Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to dismiss the entire jury venire after certain statements by a prospective juror instead of issuing an admonition; (2) erred in allowing the narration of security footage by witnesses, but the error was harmless; (3) improperly allowed speculative testimony regarding Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. View "Boyd v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this divorce action between Michael and Mary Bell, the trial court set the amount of Michael’s monthly child-support obligation by deducting unreimbursed business expenses from Michael’s gross income rather than making an appropriate adjustment in the guideline award as allowed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.212. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deducting Michael’s unreimbursed business expenses from gross income because Michael was not self-employed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to deduct unreimbursed business expenses from gross income, a trial court must find the parent is self-employed; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in this case by deviating from the statutory method of determining gross income when calculating child support. Remanded.View "Bell v. Bell" on Justia Law

Appellant’s charges in this case stemmed from a search of his residence by his parole officers and local sheriff’s deputies. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine and being a second-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the products of the search of his home, as Appellant consented to the search and there was no indication that the consent was invalid; and (2) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of lab testing on the products of the search, as the lab results were clearly admissible. View "Helphenstine v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

R.S., a teenaged child under eighteen years of age, engaged in an evening of “teenage shenanigans,” in which he and a group of contemporaries painted offenses messages on cars parked at a memorial service. Following hearings in juvenile session, a district court adjudicated R.S. guilty of second-degree criminal mischief by complicity and order him alone to pay the full amount of restitution to the owner of one of the defaced cars that was damaged in the incident. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed the adjudication and restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the adjudication of R.S.’s juvenile public offender status; and (2) the district court may, in weighing the best interest of the child in a juvenile disposition, order one party to pay the entire amount of restitution, despite other individuals’ possible involvement in the acts of vandalism.View "R.S. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2000, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft by deception and was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, probated for a period of five years. After Appellant failed to report to her probation officer, the trial court issued a warrant for her arrest. In 2011, Appellant was finally served with the arrest warrant. After a probation revocation hearing, the trial court dismissed the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Appellant’s probation, determining that Appellant’s period of probation had already expired. The court of appeals reversed, concluded that because Appellant “intentionally absconded,” she was barred from claiming that her probationary period had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issuance of a warrant for a probation violation will toll the period of probation preventing the probationer from being automatically discharged pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4); (2) the warrant, however, must be issued before the expiration of the period of probation; and (3) since the circuit court issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest within the five-year probationary period, it retained jurisdiction to conduct a probation revocation hearing.View "Whitcomb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant physicians were former employees of The New Lexington Clinic (NLC) who resigned from NLC to practice at a nearby facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, Baptist). NLC brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties, alleging that Appellants used confidential information and recruited NLC personnel while serving as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant for allegedly aiding and abetting Appellants' breaches. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the trial court considered controlling as to actions involving breach of a Kentucky corporate director's duties. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that section 271B.8-300 controlled but that sufficient facts were alleged to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) section 271B.8-300, which did not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors, did not apply in this case; and (2) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. Remanded.View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. The New Lexington Clinic, PSC" on Justia Law

Angela Frye filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer alleging that in 2008 she suffered a work-related injury. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Frye benefits related to the injury. In 2009, after the final hearing in the 2008 claim but before the ALJ took that claim under submission or rendered an opinion, Frye allegedly suffered a second work-related injury. In 2010, Frye filed a claim related to the 2009 accident. The ALJ dismissed the 2010 claim, concluding that Frye was required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270(1) to file her claim for benefits related to the 2009 accident and join it to her pending 2008 claim, which she failed to do. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, concluding that a claim is no longer pending for section 342,270(1) purposes after the date of the final hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in this case and under these facts, Frye's first injury claim was not pending between the date of the hearing and the date the ALJ rendered his opinion regarding that claim. Remanded.View "Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye" on Justia Law

Roger Collins died following an inpatient stay at Ridgeway Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Facility. Stella Collins, Roger's wife, subsequently brought an action against Ridgeway alleging wrongful death and nursing home neglect. After pretrial discovery, Ridgeway moved to disqualify Wilkes & McHugh (W&H), the lawfirm representing Collins, alleging that an investigator for W&H violated the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct by making contact with three of Ridgeway's employees. The trial court denied the motion. Ridgeway then sought a writ of mandamus seeking the dismissal of the claims brought against it or, alternatively, the disqualification of W&H. The court of appeals declined to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding that Ridgeway had an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise for the admission of unfairly and unethically obtained evidence. View "Ridgeway Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility, LLC v. Circuit Court " on Justia Law

In 1983, Appellant, the owner and chief executive officer of an asphalt company, pled guilty to violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for unlawfully bidding on state highway construction contracts. In order to have his company's privilege of bidding on new contracts reinstated, Appellant agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's (AG) investigation and proffered information pertaining to Appellant's involvement in a scheme to "rig" bids for highway construction contracts with the Kentucky Department of Transportation. In 2009, reporters for several newspapers submitted an Open Records Act (ORA) request to have the proffer disclosed. When Appellant learned the AG intended to release the proper, Appellant brought this action against the AG and ORA reporters seeking to have the release enjoined under the privacy exemption or the law enforcement exemption to the ORA. In 2011, the trial court ruled that the proffer should be released to the ORA requestors. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not have standing to invoke the law enforcement exemption provision to the ORA; and (2) matters of sufficient public interest warranted an invasion of Appellant's limited privacy interest in keeping his proffer from being disclosed.View "Lawson v. Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Father and Mother had one child when they divorced. In its initial custody order, the family court granted the parties joint custody of the child, designated Mother as the primary residential custodian, and set child support and established a visitation schedule. A final decree of dissolution of marriage was entered three months later that incorporated by reference the initial custody order. Twenty-five months after the initial custody order but only twenty-two months after entry of the final judgment awarding joint custody, Father filed a motion to modify child custody so as to grant him sole custody of the child. After a hearing, the family court granted Father sole permanent custody of the child. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the ground that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Petrey v. Cain because Father's motion was made less than two years after the entry of the final decree awarding custody and was supported by only one affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that subject matter jurisdiction of this matter was not contingent upon compliance with the affidavit requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.340. Remanded. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law