Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the unanimous jury verdict in Defendant's favor on a personal injury action brought by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was driving his motorcycle when he collided with a downed tree in the roadway. At the time, Defendant was the Metro Louisville County Engineer and an Assistant Director of Public Works. Plaintiff filed an action naming several defendants, including Defendant in his individual capacity. The jury subsequently returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant, finding that Plaintiff had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant breached a duty owed to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, ruling (1) the jury’s findings that Defendant did not fail to comply with his duty was against the weight of the evidence, and (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial but not to a directed verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals remanding the case to the circuit court for a new trial and affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of a directed verdict, holding that the court erred in granting a new trial because ample evidence on the issue of duty was presented and supported the jury verdict. View "Storm v. Martin" on Justia Law

Patients do not have a cause of action against a hospital for the negligent credentialing of a non-employee physician who is given staff privileges by the hospital because Kentucky law does not recognize the tort of negligent credentialing.In these three consolidated cases, the trial courts ruled that Kentucky does not recognize the tort of negligent credentialing. The court of appeals ultimately recognized negligent credentialing as a separate cause of action in the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that there was no need to establish the new tort of negligent credentialing specifically applying to hospitals. The court affirmed the court of appeals’ affirmance of summary judgment in one case and reinstated the order of the trial court and remanded the remaining cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital, LLC v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this civil action asserting the tort of conversion and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to grant summary judgment to Defendants.Plaintiff claimed that Defendants should be required to disgorge large sums of money that Plaintiff claimed had been stolen from her by her attorney and transferred by him to Defendants. The court of appeals concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove the essential elements of conversion, specifically finding that Plaintiff lacked the requisite legal title or possessory rights to the allegedly converted property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not maintain a conversion action against Defendants because she no longer possessed title to or a possessory interest in the funds transferred. View "Ford v. Baerg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff sued Defendant, which uses warehouses in Jefferson County to store its barrels of bourbon, seeking damages based on several state tort theories and injunctive relief. Plaintiff claimed that fugitive ethanol emissions that escape from the barrels as the bourbon ages promote the growth of the “whiskey fungus,” which causes a black film-like substance to proliferate on his property. The trial court determined that the federal Clean Air Act preempted Plaintiff’s claims. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the Act did not preempt Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff’s state tort claims for damages were not preempted by the Act; but (2) Plaintiff’s requested injunction was inappropriate. View "Brown-Forman Corp. v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order rejecting the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Schools Boards Insurance Trust’s (KSBIT) claim of governmental immunity and thus denying its motion for summary judgment. In this complaint filed by the Deputy Rehabilitator of the Kentucky School Boards Trust Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurance Fund and of the Kentucky School Boards Insurance Trust Property and Liability Self Insurance Fund against the KSBIT Board for, inter alia, negligence, the KSBIT Board asserted a defense of governmental immunity and moved for summary judgment. The circuit court determined that the KSBIT Board was not entitled to governmental immunity because its “parent” entity was not an agency of state government that enjoyed governmental immunity and because it did not perform a function that was integral to state government. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the KSBIT Board is not the offspring of local public school boards, it does not have the governmental immunity accorded to those governmental bodies; and (2) the KSBIT Board does not serve a function integral to state government. View "Board of Trustees of Kentucky School Boards Insurance Trust v. Pope" on Justia Law

This personal injury suit arose from a trip-and-fall at the Speedway SuperAmerica filling station in Manchester, Kentucky. The circuit court found for Plaintiffs and against the Speedway, the store’s owner, and the store’s manager (collectively, Defendants). The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a defense judgment based on the common law’s open and obvious doctrine. Due to recent attempts to modernize the open and obvious doctrine and to harmonize it with tort law’s shift to a regime of comparative negligence, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of recent precedent. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims failed in their entirety. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court of appeals read recent precedent too narrowly. Given the long delays in this litigation, the court departed from its usual practice and addressed additional issues concerning the liability of the store manager, the comparative fault of the injured plaintiff, and the trial judge’s denial of a post-judgment motion to recuse. View "Grubb v. Smith" on Justia Law

