Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of complicity to murder and one count of first-degree complicity to robbery. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder count and to twenty years on the robbery count. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motions for mistrial after the Commonwealth referenced two of the three co-indictees’ guilty pleas in the presence of the jury; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting eighteen jail letters written by Appellant and her co-indictee into evidence; and (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial after the jury briefly accessed inadmissible evidence during deliberations. View "Mayse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, and assault in the fourth degree, third offense. The trial in this case was trifurcated. During the first phase, the jury convicted Appellant of fourth-degree assault, and during the second phase, the jury convicted Appellant of fourth-degree assault, third offense based on two prior convictions of fourth-degree assault. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment convicting Appellant of fourth-degree assault, third offense, and vacated the corresponding sentence for that offense, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge and that retrial for the charge was precluded under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because Appellant was not sentenced for the fourth-degree assault conviction, however, the case was remanded for sentencing for that conviction. View "Galloway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of murdering his wife and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Appellant alleged, inter alia, that he was entitled to a directed verdict and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other acts. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and therefore may be retried; and (2) the trial court’s admission of the other acts evidence was error under Ky. R. Evid. 404(b) given the Commonwealth’s failure to establish proof of the factual condition necessary to make it relevant, and the error was not harmless and prejudiced Appellant. View "Southworth v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Judith Burton filed a complaint against Dr. Philip Trover, a radiologist, and the Trover Clinic Foundation (TCF), Dr. Trover’s employer, alleging (1) Dr. Trover misread CT scans of her lungs, thereby delaying the diagnosis of her lung cancer, and (2) TCF was vicariously liable for Dr. Trover’s alleged negligence and was negligent itself in credentialing. Burton died before tried, and her Estate revived the complaint with respect to TCF, which impleaded Dr. Trover. A jury entered a verdict for Dr. Trover, and the trial court dismissed all of the Estate’s claims. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by not allowing the Estate to cross-examine Dr. Trover regarding the status of his Kentucky medical license, and the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its its discretion by excluding the license-status evidence, given the potential for confusing the issues to be tried and the strong likelihood that it would cause unfair prejudice. View "Trover v. Estate of Burton" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working for Employer, which had an insurance policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company. The policy included an underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement. After settling with the tortfeasor, Appellant sought damages from the UIM coverage in the Zurich policy. After Zurich refused Appellant’s claim, Appellant sued Zurich. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich on the grounds that the UIM coverage included in the policy was the result of a mutual mistake in the making of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of UIM coverage, holding that reformation of the insurance contract on the grounds of mutual mistake was improper because (1) the facts did not establish that at the time the insurance contract was formed, the minds of the contracting parties met with the common intent to execute a policy that excluded UIM coverage; and (2) Zurich did not assert the mistake or deny the existence of UIM coverage until after Appellant had released the tortfeasor. View "Nichols v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mary Bell was a disabled person who drew Social Security Insurance benefits and participated in a federally-funded, community-based program operated by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. When Thomas Bell, Mary’s father, retired and began to draw his Social Security benefits, Mary became eligible for Old Age, Survivor and Disability Insurance. Consequently, Mary was charged $60 per month for her continued program participation. Thomas filed an administrative appeal on Mary’s behalf. The matter ultimately reached the circuit court, which held that Mary could not be charged to participate in the program. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) awarded attorney’s fees against the Cabinet due to the Cabinet’s “egregious government behavior,” and (2) ordered the Cabinet to disclose the personal information of all other participants in the program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by (1) ordering the payment of attorney’s fees solely for egregious conduct without statutory authorization or a contract providing for such fees; and (2) ordering the disclosure of records of all persons participating in the program without the other persons having filed claims and no class action being certified. View "Bell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mother stipulated that she abused or neglected her children, including thirteen-year-old Kenny. The family court committed Kenny to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and Kenny was placed in a therapeutic foster home. After the Cabinet determined that the goal of permanency would be adoption, Father filed a motion to obtain custody of Kenny. The family court denied the motion and subsequently terminated the parental rights of Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Father was entitled to have an independent determination that Kenny was an abused or neglected child as specific to Father’s conduct and not based on Mother’s abuse or neglect; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the family court’s finding that terminating Father’s rights was in Kenny’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court made individualized findings that Father abused or neglected Kenny; (2) the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Father failed to show that the family court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. K.H." on Justia Law

Lisa and Larry Walker filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. C. Lance Love, claiming medical negligence in connection with a thyroidectomy that Dr. Love had performed on Lisa. Three years later, Dr. Love moved for summary judgment because the Walkers had yet to identify an expert who would testify that Dr. Love had deviated from the applicable medical standard of care. The trial court granted the motion due to failure of proof. The Walkers filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order, arguing that a surgical expert was not necessary. The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to create a legitimate dispute about the need for an expert witness. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was appropriate as to the issue of whether Dr. Love’s performance during or after the surgery met the standard of care because the Walkers failed to timely present any expert testimony regarding the issue; but (2) summary judgment was not appropriate as to whether surgery was the correct response to Lisa’s medical diagnosis. Remanded. View "Love v. Walker" on Justia Law

Appellants, three physicians, were formerly employed by The New Lexington Clinic (“NLC”) but resigned to practice at a facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, “Baptist”). NLC subsequently brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties owed in their capacity as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant on the ground that it aided and abetted Appellants’ breaches. The trial court dismissed the complaints, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the court considered controlling to all actions involving a breach of a corporate director’s duties. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, holding (1) section 271B.8-300 does not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors but codifies a standard of conduct and liability for directors derived from business judgment rule principles; (2) section 271B.8-300 did not apply in this case because preparing for and participating in a competing venture does not constitute the type of conduct addressed in the statute; and (3) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. New Lexington Clinic, P.S.C. " on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, the Kentucky Department of Revenue, and eight horse Kentucky racing associations that wished to expand their businesses to include wagering upon historical horse racing. Appellants filed an action for a declaration of rights concerning the operation of mechanical and electronic devices for wagering on previously run horse races, so-called “historical horse racing.” The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which held (1) the Commission has the statutory authority to license and regulate the operation of pari-mutuel wagering on historic horse racing; (2) under the present statutory scheme, the Department does not have the authority to tax the wagering upon historical horse races; and (3) whether the licensed operation of wagering on historic horse racing violates the gambling provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code is an issue that depends upon facts not in the record, therefore requiring further proceedings in the circuit court. View "Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Trust Found. of Ky." on Justia Law