Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sixty-seven counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The convictions arose from the discovery upon a forensic examination of partially downloaded child-pornography videos on Appellant’s personal computer and still images in an inaccessible cache on the computer. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the evidence related to the still images found in the thumbcache of Appellant’s computer was insufficient to sustain those convictions; but (2) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict on the charges related to the videos. View "Crabtree v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim had been previously exposed to allegedly pornographic material on the internet; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to strike a juror for cause over defense objection. View "Basham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A New York Supreme Court awarded Inverultra, S.A., a Panamanian company, a $1.8 million judgment against three Honduran companies, including Parque Industrial Bufalo, S.A. de C.V. (ZIP Bufalo). Inverultra registered its New York judgment in the Warren Circuit Court, the home of Union Underwear, Inc. (Union). Union was the parent corporation of a company that leased commercial property from ZIP Bufalo. Inverultra filed in the Warren Circuit Court an affidavit for a writ of garnishment against Union seeking an order of garnishment requiring Union to hold any funds due to ZIP Bufalo. Inverulta then sought discovery from Union and Zip Bufalo. The trial court granted Union’s request for a protective order and denied Inverulta’s motion to compel discovery from ZIP Bufalo. Inverulta brought this action under Ky. R. Civ. P. 81 seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus to lift the prohibitions against discovery on Union and ZIP Bufalo. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Inverulta did not meet any of the conditions requisite for Rule 81 relief and was thus not eligible for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. View "Inverultra, S.A. v. Hon. Steven A. Wilson" on Justia Law

William Goble suffered a work-related back injury and timely filed a claim and an amended claim asserting that he suffered a low-back injury and that he also suffered a psychological injury. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Goble suffered low-back and psychological injuries and related permanent impairment ratings and awarded Goble permanent partial disability income and medical expense benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Goble had a permanent psychological impairment rating. View "Martin County Coal Co. v. Goble" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the admission of a state police detective’s testimony regarding Appellant’s invocation of his right to an attorney was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Appellant’s forensic expert witness to sit with defense counsel during the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for an instruction on first-degree manslaughter based upon extreme emotional disturbance; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new penalty phase trial even though the sentencing protocols as provided for in Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.025(3) were not followed in this case, as this deviation from the statutory procedure did not affect the ultimate sentence or jeopardize Appellant’s right to due process of law. View "Spears v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After Peggy Branham was involved in an accident, she was transported to the University of Kentucky Medical Center, where she was examined and treated by several physicians (Physicians). Two and one half hours after arriving in the emergency room, Branham was discharged. Branham died thirty-six hours later due to a ruptured aorta related to blunt force trauma to her chest. One year later, Branham’s estate (Estate) brought suit against the Physicians, the Medical Center, and University Hospital of the Albert B. Chandler Medical Center, Inc. (the Hospital Corporation). The trial court dismissed the claims against the Medical Center and the Hospital Corporation on grounds of sovereign immunity, and the jury found in favor of the Physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in excluding evidence of one physician’s licensure problems and another physician’s failure to pass his medical board examination; (2) did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Physicians to call multiple expert witnesses; (3) properly instructed the jury regarding the standard of care; and (4) correctly concluded that the Hospital Corporation and the Medical Center had immunity. View "Branham v. Rock" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third-degree terroristic threatening, other firearm-related offenses, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that a Batson violation occurred as a result of one of the peremptory strikes made by the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) a Batson violation occurred when the prosecutor struck an African-American juror from the jury pool and failed to provide a cognizable race-neutral reason for striking the juror; and (2) therefore, the trial court’s overruling of Appellant’s Batson challenge was an abuse of discretion. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant was convicted of first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading police, and second-degree burglary. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Appellant’s conviction for second-degree burglary, concluding that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on that charge; and (2) affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. On remand, Appellant moved for a new penalty phase on the affirmed convictions, arguing that the sentencing evidence related to the now-reversed reversed burglary conviction necessarily tainted the jury’s consideration of sentencing for the other offenses. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Appellant in conformity with the original sentence on the remaining convictions. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new penalty phase. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant was barred from seeking amendment of his sentence because the trial court was bound by the Court’s mandate specifically affirming the sentences and because Appellant was not entitled to raise the issue of possible reversal of the burglary conviction because it was not raised in the initial appeal. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against her former employer, a hospital, alleging that she was terminated because she was preparing to report a medication error to an appropriate hospital regulatory authority pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 216B.165. The district court certified a question of Kentucky law to the Supreme Court, asking whether a plaintiff who alleges that her employment was wrongfully terminated in violation of section 216B.165 may assert a claim for the recovery of front pay, along with other damages she may have sustained, by reason of her discharge. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that, pursuant to the general remedial provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070, an employee covered by section 216B.165, who suffers reprisal in violation of section 216B.165(3), may recover front pay as an element of compensable damages. View "Macglashan v. ABS Lincs Ky., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former members of the St. Joseph Catholic Orphan Society’s Board of Trustees, sued St. Joseph, challenging the validity of the Board’s action removing them from the Board and seeking reappointment to the Board. St. Joseph moved to dismiss, arguing that the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction because of the application of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine. The trial court denied the motion. St. Joseph then sought a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to dismiss the underlying action. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of the writ, concluding that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine does not divest courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate cases they are authorized to hear; but (2) reversed the trial court’s order denying St. Joseph’s motion. Specifically, the Court treated St. Joseph’s petition for writ of mandamus as an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss and, on the merits, agreed that the underlying action presented a question of ecclesiastical governance, which meant that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibited the underlying action from going forward in the trial court. View "St. Joseph Catholic Orphan Soc’y v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law