Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A writer for the Kentucky New Era, Inc., a newspaper serving the city of Hopkinsville and the neighboring area, requested records from the Hopkinsville City Clerk, including copies of arrest citations and police incident reports involving stalking, harassment, or terroristic threatening. The City Clerk withheld some records and redacted from others certain types of personal data. The City then initiated an action essentially seeking a declaration that its decisions to withhold and to redact records did not violate the Kentucky Open Records Act (ORA). The circuit court ultimately ruled that the City's redactions of social security and driver's license numbers, of home addresses, and of telephone numbers comported with the ORA. The court of appeals upheld the redactions and held that the City had the right to redact the names of all juveniles in the records. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied the ORA's privacy exemption in concluding that the redactions at issue in this case were in accordance with the ORA. View "Ky. New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville" on Justia Law

After the foreign language taught at Knott County Central High School was switched from French to Spanish, Grace Patton, the high school's French teacher, lost her job. Patton brought suit against Appellants - the Knott County Board of Education, individual Board members, the high school principal, the superintendent, and individual members of the school's Site-Based Decision-Making Council. Appellant's complaint did not specifically identify any particular claim or cause of action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that (1) Patton's complaint had stated a claim against the school board under the whistleblower statute, and the evidence precluded summary judgment; and (2) the individual Appellants were not subject to qualified official immunity because the actions taken to Patton's detriment were ministerial, not discretionary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Patton did not state a claim under the whistleblower act and had no claim under the act under the facts as alleged; and (2) the individual Appellants were engaged in the performance of discretionary duties covered by the qualified official immunity doctrine.View "Knott County Bd. of Educ. v. Patton" on Justia Law

The Brattons brought an action against CitiFinancial, Inc. (Citi) alleging that Citi erroneously placed a mortgage on their property and did not release the mortgage after it was notified of the error. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Brattons and awarded damages pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 382.365. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Brattons failed to comply with the requirements of section 382.365(4) because they did not give notice by certified mail. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that section 382.365 simply did not apply to the situation in this case.View "Bratton v. CitiFinancial, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy and first-degree burglary, enhanced by the status offense of persistent felony offender (PFO) in the second degree, and was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree burglary charge; (2) properly applied Ky. R. Evid. 412, the rape shield rule, to prohibit admission of evidence of the victim's sexual history; and (3) did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to proceed to trial on the PFO charge. View "Minter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for the crimes of murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and trafficking in marijuana while in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges and sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to counsel by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictments against him; (2) did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to police detectives because Appellant did not unambiguously invoke his right to an attorney; (3) did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (4) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the trafficking in marijuana charge; and (5) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth failed to redact portions of Appellant's recorded interview with the detectives.View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other charges. The Supreme Court affirmed except as to Defendant's conviction for wanton endangerment, which the Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant's due process right to a fair trial by failing to remove two jurors for cause; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by introducing a hospital laboratory report without the testimony of the person who prepared the report; but (3) the prosecution of the wanton endangerment charge violated Defendant's double jeopardy rights, and the wanton endangerment instruction violated Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. Remanded.View "Little v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) denied her motion to suppress statements she gave to police after a polygraph examination because she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, and (2) failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant's statements given to the police because, under the totality of the circumstances, nothing showed that Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her rights as to her post-polygraph interview with police; and (2) Appellant's argument that the trial court failed to give an instruction on first-degree manslaughter was not properly preserved and not subject to palpable-error review.View "Wise v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of her vehicle during an investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to several drug-related charges and subsequently appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Defendant was detained for an unreasonably prolonged amount of time; and (2) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop beyond the time needed to complete a citation for a traffic violation. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant was detained beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop; but (2) the prolonging of Defendant's detention was justified by at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity.View "Commonwealth v. Bucalo" on Justia Law

Appellee entered guilty pleas to three charges of theft by unlawful taking over $300. The final judgment provided that Appellee be placed on supervised probation for five years and pay restitution. After the expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellee's probation based upon his failure to pay restitution. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that, pursuant to Conrad v. Evridge, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to revoke Appellee's probation. In so holding, the circuit court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4) operated to automatically extend Appellee's probationary period so long as he failed to complete payment of the restitution as ordered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 533.020(4) authorizes a trial court to extend the duration of a sentence of probation only if such an extension is necessary for payment of restitution; and (2) upon expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and was without authority to revoke Appellee's probation.View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed one of Appellant's convictions for first-degree assault, reversed the other conviction, and remanded, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to strike three prospective jurors for cause, failing to provide limiting instructions, or allowing a fact witness to present an expert opinion; (2) the Commonwealth's question to Appellant was to whether it was lawful for him to possess a firearm was not reversible error; but (3) the Commonwealth's proof did not support a conviction for one of the first-degree assault convictions.View "McDaniel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law