The estate of Stephen Patton, an eighth-grader who committed suicide, filed suit against various teachers and administrators, claiming that Defendants should have known of the bullying Stephen was subjected to at school and taken steps to prevent it. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, ruling (1) Defendants were protected by qualified immunity, and (2) Stephen’s suicide was a superseding intervening cause interrupting any potential liability of Defendants. The court of appeals upheld the summary judgment solely on the intervening cause issue and ruled that Defendants were not entitled to qualified official immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ opinion to uphold summary judgment but for different reasons, holding (1) while the Administrators were protected by qualified immunity, the Teachers were not immune from suit on the basis of qualified official immunity; (2) bullying and tormenting behavior, if shown to be the proximate cause of a suicide, may form the basis for a wrongful death claim by the decedent’s estate; but (3) under the facts of this case, the Estate failed to make a prima facie showing that the Teachers’ conduct of failing to prevent the bullying of Stephen was the “but-for” cause or the proximate cause of Stephen’s suicide. View "Patton v. Bickford" on Justia Law

Roniesha Adams, her son, and her son’s father, Barry Adams (Barry), were passengers in Milton Mitchell’s car when the car was rear ended. Mitchell and his three passengers asserted claims against State Farm, seeking personal injury protection and uninsured motorist benefits. Because they allegedly gave inconsistent statements to State Farm regarding “substantive issues,” State Farm advised Mitchell, Adams, and Barry that they were required to submit to questioning under oath. Adams and Barry refused to submit to questioning under oath, and State Farm refused to pay additional benefits. Adams and Barry filed suit, and State Farm filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not have to provide coverage because Adams and Barry failed to cooperate with its investigation. The circuit court granted summary judgment for State Farm. Adams appealed. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that State Farm was required to obtain a court order before it could require Adams to submit to questioning under oath. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that Adams was required to submit to questioning under oath regarding issues as a condition precedent to coverage. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Personal-injury law firm Hughes & Coleman was entitled to quantum meruit compensation after being hired and then fired by Travis Underwood, who was injured in a car crash. Shortly after Underwood discharged Hughes & Coleman and hired another attorney, Underwood agreed to a final settlement of his claims. Hughes & Coleman asserted an attorney’s lien on the new counsel’s contingency attorney fee on the final settlement, claiming it was entitled to a quantum meruit share of the fee as compensation for its services rendered before being terminated. The trial court concluded that Hughes & Coleman was discharged without cause and apportioned seventy-five percent of the contingency fee to the firm. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Underwood had valid cause for terminating Hughes & Coleman’s services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) case precedent entitles a discharged lawyer to receive, on a quantum meruit basis, a portion of a contingency fee on a former client’s recovery so long as the termination was not for cause; and (2) because Hughes & Coleman’s firing was not for cause, the firm was entitled to quantum meruit compensation. View "Hughes & Coleman, PLLC v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board in this workers’ compensation case. Appellant suffered a work-related injury in 2007. After she returned to work, Appellant suffered a second work-related injury in 2011 that resulted in Appellant being found permanently totally disabled. At issue before the Supreme Court was the proper disposition of Appellant’s claim for benefits following her first injury. The Board remanded the matter to the administrative law judge, determining that the ALJ erred in concluding that Appellant had not claimed entitlement to permanent total disability benefits following her first injury. The Board remanded this case to the ALJ with specific instructions to first determine Appellant’s entitlement to permanent total disability benefits and, if she was not entitled to such benefits, to determine her permanent partial disability benefits using a proper analysis under Fawbush v. Gwinn, 103 S.W. 3d 5 (Ky. 2005). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its judgment. View "Blaine v. Downtown Redevelopment Authority, Inc." on Justia Law