Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendants' convictions arose from dealing in Suboxone, the trade name of a drug containing buprenorphine. Before the trial court, Defendants challenged the scientific evidence used in classifying buprenorphine as a Schedule III controlled substance. Defendants argued that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services wrongly reclassified buprenorphine in 2002 from a Schedule V to Schedule III controlled substance, which change came about as a result of a change in federal law. The trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a challenge to the Cabinet's scheduling of a controlled substance following federal action. The court of appeals remanded with directions to name the Attorney General and Cabinet as parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did have jurisdiction here, as a trial court may take judicial notice of the federal regulation used by the Cabinet and make a determination whether the findings comport with the requirements of Kentucky law; and (2) the Attorney General and Cabinet were not necessary parties in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery, first-degree sodomy, first-degree rape, kidnapping, and tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of imprisonment with the sentences to be served consecutively, not to exceed sixty years. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively because they exceeded fifty years in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110 and 532.080(6)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the only limitation on the aggregate length of consecutive sentences for defendants whose highest class of crime is a Class A or B felony is the seventy-year cap found in section 532.110(1)(c), and because the highest class of crime Defendant was convicted of was a Class B felony, Defendant's sentence was lawful. View "Castle v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against the company that marketed the anti-obesity drug combination known as Fen-Phen. Plaintiffs claims were transferred from Kentucky to a similar action pending in Alabama, where Plaintiffs were represented by Attorneys. After Plaintiffs' claims were settled, Plaintiffs brought this action against Attorneys, claiming that Attorneys wrongfully withheld from each Plaintiff a substantial portion of the settlement award. The circuit court dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiffs' complaint was untimely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the court of appeals' affirmation of a summary judgment dismissing the claims of all fifty Plaintiffs where the motion before the trial court related to only one particular plaintiff; (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the Alabama statute of limitations rather than Kentucky's, but Appellants' suit was untimely under the applicable Kentucky statutes; (3) Plaintiffs' claims of misrepresentation were subject to the one-year limitation period for professional service malpractice rather than the general five-year limitation period; and (4) the application of the statutes of limitations was not an issue to be resolved by a jury. View "Abel v. Austin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of third-degree assault, third-degree criminal mischief, and of being a first-deree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not palpably err in failing to provide the jury with an instruction based upon the voluntary act concept embodied in Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.030(1); (2) palpable error did not occur when the trial court failed to instruct on the burden of proof in relation to Appellant's insanity defense instruction; (3) the final sentencing was fair and did not deny Appellant of the benefit of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.070; and (4) the persistent felony offender enhanced twenty-year sentence imposed in this case did not violate the Kentucky Constitution. View "Thornton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Pennsylvania resident who was injured in Kentucky. Plaintiff's daughter, with whom Plaintiff resided, was driving the vehicle involved in the accident. Plaintiff brought suit against her insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under a policy issued in Pennsylvania and covering a vehicle that Plaintiff registered and used exclusively in Pennsylvania. The trial court and court of appeals concluded that Pennsylvania law governed the dispute between Plaintiff and State Farm, but the two courts reached different results. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage because her policy disallowed coverage when she was injured in an underinsured vehicle owned or regularly used by a "resident relative." The court of appeals found Kentucky public policy would prohibit enforcement of the policy provision and concluded Plaintiff was entitled to UIM coverage despite the plain language of her policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Pennsylvania law applied to this dispute; and (2) there was no prohibition on the type of UIM exclusion at issue in this case. View "State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree and of being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) striking a potential juror for cause based on his religious views; (2) allowing the jury to re-watch videotapes while in the jury deliberation room; (3) failing to instruct the jury on the offense of criminal facilitation to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree; and (4) denying Appellant's request for a second-degree PFO jury instruction. View "Springfield v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of wanton murder, three counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and two counts of second-degree wanton endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Appellant's pretrial motion to suppress the recorded interview he gave to the police shortly after his arrest; (2) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on two of the counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, as sufficient evidence supported the charges; (3) while the trial court erred by failing to give a definitional instruction corresponding with the self-protection instruction, the error did not result in a manifest injustice under the circumstances of this case; and (4) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's request to give an instruction to the jury defining reasonable doubt. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of several drug-related offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's request for a jury instruction on criminal facilitation as a lesser included offense to manufacturing methamphetamine; (2) because Appellant did not request an instruction on unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor, Appellant was not entitled to relief on his argument that the trial court erred by failing to give this instruction; and (3) the trial court clearly erred by imposing fines upon Appellant, who was indigent, for his misdemeanor convictions. View "Roberts v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree fleeing or evading the police and several other crimes. Appellant challenged his conviction for fleeing or evading and claimed that the trial court erred in not allowing the jurors to use their notes during deliberations. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first-degree fleeing or evading police; and (2) the trial court erred in prohibiting jurors from taking their notes into the jury room for deliberations, but the error was not reversible under palpable-error review. View "McCleery v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant's conviction for tampering with physical evidence and vacated his sentence for that conviction, holding that a directed verdict of acquittal should have been entered on the tampering charge, as there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could fairly find Appellant guilty of tampering with physical evidence; and (2) affirmed Appellant's murder conviction and corresponding sentence, holding that the court did not reversibly err in its judgment regarding this conviction. View "McAtee v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law