Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Appellant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized upon his arrest. The circuit court and court of appeals both affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress, holding that police officers’ search and ultimate seizure of a gun and controlled substances found on Appellant’s person was supported by sufficient cause and thus was a valid search incident to arrest. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, illegal possession of a controlled substance, and second-degree criminal mischief. The jury also found Appellant guilty of being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”) in the first-degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an enhanced sentence of twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40, the rule prescribing the number of peremptory challenges in a criminal case, is valid, and the trial court properly relied on that rule in this case; and (2) the Commonwealth improperly characterized Appellant’s PFO status, but the mischaracterization was not palpable error. View "Glenn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of robbery, burglary, unlawful imprisonment, receiving stolen property, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the trial court erred when it misinformed Appellant that he could not proceed to trial with a hybrid form of representation and therefore denied Appellant his right to represent himself for one pretrial motion while still retaining the services of counsel for the remainder of the proceedings; and (2) because the trial judge misstated the law, reversal and a new trial were necessary. View "Mitchell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, an experienced criminal attorney, was indicted on five counts of failure to file Kentucky tax returns for the tax years 2002 through 2006. Appellee proceeded pro se until a day before the jury trial was scheduled to begin, at which point Appellees requested a continuance for the purpose of possibly retaining private counsel. The trial court overruled the motion for a continuance. At no stage during the proceedings did the court conduct a Faretta hearing. Appellee was subsequently found guilty of five counts of failing to file a state tax return. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that criminal defendants who are experienced criminal trial attorneys are not entitled to a Faretta hearing or inquiry prior to representing themselves. View "Commonwealth v. Ayers" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Appellee for one count of murder. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that he was legally justified to act in self-defense and therefore immune from prosecution pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085. The trial court denied Appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellee subsequently filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal, holding that an order denying immunity from prosecution is immediately appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals was not authorized by statute or by the Constitution to consider an appeal from an interlocutory order denying immunity pursuant to section 503.085; and (2) furthermore, the collateral order exception to the finality doctrine did not apply in this circumstance. View "Commonwealth v. Farmer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, fleeing or evading police, and being a persistent felony offender. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Appellee subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion seeking relief from the judgment by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Appellee was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing, concluding that Appellee’s allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not clearly refuted by the record. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Appellee’s Rule 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing because a hearing was not necessary to determine that Appellee was not prejudiced by any errors of trial counsel regardless of whether those errors amounted to unprofessional performance. View "Commonwealth v. Searight" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against a rehabilitation hospital where her husband was staying after Plaintiff became entangled in some wires strung along the side of her husband's bed and fell, fracturing her kneecap. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital, concluding that the hospital owed no duty of care to Plaintiff because the wires were an open and obvious condition. Before the court of appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh, which modified Kentucky premises-liability law. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the court of appeals on a second appeal, holding (1) the foreseeability and duty analysis employed by the court of appeals in reaching its decision was incompatible with modern tort law trends; and (2) the analysis is now such that a court no longer makes a no-duty determination but, rather, makes a no-breach determination, which places the reasonable-foreseeability analysis in the hands of the jury. Remanded. View "Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc'y, Inc." on Justia Law

The underlying class action here was brought against Southern Financial Life Insurance Company, which sold credit life and disability insurance through lending institutions, by purchasers of Southern Financial's credit life and disability policies. During the discovery phase, the trial court entered an order compelling Southern Financial to produce certain loan information and documents regarding the putative class members and the insurance sold to them. Southern Financial did not comply with the order, arguing that the loan information was not in its "possession, custody or control" within the meaning of Ky. R. Civ. P. 34.01, but rather, the information was in the possession of the individual lenders. After applying principles of general agency law, the trial court overruled the objection. Southern Financial subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court's enforcement of the discovery order. The court of appeals declined to issue a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Southern Financial was legally in control of the information it was compelled to disclose in the trial court's order, and therefore, the trial court committed no error. View "S. Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Pike Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Following the death of their father in an accident in which the van he was driving struck a retaining wall, Appellees retained a law firm and attorneys (collectively, Appellants) to pursue a wrongful death action against the company charged with maintaining the van. The circuit court dismissed the suit after the defendant successfully excluded two of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Two years later, Appellees filed a professional negligence action against Appellants. The trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellees were not in privity with Appellants and thus lacked standing to sue for professional negligence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) there was a material factual issue in dispute as to whether Appellees were represented by Appellants or were led to believe they were being represented by them, and (2) even if there was no privity, the children were owed professional duties because they were the intended beneficiaries of the underlying wrongful death action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of material fact regarding the attorney-client relationship; and (2) the attorneys owed duties to the children, who were real parties in interest to the wrongful death action. View "Pete v. Anderson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, fleeing or evading the police, first-degree illegal possession of a controlled substance, and second-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender (PFO) to twenty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40, which prescribes the number of peremptory challenges in a criminal case, is valid, and the Court has the authority to promulgate that rule and all other rules of practice and procedure in the Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth improperly mischaracterized Appellant's PFO status during closing arguments of the PFO guilt phase trial, but the error was not palpable. View "Glenn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law