Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an incident that occurred during the 2018 Kentucky Derby. Joi Denise Roby and her husband were invited by Kyle McGinty to the backside stable area of Churchill Downs, a restricted area not open to the public. Roby, who had experience with horses, interacted with the horses in their stalls, including a stable pony named Henry. Henry, owned by Bradley Racing Stables and William Buff Bradley, was used to escort racehorses to and from the track, but was not actively engaged in this activity on the day of the incident. As Roby approached Henry in his stall, he lunged and bit her. Roby subsequently sued Bradley and Churchill Downs for breaching their duty to maintain a safe premises.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Bradley and Churchill Downs, holding that the Farm Animals Activity Act (FAAA) exemption did not apply to Churchill Downs because the stabling of a horse was a farm animal activity, not a horse racing activity. The court also ruled that Roby was a licensee because she conferred no benefit to Churchill Downs and no evidence in the record supported a breach of duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court orders granting summary judgment for Bradley and Churchill Downs, finding that the horse racing exemption applied because live racing was occurring, Roby was injured after being bitten by a horse located on the premises, and the horse was used to escort racehorses to and from the track.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the FAAA horse racing exemption did not apply to Roby's injuries. The court reasoned that while horse racing activities were occurring at Churchill Downs during the Kentucky Derby, neither Bradley, Churchill Downs, nor Roby were engaged in horse racing activities at the time Roby was bitten. The court also held that Louisville Metro Code of Ordinances § 91.028(A), which imposes liability for any personal injury caused by an animal, did not apply to Roby's injuries due to the FAAA's limitation of liability. View "Bradley Racing Stables, LLC v. Roby" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a car accident that occurred on November 4, 2015, involving Donna Powers and Fendol Carruthers, Jr. Carruthers was charged and pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Powers claimed to have sustained serious, permanent injuries from the crash. Carruthers was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) with a policy limit of $50,000. Powers began receiving Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits from her own insurance carrier, Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB). The Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions arising from motor vehicle accidents. Powers received her last PIP payment on August 4, 2016, meaning any tort claim she wished to assert arising from her accident with Carruthers must have been filed by August 4, 2018.Powers filed a complaint in McCracken Circuit Court on April 3, 2018, asserting a negligence claim against Carruthers and an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against KFB. However, Carruthers had died two years earlier in March 2016, unbeknownst to Powers or her attorneys. The case remained stagnant for the next year, with Powers failing to take any action to rectify the portion of her complaint that was a nullity against Carruthers. It wasn't until August 2019 that Powers successfully moved the district court to appoint the Public Administrator to act as Administrator of Carruthers’s Estate.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, which had dismissed Powers’s negligence claim against Carruthers, denied Powers’s motions for substitution and revival, denied Powers’s motion for leave to amend her complaint to raise a new claim, and granted summary judgment in favor of KFB. The court held that Powers’s claim against Carruthers was null, and her attempted claim against the Estate was untimely. Furthermore, Powers’s inability to recover from Carruthers or the Estate foreclosed her underinsured motorist claim against KFB. View "Powers v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Ricky Ullman was convicted on three counts of distribution of a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to twelve years, probated for five years, with several conditions including completion of a community-based sex offender treatment program (SOTP). The court later revoked his probation due to his failure to complete the SOTP, among other violations. Nearly two years after his probation was revoked, Ullman filed a motion challenging the revocation order, arguing that he could not be legally required to complete the SOTP. The circuit court granted him relief and vacated its revocation order, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Ullman’s challenge to the condition that he complete the SOTP was untimely and reinstated the circuit court’s revocation order. The court also held that a sentencing court may impose SOTP as a condition of probation for defendants who have not been convicted of a “sex crime” as defined by KRS 17.500. The court declined to address Ullman’s argument that the circuit court’s revocation order failed to comply with KRS 439.3106, as it was not properly preserved for review. However, the court agreed to remand the case for consideration of Ullman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. ULLMAN" on Justia Law

In 1998, Robert Keith Woodall was sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a teenage girl. In 2015, Woodall filed a Motion to Vacate the Death Sentence Due to Intellectual Disability, arguing that he is intellectually disabled and thus the imposition of the death penalty would violate his constitutional rights. The trial court denied his motion without a hearing. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied Woodall’s motion. The court found that Woodall had not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. Woodall appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the trial court. The court found that the trial court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Woodall had not proven that he is intellectually disabled by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also rejected Woodall's arguments that the trial court violated his due process rights and Confrontation Clause rights by admitting and relying on a report without requiring the report's author to testify at the hearing. View "WOODALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case involves four appellants who are parole-eligible inmates serving life sentences in the Kentucky Department of Corrections. They were denied any further opportunity at parole for the remainder of their sentences by the Kentucky Parole Board. The appellants challenged the Board's authority to issue a "serve-out," arguing that it violates the constitutional separation of powers.The Franklin Circuit Court concluded that the Board was within its statutory authority to issue a serve-out on a life sentence and granted summary judgment to the Board. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, reasoning that the legislature had not prohibited the Board from authorizing serve-outs on life sentences.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Board has the power to issue a serve-out to an inmate serving a life sentence. The court reasoned that while the current statutory scheme may not explicitly authorize the Board to grant serve-outs, the relevant legislative and administrative history indicates that the legislature has condoned the Board’s use of this power. The court also held that the Board's power to issue a serve-out does not violate the constitutional separation of powers. The court concluded that a serve-out is authorized by the legislature and is not constitutionally impermissible. View "CONN V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD" on Justia Law

