Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In July 2006, the General Assembly amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 65.7629(3), which required Virgin to collect a CMRS service charge from its customers. In 2008, the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (Board) filed suit against Virgin to recover from Virgin all monthly 911 services charges owed by Virgin for commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) connections before July 2006. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945, concluding that under the pre-July 2006 version of section 65.7629, Virgin was to collect the CMRS service charges and remit them to the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the CMRS service charge did not apply to Virgin prior to the July 2006 amendment. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., LP v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Lebron Gaither was eighteen years old when he began working as a confidential informant for the Kentucky State Police (KSP). Lebron was tortured and killed while working as a confidential informant. Gaither’s Estate filed a wrongful death claim against the KSP, alleging that Gaither’s death was caused by KSP officers in the negligent performance of ministerial duties within the course and scope of heir employment. The Board identified four instances of KSP conduct that it found to be the negligent performance of ministerial acts and awarded Gaither’s estate $168,729. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the actions of the KSP officers that led to Gaither’s death were discretionary acts, not ministerial acts, and were therefore subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Surpeme Court reversed, holding that, while some of the acts of the KSP leading up to Gaither’s death were discretionary acts, the KSP's decision to use Gaither as a confidential informant after his identity had been compromised was the negligent performance of a ministerial act. View "Gaither v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to charges of murder, abuse of a corpse, and tampering with physical evidence in connection with the shooting death of her husband, as well as several counts of forgery. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court committed two errors in its decisions regarding her sentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellant was not entitled to the victim-of-domestic-violence exception to the parole eligibility requirement for violent offenders established by Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401; and (2) if the trial court erred in failing to consider probation as a sentencing alternative, the error was harmless. View "Gaines v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant and her former husband filed competing domestic violence petitions. Emergency protective orders (EPOs) were entered against each. Judge Larry Thompson recused from both cases, and Judge Julie Paxton was appointed to preside over the cases. Judge Paxton entered orders dismissing both of the domestic violence orders. Appellant subsequently petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus against circuit court clerk David Deskins, claiming that he should not have entered the EPO dismissal orders because Judge Thompson was not properly removed from the case, and therefore, the orders entered by Judge Paxton were void ab initio. Appellant also claimed that Trial Commissioner Fred Hatfield was not properly qualified and had impermissibly issued the EPOs. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that it had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus against Deskins or Hatfield because they were not judicial offers, that Judge Thompson had properly recused, and that the dismissal orders were valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit clerk to remove an order from the court record; and (2) the petition for writ of mandamus against Judge Thompson and Commissioner Hatfield was properly denied. View "Mischler v. Hon. Larry Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to dismiss the entire jury venire after certain statements by a prospective juror instead of issuing an admonition; (2) erred in allowing the narration of security footage by witnesses, but the error was harmless; (3) improperly allowed speculative testimony regarding Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. View "Boyd v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this divorce action between Michael and Mary Bell, the trial court set the amount of Michael’s monthly child-support obligation by deducting unreimbursed business expenses from Michael’s gross income rather than making an appropriate adjustment in the guideline award as allowed by Ky. Rev. Stat. 403.212. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by deducting Michael’s unreimbursed business expenses from gross income because Michael was not self-employed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in order to deduct unreimbursed business expenses from gross income, a trial court must find the parent is self-employed; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in this case by deviating from the statutory method of determining gross income when calculating child support. Remanded.View "Bell v. Bell" on Justia Law

Appellant’s charges in this case stemmed from a search of his residence by his parole officers and local sheriff’s deputies. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine and being a second-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the products of the search of his home, as Appellant consented to the search and there was no indication that the consent was invalid; and (2) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of lab testing on the products of the search, as the lab results were clearly admissible. View "Helphenstine v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

R.S., a teenaged child under eighteen years of age, engaged in an evening of “teenage shenanigans,” in which he and a group of contemporaries painted offenses messages on cars parked at a memorial service. Following hearings in juvenile session, a district court adjudicated R.S. guilty of second-degree criminal mischief by complicity and order him alone to pay the full amount of restitution to the owner of one of the defaced cars that was damaged in the incident. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed the adjudication and restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the adjudication of R.S.’s juvenile public offender status; and (2) the district court may, in weighing the best interest of the child in a juvenile disposition, order one party to pay the entire amount of restitution, despite other individuals’ possible involvement in the acts of vandalism.View "R.S. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2000, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft by deception and was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, probated for a period of five years. After Appellant failed to report to her probation officer, the trial court issued a warrant for her arrest. In 2011, Appellant was finally served with the arrest warrant. After a probation revocation hearing, the trial court dismissed the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Appellant’s probation, determining that Appellant’s period of probation had already expired. The court of appeals reversed, concluded that because Appellant “intentionally absconded,” she was barred from claiming that her probationary period had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the issuance of a warrant for a probation violation will toll the period of probation preventing the probationer from being automatically discharged pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4); (2) the warrant, however, must be issued before the expiration of the period of probation; and (3) since the circuit court issued a warrant for Appellant’s arrest within the five-year probationary period, it retained jurisdiction to conduct a probation revocation hearing.View "Whitcomb v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant physicians were former employees of The New Lexington Clinic (NLC) who resigned from NLC to practice at a nearby facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, Baptist). NLC brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties, alleging that Appellants used confidential information and recruited NLC personnel while serving as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant for allegedly aiding and abetting Appellants' breaches. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the trial court considered controlling as to actions involving breach of a Kentucky corporate director's duties. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that section 271B.8-300 controlled but that sufficient facts were alleged to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) section 271B.8-300, which did not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors, did not apply in this case; and (2) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. Remanded.View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. The New Lexington Clinic, PSC" on Justia Law