Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother stipulated that she abused or neglected her children, including thirteen-year-old Kenny. The family court committed Kenny to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, and Kenny was placed in a therapeutic foster home. After the Cabinet determined that the goal of permanency would be adoption, Father filed a motion to obtain custody of Kenny. The family court denied the motion and subsequently terminated the parental rights of Father. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Father was entitled to have an independent determination that Kenny was an abused or neglected child as specific to Father’s conduct and not based on Mother’s abuse or neglect; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the family court’s finding that terminating Father’s rights was in Kenny’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the family court made individualized findings that Father abused or neglected Kenny; (2) the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Father failed to show that the family court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights. View "Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. K.H." on Justia Law

Lisa and Larry Walker filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. C. Lance Love, claiming medical negligence in connection with a thyroidectomy that Dr. Love had performed on Lisa. Three years later, Dr. Love moved for summary judgment because the Walkers had yet to identify an expert who would testify that Dr. Love had deviated from the applicable medical standard of care. The trial court granted the motion due to failure of proof. The Walkers filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order, arguing that a surgical expert was not necessary. The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to create a legitimate dispute about the need for an expert witness. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was appropriate as to the issue of whether Dr. Love’s performance during or after the surgery met the standard of care because the Walkers failed to timely present any expert testimony regarding the issue; but (2) summary judgment was not appropriate as to whether surgery was the correct response to Lisa’s medical diagnosis. Remanded. View "Love v. Walker" on Justia Law

Appellants, three physicians, were formerly employed by The New Lexington Clinic (“NLC”) but resigned to practice at a facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, “Baptist”). NLC subsequently brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties owed in their capacity as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant on the ground that it aided and abetted Appellants’ breaches. The trial court dismissed the complaints, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the court considered controlling to all actions involving a breach of a corporate director’s duties. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, holding (1) section 271B.8-300 does not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors but codifies a standard of conduct and liability for directors derived from business judgment rule principles; (2) section 271B.8-300 did not apply in this case because preparing for and participating in a competing venture does not constitute the type of conduct addressed in the statute; and (3) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. New Lexington Clinic, P.S.C. " on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, the Kentucky Department of Revenue, and eight horse Kentucky racing associations that wished to expand their businesses to include wagering upon historical horse racing. Appellants filed an action for a declaration of rights concerning the operation of mechanical and electronic devices for wagering on previously run horse races, so-called “historical horse racing.” The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which held (1) the Commission has the statutory authority to license and regulate the operation of pari-mutuel wagering on historic horse racing; (2) under the present statutory scheme, the Department does not have the authority to tax the wagering upon historical horse races; and (3) whether the licensed operation of wagering on historic horse racing violates the gambling provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code is an issue that depends upon facts not in the record, therefore requiring further proceedings in the circuit court. View "Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Trust Found. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions against each other. Emergency protective orders were entered against each. Shortly after entry of the orders, Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases. Judge Julie Paxton subsequently dismissed both of the domestic violence orders. Later, Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against David Deskins, the circuit court clerk who entered the dismissal of the orders into the record, former Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield, and Judge Thompson, contending that Judge Thompson was never removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Deskins to remove the order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Pike County Family Court (Thompson)" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sexual abuse for an incident involving his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) insufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction for first-degree rape because the Commonwealth did not prove the “forcible compulsion” element; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant’s computer password into evidence; and (3) the trial court committed reversible error when it did not allow Appellant to ask the victim about her prior inconsistent statement, and thus, Appellant’s conviction for first-degree sexual abuse must also be reversed. Remanded. View "Yates v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant entered an Alford plea to eleven counts of first-degree robbery and was sentenced to twenty-one years imprisonment. In 2008, Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, alleging that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance by misinforming him that he would be eligible for parole when he had served twenty percent of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on the specific allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pertaining to his parole eligibility. The court of appeals concluded that Appellant failed to preserve his right to appeal the summary denial of his Rule 11.42 motion because he did not request additional findings pursuant to Rule 11.42(6). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant did not waive his right to appeal the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 11.42 motion. View "Cawl v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After the mother (“Mother”) of two minor children died, Appellants, Mother’s nephew and his wife, were awarded emergency custody of the children. Appellants subsequently sought permanent custody of the children. The circuit court awarded Appellants custody. The children’s biological father (“Father”) appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on the grounds that Appellants lacked standing, but the court did not address the issue of Father’s fitness as a parent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants did in fact have standing to pursue the custody action under the comports of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.800, et seq. Remanded. View "Coffey v. Wethington" on Justia Law

Appellee was the target of a drug investigation conducted by investigators from the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) and Operation UNITE, a task force receiving federal funds that investigates drug-related crimes. No local law enforcement officer or entity participated in the investigation. Two indictments were returned by a Powell County grand jury charging Appellee with several drug-related offenses. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictments against him, holding that neither the OAG officers nor the Operation UNITE detectives had jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the OAG was not vested with statewide jurisdiction to investigate drug crimes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 218A.240(1) specifically vests the OAG with the authority to enforce and investigate drug crimes throughout the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine and second-degree persistent felony offender status. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drug-related evidence seized by a state police officer and a parole officer during a warrantless search of his residence while he was a parolee. Specifically, Appellant argued that the warrantless search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the parole officers did not have reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress, holding that because the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee, Appellant had no basis for application of the exclusionary rule. View "Bratcher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law