The case involves Demetrius Roberson, who was convicted by a Logan County jury for murder, first-degree robbery, nine counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and attempted murder. The case arose from an incident where two men, one of whom was identified as Roberson, entered an apartment and fired shots, killing Lexus Bell and endangering several others present. The prosecution's theory was that Roberson and another individual, Reba Kirk, planned to rob the apartment as a form of retaliation against Bell's boyfriend, who had allegedly stolen from Kirk's drug dealing business. Roberson was sentenced to life without parole for twenty-five years.Roberson appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, raising several issues. He argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that another man admitted to the shooting, in admitting deposition testimony of a deceased witness, in excluding testimony regarding why he broke up with his child’s mother, in allowing the prosecution to accuse his mother of lying and committing perjury, in excluding evidence that his family attempted to provide police with exculpatory evidence, in failing to sequester the jury during its guilt phase deliberations, in allowing the jury to review only a portion of a witness’s testimony, and in imposing the longer of two inconsistent sentences recommended by the jury.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Logan Circuit Court, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings and actions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the sentence imposed was within the trial court's discretion. View "ROBERSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld an appellate court's decision in a workers' compensation claim involving claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Lewis Hicks, a Kentucky resident, was injured in West Virginia while working for Southeastern Land, LLC, a subsidiary of Booth Energy. Despite receiving medical and income benefits from Southeastern Land's West Virginia workers' compensation insurance carrier, Hicks filed a workers' compensation claim in Kentucky. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Hicks' employment was "principally localized" in Kentucky, and hence awarded him benefits. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, determining Hicks' employment was "principally localized" in West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court noted that the primary issue was whether Hicks' employment was "principally localized" in Kentucky, thereby allowing for benefits under Kentucky law, or in West Virginia, thereby disallowing Kentucky benefits. The court concluded that while Southeastern Land conducted business in both states, the majority of Hicks' work time was devoted to his employment responsibilities at the West Virginia job site. As such, his employment was "principally localized" in West Virginia, disqualifying him from Kentucky's workers' compensation benefits. View "HICKS V. KEMI" on Justia Law

The case originates from a dispute over the jurisdiction for a child custody matter. The parties involved are Justin Aldava and Alyssa Baum, parents of H.A., a child born in Texas in 2019. The couple moved from Texas to Kentucky, then to Washington for Aldava's work, and back to Texas. Eventually, Baum and H.A. moved back to Kentucky. In November 2020, Baum filed a petition for an order of protection in Kentucky, indicating she sought temporary custody of H.A. Aldava filed a custody petition in Texas in December 2020. The issue arises from the interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), specifically the definition of "home state" and "temporary absence".The Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that under the UCCJEA, a bright-line, objective standard should be used to determine a child's "home state" - focusing on where the child has lived in the six months preceding the custody proceeding, and not the intent of the parties. Applying this standard, the court found that neither Texas nor Kentucky had initial jurisdiction over H.A. when custody was first raised, as H.A. had not lived in any state long enough to establish "home state" status. However, Kentucky obtained temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to Baum's petition for an order of protection. Consequently, Kentucky was the only state with any jurisdiction over H.A., and the custody action should be heard there. The court concluded that the Texas court's later finding that Texas was H.A.'s home state did not divest Kentucky of jurisdiction. The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. View "ALDAVA V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

A man, convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and possession of a handgun by a felon, appealed his convictions and sentence to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The case centered around the shooting death of a bar owner. The defendant argued that he shot in self-defense during a struggle, but the prosecution argued that the defendant was the initial aggressor, pointing to high-quality security camera footage that captured the events leading up to and following the shooting.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the defendant was not in custody when initially questioned at the hospital, so his Miranda rights were not violated. The Court also ruled that the trial court did not err in issuing an "initial aggressor" limitation to the jury's self-defense instructions, as the defendant’s act of pointing a gun at the victim constituted "physical force" under Kentucky law. Finally, while the trial court erred in the manner it polled the jury, the Supreme Court found the error was not "palpable" and would not have changed the result of the case. View "BOWMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed a dispute over the division of proceeds from the sale of a commercial property. The parties involved were business partners who had formed an LLC to manage the property. One of the partners, Allen, had previously asked his partners to sell their interests in the LLC to his children to resolve a tax problem. The partners agreed, but wanted to ensure they would not forfeit potential future profits from the property sale. They decided that proceeds from a future sale of the building would be split according to their ownership interests up to $8 million, and any proceeds above $8 million would be divided equally among them.In 2017, the property sold for $10 million, and a dispute arose over how to distribute the proceeds. One of the partners, Swyers, distributed the proceeds according to the previously agreed upon formula. However, the Allen family contested this, arguing that the entire proceeds should have been distributed according to ownership interests.The trial court ruled in favor of Swyers, finding that the agreement provided for a bifurcated distribution of proceeds, with an $8 million sale price threshold. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that distributions of one-third each were warranted only if the total net proceeds exceeded $8 million.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, agreeing with the trial court's interpretation of the agreement. The court concluded that the parties had intended to split the proceeds on a sale price threshold of $8 million, and that only the sales commission needed to be deducted before calculating the distribution of the final $2 million of the sale price. View "SWYERS V. ALLEN FAMILY PARTNERSHIP #1" on Justia Law