Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Angela Frye filed a workers' compensation claim against her employer alleging that in 2008 she suffered a work-related injury. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Frye benefits related to the injury. In 2009, after the final hearing in the 2008 claim but before the ALJ took that claim under submission or rendered an opinion, Frye allegedly suffered a second work-related injury. In 2010, Frye filed a claim related to the 2009 accident. The ALJ dismissed the 2010 claim, concluding that Frye was required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.270(1) to file her claim for benefits related to the 2009 accident and join it to her pending 2008 claim, which she failed to do. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, concluding that a claim is no longer pending for section 342,270(1) purposes after the date of the final hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in this case and under these facts, Frye's first injury claim was not pending between the date of the hearing and the date the ALJ rendered his opinion regarding that claim. Remanded.View "Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Frye" on Justia Law

Roger Collins died following an inpatient stay at Ridgeway Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Facility. Stella Collins, Roger's wife, subsequently brought an action against Ridgeway alleging wrongful death and nursing home neglect. After pretrial discovery, Ridgeway moved to disqualify Wilkes & McHugh (W&H), the lawfirm representing Collins, alleging that an investigator for W&H violated the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct by making contact with three of Ridgeway's employees. The trial court denied the motion. Ridgeway then sought a writ of mandamus seeking the dismissal of the claims brought against it or, alternatively, the disqualification of W&H. The court of appeals declined to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding that Ridgeway had an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise for the admission of unfairly and unethically obtained evidence. View "Ridgeway Nursing & Rehabilitation Facility, LLC v. Circuit Court " on Justia Law

In 1983, Appellant, the owner and chief executive officer of an asphalt company, pled guilty to violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for unlawfully bidding on state highway construction contracts. In order to have his company's privilege of bidding on new contracts reinstated, Appellant agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's (AG) investigation and proffered information pertaining to Appellant's involvement in a scheme to "rig" bids for highway construction contracts with the Kentucky Department of Transportation. In 2009, reporters for several newspapers submitted an Open Records Act (ORA) request to have the proffer disclosed. When Appellant learned the AG intended to release the proper, Appellant brought this action against the AG and ORA reporters seeking to have the release enjoined under the privacy exemption or the law enforcement exemption to the ORA. In 2011, the trial court ruled that the proffer should be released to the ORA requestors. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not have standing to invoke the law enforcement exemption provision to the ORA; and (2) matters of sufficient public interest warranted an invasion of Appellant's limited privacy interest in keeping his proffer from being disclosed.View "Lawson v. Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Father and Mother had one child when they divorced. In its initial custody order, the family court granted the parties joint custody of the child, designated Mother as the primary residential custodian, and set child support and established a visitation schedule. A final decree of dissolution of marriage was entered three months later that incorporated by reference the initial custody order. Twenty-five months after the initial custody order but only twenty-two months after entry of the final judgment awarding joint custody, Father filed a motion to modify child custody so as to grant him sole custody of the child. After a hearing, the family court granted Father sole permanent custody of the child. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's order on the ground that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Petrey v. Cain because Father's motion was made less than two years after the entry of the final decree awarding custody and was supported by only one affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that subject matter jurisdiction of this matter was not contingent upon compliance with the affidavit requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.340. Remanded. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law

A writer for the Kentucky New Era, Inc., a newspaper serving the city of Hopkinsville and the neighboring area, requested records from the Hopkinsville City Clerk, including copies of arrest citations and police incident reports involving stalking, harassment, or terroristic threatening. The City Clerk withheld some records and redacted from others certain types of personal data. The City then initiated an action essentially seeking a declaration that its decisions to withhold and to redact records did not violate the Kentucky Open Records Act (ORA). The circuit court ultimately ruled that the City's redactions of social security and driver's license numbers, of home addresses, and of telephone numbers comported with the ORA. The court of appeals upheld the redactions and held that the City had the right to redact the names of all juveniles in the records. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied the ORA's privacy exemption in concluding that the redactions at issue in this case were in accordance with the ORA. View "Ky. New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville" on Justia Law

After the foreign language taught at Knott County Central High School was switched from French to Spanish, Grace Patton, the high school's French teacher, lost her job. Patton brought suit against Appellants - the Knott County Board of Education, individual Board members, the high school principal, the superintendent, and individual members of the school's Site-Based Decision-Making Council. Appellant's complaint did not specifically identify any particular claim or cause of action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that (1) Patton's complaint had stated a claim against the school board under the whistleblower statute, and the evidence precluded summary judgment; and (2) the individual Appellants were not subject to qualified official immunity because the actions taken to Patton's detriment were ministerial, not discretionary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Patton did not state a claim under the whistleblower act and had no claim under the act under the facts as alleged; and (2) the individual Appellants were engaged in the performance of discretionary duties covered by the qualified official immunity doctrine.View "Knott County Bd. of Educ. v. Patton" on Justia Law

The Brattons brought an action against CitiFinancial, Inc. (Citi) alleging that Citi erroneously placed a mortgage on their property and did not release the mortgage after it was notified of the error. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Brattons and awarded damages pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 382.365. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Brattons failed to comply with the requirements of section 382.365(4) because they did not give notice by certified mail. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that section 382.365 simply did not apply to the situation in this case.View "Bratton v. CitiFinancial, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sodomy and first-degree burglary, enhanced by the status offense of persistent felony offender (PFO) in the second degree, and was sentenced to thirty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree burglary charge; (2) properly applied Ky. R. Evid. 412, the rape shield rule, to prohibit admission of evidence of the victim's sexual history; and (3) did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to proceed to trial on the PFO charge. View "Minter v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for the crimes of murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and trafficking in marijuana while in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges and sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to counsel by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictments against him; (2) did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to police detectives because Appellant did not unambiguously invoke his right to an attorney; (3) did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (4) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the trafficking in marijuana charge; and (5) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth failed to redact portions of Appellant's recorded interview with the detectives.View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other charges. The Supreme Court affirmed except as to Defendant's conviction for wanton endangerment, which the Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant's due process right to a fair trial by failing to remove two jurors for cause; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by introducing a hospital laboratory report without the testimony of the person who prepared the report; but (3) the prosecution of the wanton endangerment charge violated Defendant's double jeopardy rights, and the wanton endangerment instruction violated Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. Remanded.View "Little v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law