Fiscal Court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellants' action could be brought in the circuit court only as an appeal from the decision of the County Fiscal Court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because no appealable event occurred under the facts of this case, Appellants properly invoked the declaratory judgment process to challenge the legal status of the passway. View "Whitley v. Robertson County" on Justia Law

Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.011(8), reductions within a job classification must be made based on seniority. Pamela Meyer had been employed for several years at the Clark Elementary School as a coordinator for the Family Resource Youth Service Center (FRYSC). When a new elementary school was opened in 2007, two older elementary schools were closed, including Clark Elementary. When positions were reassigned, Meyer was placed at the new school as a FRYSC clerk, rather than a FRYSC coordinator, with an accompanying reduction in salary. Meyer subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that her statutory rights under section 161.011(8) had been violated because her transfer was the result of an improperly conducted reduction in force. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Meyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a reduction in force under section 161.011(8) requires a reduction in the total number of employees, based on a sound business reason; and (2) in this case, there was no reduction in force, and therefore, section 161.011(8) did not apply to Meyer. View "Webb v. Meyer " on Justia Law