Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured while working as a carman for CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT). Appellant sued CSXT under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), asserting that his injuries were, in part, the result of CSXT’s negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment on Appellant’s negligence claims in favor of CSXT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellant’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of CSXT, and the issues were within the common knowledge and experience of the jury; and (2) therefore, summary judgment was improper. View "Caniff v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to several offenses, including manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm and being a first-degree persistent felony offender, and received a maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. Based on his convictions, the Department of Corrections classified Appellant as a violent offender, which required Appellant to serve a greater part of his sentence before reaching parole eligibility. Appellant sued the Department in circuit court to block the violent-offender classification’s application to him, arguing that his convictions were all non-violent drug offenses. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s suit, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Controlled Substances Act operates to enhance the conviction, not simply the sentence; and (2) the firearm-enhancement provision of the Act served to elevate Appellant’s conviction for manufacturing methaphetamine from a Class B to a Class A felony conviction, which qualified Appellant for classification as a violent offender. View "Mills v. Dep’t of Corr. Offender Info. Servs." on Justia Law

Marc Rosen, a retired senior status special judge who sought to become a candidate for circuit judge in the 2014 election, filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of HB 427, a statute that prohibits judges who have chosen to retire as a senior status special judge from becoming candidate for an elected office for five years after retirement. The circuit court found Rosen was disqualified from being a candidate under the terms of HB 427 without ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. Rosen petitioned the court of appeals to set aside the circuit court order, and the court granted the motion. George W. Davis then initiated a writ action in the court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide Rosen’s constitutional challenge. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear Rosen’s declaratory action regarding the constitutionality of HB 427. View "Hon. George W. Davis, III v. Hon. Thomas D. Wingate" on Justia Law

Appellant represented Claimant in a workers’ compensation case. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) entered an interlocutory order, which resulted in Claimant receiving temporary total occupational disability benefits. The claim was later returned to the active docket, and the parties reached a settlement. Appellant subsequently filed two motions for approval of attorney fees, requesting approval of $12,000 for work performed in obtaining the lump sum payment and requesting approval of $8,369 for work performed in obtaining the benefits which Claimant recovered from the interlocutory award. The CALJ granted Appellant’s motion for $12,000 but denied the motion for $8,369 in fees, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.320(2)(a) caps attorney fees to a total of $12,000. On appeal, Appellant argued that an interlocutory proceeding in a workers’ compensation case should be considered separate from a claim for income benefits and therefore not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys fees established in section 342.320(2)(a). The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney fee for the entire proceeding in this matter was subject to the statutory maximum of $12,000 under section 342.320(2)(a). View "Watts v. Danville Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Appellants, former employees of the University of Kentucky, filed suit against the University alleging that, by rejecting their applications for disability status, the University breached a written contract consisting of a staff handbook and associated personnel policy documents defining the disability compensation programs. The court of appeals dismissed Appellants’ claims on the basis of governmental immunity, concluding that the documents establishing the University’s employee disability compensation did not constitute a written contract, and therefore, the University was shielded from Appellants’ claims by the doctrine of governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants did not establish that the General Assembly expressly waived sovereign immunity in claims based upon implied contracts arising from a state university’s employee handbooks and personnel policies, and the relevant University personnel documents specifically disclaimed the creation of a contract; and (2) therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances presented. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

After a jury convicted Appellant of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to various other charges. On appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court’s exclusion of prior-bad-acts evidence and hearsay testimony. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court erred by excluding the evidence but that Appellant did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) counsel’s offer of proof about the excluded testimony was insufficient to preserve appellate review; and (2) regardless of any preservation misstep, the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony was harmless. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In July 2006, the General Assembly amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 65.7629(3), which required Virgin to collect a CMRS service charge from its customers. In 2008, the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (Board) filed suit against Virgin to recover from Virgin all monthly 911 services charges owed by Virgin for commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) connections before July 2006. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945, concluding that under the pre-July 2006 version of section 65.7629, Virgin was to collect the CMRS service charges and remit them to the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the CMRS service charge did not apply to Virgin prior to the July 2006 amendment. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., LP v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Lebron Gaither was eighteen years old when he began working as a confidential informant for the Kentucky State Police (KSP). Lebron was tortured and killed while working as a confidential informant. Gaither’s Estate filed a wrongful death claim against the KSP, alleging that Gaither’s death was caused by KSP officers in the negligent performance of ministerial duties within the course and scope of heir employment. The Board identified four instances of KSP conduct that it found to be the negligent performance of ministerial acts and awarded Gaither’s estate $168,729. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the actions of the KSP officers that led to Gaither’s death were discretionary acts, not ministerial acts, and were therefore subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Surpeme Court reversed, holding that, while some of the acts of the KSP leading up to Gaither’s death were discretionary acts, the KSP's decision to use Gaither as a confidential informant after his identity had been compromised was the negligent performance of a ministerial act. View "Gaither v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to charges of murder, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with physical evidence in connection with the shooting death of her husband, as well as several counts of forgery. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court committed two errors in its decisions regarding her sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellant was not entitled to the victim-of-domestic-violence exception to the parole eligibility requirement for violent offenders established by Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401; and (2) if the trial court erred in failing to consider probation as a sentencing alternative, the error was harmless. View "Gaines v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions. Emergency protective orders (EPOs) were entered against each. Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases, and Judge Julie Paxton was appointed to preside over the cases. Judge Paxton entered orders dismissing both of the domestic violence orders. Appellant subsequently petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against circuit court clerk David Deskins, claiming that he should not have entered the EPO dismissal orders because Judge Thompson was not properly removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. Appellant also claimed that Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield was not properly qualified and had impermissibly issued the EPOs. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that it had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus against Deskins or Hatfield because they were not judicial offers, that Judge Thompson had properly recused, and that the dismissal orders were valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit clerk to remove an order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Hon. Larry Thompson" on Justia Law