Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (the "Cabinet") filed a petition to condemn a 30.366-acre tract of land containing subsurface coal in Floyd County for the construction of a highway. The land was part of a larger mineral parcel owned by several individuals, with Leah Atkinson holding the majority share. The owners had a coal lease with SAS Resources, LLC, which had not yet begun mining the property at the time of the condemnation.The Floyd Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the condemned property. The commissioners concluded that the property had a fair market value of $500 both before and after the condemnation. The court adopted this award, but several owners filed exceptions, leading to a trial to determine just compensation. The Cabinet sought to exclude evidence of anticipated royalty income, but the court denied this motion. At trial, the Cabinet's expert valued the property at $145,600 using a comparable sales approach, while the owners' expert valued it at over $2 million using an income capitalization approach, considering future royalty income.The jury awarded the owners $550,000 as just compensation. The Cabinet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the owners' expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the income capitalization approach was permissible.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony that considered the property's capacity to produce future royalty income. The court found that the testimony appropriately accounted for the contingencies and uncertainties of business, making it relevant and admissible. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS V. ATKINSON" on Justia Law

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James Javonte Crite appealed the Daviess Circuit Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his apartment. Crite was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, resulting in a two-year sentence and shock probation. He argued that his landlord had no right to enter his apartment without an emergency and lacked authority to grant police entry, making the search and seizure of the firearm illegal.The Daviess Circuit Court denied Crite's motion to suppress, finding that the landlord had the right to enter the apartment under the "emergency entry" clause of the lease due to significant electrical damage that posed a danger to the tenants. The court also concluded that the police entry was reasonable to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician, given the information that Crite was a schizophrenic off his medication, had acted irrationally, and there was a firearm in the apartment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the landlord's entry was justified by the emergency and that the police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment as they were facilitating the landlord's legitimate interest in addressing the emergency.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the landlord's entry was justified under the lease's emergency entry clause due to the electrical damage posing a risk to the tenants. The police entry was deemed reasonable and necessary to ensure the safety of the landlord and the electrician. The Court also held that the seizure of the AR-15 rifle was lawful under the plain view doctrine, as the officers were lawfully present and the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent. View "CRITE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

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In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). By 2017, LPW Redevelopment, LLC owned Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which was approved. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The NPC required Boone to include the bridge and road extension in a letter of credit, which Boone disputed, leading to this litigation.The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in favor of Boone, stating the NPC had not made a decision, necessitating a declaratory action. The NPC then issued a Notice of Decision affirming its requirements, which the Board of Adjustment upheld. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding the Board’s actions were within its legislative powers, provided due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court found the statute unconstitutional, referencing its decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court also addressed the merits of the case, affirming the Jessamine Circuit Court’s decision that Boone was responsible for the bridge and road extension as per the development plan. The Court found no procedural due process violations and determined the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was reversed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RAZ, INC. V. MERCER COUNTY FISCAL COURT" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Commonwealth Building, located in the South Hill Historic District in Lexington, Kentucky. Built in the late 1950s, the building was purchased by The Residences at South Hill, LLC in 2017. The Residences sought approval from the Board of Architectural Review (BOAR) to demolish the building and construct a five-story apartment complex. The BOAR approved the demolition, leading to several appeals. The Historic South Hill Neighborhood Association (HSHNA) and Bluegrass Trust for Historic Preservation (Bluegrass Trust) were among the appellants, with Bluegrass Trust arguing that the building contributed to the historic character of the district and could provide economic return if renovated.The Fayette Circuit Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Planning Commission's decision to uphold the BOAR's approval was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Planning Commission had considered various testimonies and evidence, including expert opinions, and found that the Commonwealth Building did not contribute to the historic character of the district. Bluegrass Trust appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals but did not post the required appeal bond, arguing financial incapacity. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the failure to post the bond and stated in dictum that it would have affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 100.3471, which mandates an appeal bond in zoning and land use disputes, is unconstitutional. The court found that the statute infringes on the constitutional right of Kentuckians to at least one appeal to the next highest court, as guaranteed by Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal but affirmed the circuit court's decision on the merits, upholding the Planning Commission's approval of the demolition. View "BLUEGRASS TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION V. LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT PLANNING COMMISSION" on Justia Law

