Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Appellant stabbed and killed Cory Kessnick. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he was entitled to immunity under Ky. Rev. Stat. 503.085, which provides immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who use force in self defense or defense of others. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the use of force employed by Appellant was unlawful. Appellant subsequently entered an Alford plea to charges of second-degree murder and assault under extreme emotional distress but appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed after undertaking a de novo review of the evidence on record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) court of appeals applied the incorrect standard of review in reversing the denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss; and (2) under the correct standard of review, there was a substantial basis for the trial court’s rulings. View "Commonwealth v. Lemons" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, of being a convicted felon in possession of a hand gun, and possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender to thirty-four years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by not instructing the jury on unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor as a lesser-included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (2) did not err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s motion to suppress items seized from his home, as the search was done pursuant to a valid search warrant. View "Rawls v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After Donald Brown had worked for Charles T. Creech, Inc. for more than sixteen years, Creech asked Brown to sign an agreement that contained a non-compete provision. Brown signed the agreement. After Brown went to work for Standlee Hay Company, Creech sued Brown and Standlee, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contract, intentional interference with existing, and prospective business contacts. The trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining Brown from directly or indirectly competing with Creech and from using information regarding Creech’s customers. The court of appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction, and the trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Standlee and Brown. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that issues of fact remained as to whether the non-compete portion of the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was not enforceable. View "Creech, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Bullitt County Board of Health enacted a Regulation that prohibited tobacco smoke in all enclosed public places, among other places, and placed additional restrictions regarding tobacco use on smoking-regulated businesses and regulated places. Appellants filed a petition for declaration of rights against the Board, arguing that the Board had exceeded its authority by enacting a substantive law without proper enabling legislation. The trial court agreed with Appellants and held that the Regulation was invalid. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the Regulation was valid and a proper exercise of the Board’s statutory authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the Resolution, and therefore, the Resolution was invalid and unenforceable. View "Bullitt Fiscal Court v. Bullitt County Bd. of Health" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy, intimidating a participant in the legal process, second-degree wanton endangerment, third-degree terroristic threatening, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error admitting testimony of a sexual assault nurse examiner; and (2) the trial court did not err by failing to grant Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict on the charge of intimidating a witness in the legal process. View "Edmonds v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed to sequential motions to suppress evidence, contending that the warrantless search of his mobile home was illegal and that the Commonwealth did not establish the proper chain of custody for the evidence seized from his home. Both motions were denied, and Defendant was found guilty as charged. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant's mobile home satisfied neither the textual directives of the Fourth Amendment and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution nor the judicially-created exception under Maryland v. Buie.View "Brumley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee filed suit against Appellants, seeking personal property damages and lost business income resulting from a vehicle collision in which a truck was damaged. The truck was owned by Appellee individually and used in his trucking business, an LLC. The LLC was not named as a plaintiff in the lawsuit. After the trial court granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment as to the lost business income, the court granted Appellants a judgment on the pleadings due to Appellee's failure to comply with discovery orders. The court of appeals reversed, concluding, inter alia, that (1) Appellee could properly pursue his lost business claim in his own name because he was the sole owner of the LLC, and (2) Appellee had presented sufficient evidence to overcome the motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in determining that Appellee could bring a claim in his own name for any trucking business lost by the LLC; and (2) the discovery sanction imposed on Appellee was the functional equivalent of an order dismissing both claims, and as such, findings of fact and conclusions of law were required.View "Turner v. Andrew" on Justia Law

James Taylor sued Chase Bank for failure to comply with the Uniform Commercial Code in regard to a check that had been returned for insufficient funds. The trial court concluded that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties and referred the case to arbitration. The arbitrator later granted Chase’s motion to dismiss the claim because of Taylor’s delay in filing the arbitration claim. Thereafter, the trial court set aside its earlier order finding that an arbitration agreement existed and its referral of the case to arbitration and denied Chase’s motion to confirm the arbitration award. Chase took an interlocutory appeal of the order denying its motion to confirm the arbitration order, arguing that the trial court was bound to confirm the arbitrator’s decision. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had the authority to set aside the order compelling arbitration after the arbitrator had rendered a dispositive order because the matter was not final and there was insufficient proof of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Bluegrass Powerboats" on Justia Law

Ann Shannon was the sole member of a limited liability company (LLC). In 2004, Shannon signed a lease for commercial space with the property’s owner, Rick Pannell, on behalf of the LLC. In 2005, the LLC was administratively dissolved. In 2006, Shannon and Pannell entered into a release of the old lease and a new lease. The new lease expressly stated that the LLC was the tenant and was signed by Shannon but did not mention Shannon’s company capacity in any direct way. Pannell subsequently sued for breach of the lease, naming the LLC and Shannon individually. Shortly after, the LLC was reinstated. The circuit court concluded that Shannon was entitled to immunity from personal liability and awarded Pannell damages against the LLC under the lease. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the facts of this case, Shannon did not directly obligate herself because she clearly signed the lease in her representative capacity and the lease was expressly with the company; and (2) Shannon could not be personally liable under Kentucky’s Limited Liability Company Act or under the theory that she exceeded her authority as an agent of the LLC during the dissolution. View "Pannell v. Shannon" on Justia Law

After a prison disciplinary hearing, Appellant, a prisoner, was found guilty of committing physical action against another inmate resulting in death or serious physical injury. Appellant subsequently filed a declaration of rights action in circuit court appealing the finding of guilt, contending that his due process rights were violated because the prison’s disciplinary hearing officer refused to allow him to call the victim of the assault and declined to view surveillance camera footage of the incident. The circuit court denied the petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if a prison challenges the denial of a prisoner’s request for a particular witness in a disciplinary proceeding by appealing the discipline imposed, the adjustment officer (AO) must provide for the record on review the AO’s reason for denying the witness; (2) if requested by the prisoner in a disciplinary proceeding an AO must review surveillance footage or similar documentary evidence; and (3) Appellant was found guilty and subject to prison discipline as a result of a process that failed to comport with the minimum requirements of due process. Remanded. View "Ramirez v. Nietzel" on Justia Law