Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) denied her motion to suppress statements she gave to police after a polygraph examination because she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, and (2) failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant's statements given to the police because, under the totality of the circumstances, nothing showed that Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her rights as to her post-polygraph interview with police; and (2) Appellant's argument that the trial court failed to give an instruction on first-degree manslaughter was not properly preserved and not subject to palpable-error review.View "Wise v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of her vehicle during an investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to several drug-related charges and subsequently appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Defendant was detained for an unreasonably prolonged amount of time; and (2) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop beyond the time needed to complete a citation for a traffic violation. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant was detained beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop; but (2) the prolonging of Defendant's detention was justified by at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity.View "Commonwealth v. Bucalo" on Justia Law

Appellee entered guilty pleas to three charges of theft by unlawful taking over $300. The final judgment provided that Appellee be placed on supervised probation for five years and pay restitution. After the expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellee's probation based upon his failure to pay restitution. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that, pursuant to Conrad v. Evridge, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to revoke Appellee's probation. In so holding, the circuit court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4) operated to automatically extend Appellee's probationary period so long as he failed to complete payment of the restitution as ordered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 533.020(4) authorizes a trial court to extend the duration of a sentence of probation only if such an extension is necessary for payment of restitution; and (2) upon expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and was without authority to revoke Appellee's probation.View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed one of Appellant's convictions for first-degree assault, reversed the other conviction, and remanded, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to strike three prospective jurors for cause, failing to provide limiting instructions, or allowing a fact witness to present an expert opinion; (2) the Commonwealth's question to Appellant was to whether it was lawful for him to possess a firearm was not reversible error; but (3) the Commonwealth's proof did not support a conviction for one of the first-degree assault convictions.View "McDaniel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Barbara Allgeier sustained serious injuries as a passenger on a bus operated by MV Transportation, Inc. Allgeier filed suit against MV, alleging that her injury was caused by the bus driver’s negligence for which MV was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that MV was negligent in hiring and supervising the bus driver. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Allgeier. Allgeier was awarded medical expenses in the amount of $74,630 and $4,100,000 as compensation for pain and suffering. The court of appeals affirmed the award of compensatory damages and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Allgeier’s punitive damage claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming evidentiary rulings of the trial court relating to the bus driver’s past alcoholism; (2) did not err by reinstating Allgeier’s punitive damages claim; and (3) did not err by remanding the case for trial upon the issue of punitive damages alone instead of a complete retrial upon all issues presented in the original trial. View "MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier" on Justia Law

Some members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Union), an unincorporated association of carpenters, volunteered to help build a barn for Birchwood Conservation Center, a non-profit organization, but failed to complete the barn. Birchwood filed a complaint alleging breach of contract or promissory estoppel. The trial court dismissed Birchwood’s action for lack of standing. Birchwood then filed an amended complaint substituting four new party plaintiffs who did possess standing. The trial court dismissed the new plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the Union could not be sued because it was a voluntary association. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the Union waived the defense of lack of capacity to be sued. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the case, holding that, under the facts of this case, the Union did not waive the defense of lack of capacity to be sued. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Birchwood Conservancy" on Justia Law

A Law Firm had an escrow account with a Bank and authorized an employee to sign checks on the account by herself. The employee began embezzling money from the Firm’s various escrow accounts by engaging in a scheme called “check-kiting,” which involved the employee writing and depositing checks between the Bank account and the Law Firm’s account at another bank. More than three years after the last activity on the Bank account the Law Firm sued the Bank, raising four claims, including violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and common-law causes of action. The court of appeals concluded that the claims were barred by the one-year repose period of Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-406. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding that the claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.4-111. View "Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of second-degree manslaughter and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment enhanced to twenty years’ imprisonment due to Appellant’s status as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in phrasing the jury instructions in a manner that unfairly suggested to the jury that it had to acquit on the higher degree of homicide before considering any lesser offense was not eligible for appellate review; and (2) Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in reading the jury instructions at the beginning of the penalty phase instead of at the conclusion of the proof was not preserved for appellate review. View "Webster v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law