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In 2002, a 208-acre estate in Jessamine County was divided into four parcels. In 2004, the owner of Parcel 2 planned residential development, including a bridge and road extension, which was approved by the Nicholasville Planning Commission (NPC). However, these were not built. LPW Redevelopment, LLC later acquired Parcels 2 and 3, sought a zone change, and submitted a development plan, which included the bridge and road extension. Boone Development, LLC purchased Parcel 3 in 2018 and began construction. The City of Nicholasville then informed Boone it was responsible for the bridge and road extension, which Boone disputed.Boone filed a declaratory action in Jessamine Circuit Court, which ruled in Boone's favor, instructing the NPC to make a decision. The NPC affirmed its letter of credit requirements, including the bridge and road extension. The Board of Adjustment upheld the NPC's decision. Boone appealed, and the Jessamine Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision, finding the Board's actions were within its legislative powers, provided procedural due process, and were supported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, focusing on the constitutionality of the appeal bond requirement in KRS 100.3471. The Court held that the statute imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right to appeal, referencing its contemporaneous decision in Bluegrass Trust v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Boone's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to the bond issue. On the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the Jessamine Circuit Court's decision, finding the NPC's requirements for the bridge and road extension were not clearly unreasonable. View "BOONE DEVELOPMENT, LLC V. NICHOLASVILLE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed a dispute over the division of proceeds from the sale of a commercial property. The parties involved were business partners who had formed an LLC to manage the property. One of the partners, Allen, had previously asked his partners to sell their interests in the LLC to his children to resolve a tax problem. The partners agreed, but wanted to ensure they would not forfeit potential future profits from the property sale. They decided that proceeds from a future sale of the building would be split according to their ownership interests up to $8 million, and any proceeds above $8 million would be divided equally among them.In 2017, the property sold for $10 million, and a dispute arose over how to distribute the proceeds. One of the partners, Swyers, distributed the proceeds according to the previously agreed upon formula. However, the Allen family contested this, arguing that the entire proceeds should have been distributed according to ownership interests.The trial court ruled in favor of Swyers, finding that the agreement provided for a bifurcated distribution of proceeds, with an $8 million sale price threshold. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that distributions of one-third each were warranted only if the total net proceeds exceeded $8 million.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, agreeing with the trial court's interpretation of the agreement. The court concluded that the parties had intended to split the proceeds on a sale price threshold of $8 million, and that only the sales commission needed to be deducted before calculating the distribution of the final $2 million of the sale price. View "SWYERS V. ALLEN FAMILY PARTNERSHIP #1" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of John and Beth Bruner and against Don and Cathy Cooper in this property dispute, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief.The Coopers brought this action seeking to have a road that had been maintained by the fiscal court and used by the public and the Bruners, the Coopers' adjoining landowners, The circuit court ultimately concluded that the road was neither a public road nor an easement. Thereafter, the Bruners successfully sought relief from the court's orders regarding the road's classification under Rule 60.02. The circuit court subsequently granted summary judgment for the Bruners, finding that the road was a public road by prescription. The court of appeals vacated the summary judgment order. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the grant of summary judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting the Bruners' motion for Rule 60.02 relief or by granting summary judgment in favor of the Bruners. View "Bruner v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals in this case involving the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350 is applicable only in instances in which a party has pled voluntary waste.Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350, a life tenant who commits waste against the corpus of an estate shall "lose the thing wasted and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed." At issue was when the statute of limitations began to run in this case, a question that required resolution of the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, which required the Supreme Court either to affirmed its longstanding distinction between voluntary and permissive waste or to collapse the two categories into simply "waste." The Supreme Court held (1) long-standing case law continues to be accurate statements of the law of waste as it exists in Kentucky, therefore, section 381.350 continues to apply only to claims of voluntary waste; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff in this case stated claims for voluntary waste. View "Ferrill v. Stock Yard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of John and Beth Bruner based on its finding that a disputed road was a public road by prescription, holding that the road was a public road by prescription.Don and Cathy Cooper sought to have the subject road, which had been maintained by the fiscal court and used by the public and the Bruners, adjoining landowners, declared their private driveway. During the litigation, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order finding that the road was not a public road or an easement. The circuit court subsequently granted summary judgment for the Bruners, finding that the road was a public road by prescription. View "Bruner v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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In this appeal concerning the statutory ownership of a vehicle involved in a crash, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision affirming the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Central Motors, Inc., holding that the circuit court correctly held that Juan Garcia was the statutory owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident.Dolores Zepeda was the passenger in a 2002 BMW being driven by Darley Morales, the son of Juan Garcia, when Morales caused the car to crash in a single vehicle accident. As a result of the accident, Morales died and Zepeda was left paralyzed. Zepeda sued, among other defendants, Garcia for negligent entrustment and Central Motors as the purported statutory owner of the BMW. The trial court granted summary judgment for Central Motors, determining that Garcia, and not Central Motors, was the statutory owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Central Motors substantially complied with Ky. Rev. Stat. 186A.220 and delivered possession of the vehicle pursuant to a bona fide sale, thus making Garcia the BMW's statutory owner. View "Zepeda v. Central Motors, Inc." on Justia Law