Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Appellee sued Dick's Sporting Goods after she slipped and fell to the floor at one of Dick's stores, claiming the store was negligent in maintaining its premises. Dick's denied that it owed any duty to Appellee because the condition of the floor was open and obvious. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dick's. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment, as Dick's had an affirmative duty to maintain its store premises in a reasonably safe condition and whether Dick's breached that duty was a question for the jury to decide. Remanded. View "Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Webb" on Justia Law

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Appellee, a licensed attorney with experience in the practice of criminal law, was indicted on five counts of failure to file Kentucky tax returns for several years. Prior to trial, Appellee appeared on his own behalf, but one day before jury trial was to begin, Appellee requested a continuance to retain private counsel. The trial judge overruled the motion without holding a formal Faretta hearing. After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted on five counts of failing to file a state tax return. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment, holding that criminal defendants who are experienced criminal trial attorneys are not entitled to a Faretta hearing or inquiry prior to representing themselves. View "Commonwealth v. Ayers" on Justia Law

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In Haydon Bridge I, the Supreme Court held that provisions of the 2000-2002 and 2002-2004 budget bills, which suspended annual General Fund appropriations to the Benefit Reserve Fund (BRF) were constitutional but that other provisions of the bills ordering funds transferred from the BRF to the General Fund were unconstitutional. On remand, the trial court granted permanent prospective relief prohibiting the future transfer of funds from the BRF to the General Fund or other state agencies and ordered retroactive injunctive relief requiring the Governor and State Budget Director (collectively, "the Governor") to return monies that had been transferred from the BRF to the General Fund from 2000 to 2010. The court's order addressed, among other things, transfers from the part of the BRF known as the Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis Fund. The Governor appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the retroactive injunctive relief ordered by the trial court violated sovereign immunity and the separation of powers; (2) there was no basis for the trial court's award of attorneys' fees; and (3) because Plaintiffs had no standing with regard to the Pneumoconiosis Fund, the trial court should not have enjoined transfers from that Fund based on a request from Plaintiffs. View "Beshear v. Haydon Bridge Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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This case involved a dispute between a condominium association (the Council) and one of its co-owners (Ballard) regarding the need to replace and who should bear the cost of replacement of a two-story wall of windows in Ballard's condominium. Ballard filed suit against the Council seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. The Council, meanwhile, replaced the wall of windows and filed a lien statement and lis pendens to serve as notice that it was asserting a lien against Ballard's condominium. The Council counterclaimed. Ballard amended her complaint to assert, inter alia, a slander of title claim. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Ballard and ordered the Council to release its lis pendens notice and statement of lien from Ballard's condominium. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Ballard's slander of title claim was properly submitted to the jury; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the Council did not have a fiduciary duty to Ballard, and therefore, the fiduciary claim should have been dismissed rather than a new trial ordered. Remanded. View "Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to second-degree possession of a controlled substance and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized upon his arrest because the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that Appellant had committed a misdemeanor offense by carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an objectively reasonable police officer would have believed there was probable cause to arrest Appellant for carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) therefore, the search and ultimate seizure of the evidence leading to Appellant's conviction were valid, and the circuit court thus did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses, including first-degree robbery and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer prejudice when the trial court's voir dire procedure was not consistent with the applicable statutes and rules, as the procedure employed in this case did not constitute a substantial deviation from the proper method; (2) the trial court's use of Appellant's single prior felony conviction to establish the offense of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and to enhance Appellant's first-degree robbery sentences under the persistent felony offender statute did not constitute double enhancement; and (3) the trial judge properly concluded that a mistrial was not warranted after a juror had contact with a victim-witness. View "Oro-Jimenez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of complicity to murder and first-degree complicity to robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motions for mistrial after the Commonwealth repeatedly referenced two of Appellant's three co-indictees' guilty pleas in the presence of the jury; (2) admitting eighteen jail letters written between Appellant and a co-indictee as relevant evidence; (3) holding that Appellant's co-indictee had not waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, thus not implicating Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense due to the co-indictee's refusal to testify; and (4) denying Appellant's motion for mistrial after the jury briefly accessed inadmissible evidence during deliberations. View "Mayse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Claimant was working for Employer when she was seriously injured. Claimant, a janitor, became trapped in a stalled elevator and fell several stories down the shaft when Employer's security staff attempted to rescue her. An administrative law judge (ALJ) enhanced Claimant's worker's compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which penalizes an employer for an intentional failure to follow a safety protocol. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Claimant was not entitled to an award enhancement because there must be a finding that Employer "ignored or willfully overlooked a safety hazard that was reasonably foreseeable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in order to warrant enhancement under section 342.165(1), the employer must be found to have intentionally disregarded a safety hazard that even a lay person would recognize as likely to cause serious physical harm; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Employer intentionally disregarded a safety hazard in this case. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

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Comprehensive Home Health Services filed a certificate of need (CON) with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to expand its home health services into Whitley County. Two Existing Providers requested a hearing to oppose the application. The hearing officer approved of the CON after disallowing certain evidence proffered by the Existing Providers. The circuit court reversed, finding that the Cabinet's decision to grant the CON was arbitrary and ruling that the evidence allowed at the remand hearing should be "limited to the scope of the October 25, 2006 hearing." The Existing Providers appealed, contending that the circuit court's order would limit the evidence on remand to an outdated state health plan (SHP). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the current SHP, not the one in place at the time of the original hearing, must guide the decision on remand. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) allowing consideration of changed circumstances and the current SHP on remand was not contrary to principles of administrative law and fulfilled the purpose of the CON statute; and (2) the court of appeals properly interpreted CON statutes and regulations to require consideration of the current SHP and calculations. View "Comprehensive Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Prof'l Home Health Care Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft by deception and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that a hearing with testimony would be necessary to determine the proper amount of restitution. Defendant did not object to this. The trial court then entered final judgment sentencing Defendant to imprisonment. Ten days later, the court ordered restitution. Defendant did not object to the court's power to order restitution during the restitution hearing. Defendant subsequently moved to vacate his conviction and the restitution order. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals vacated the restitution order, concluding that the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the restitution order ten days after the entry of the final judgment sentencing Defendant to imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the question of restitution, and Defendant waived any other claims regarding restitution by failing to raise that issue to the trial court. View "Commonwealth v. Steadman" on Justia Law