Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this case alleging that Defendants breached their duties under the Farm Animals Activity Act by failing to make a reasonable inquiry into Plaintiff’s ability to manage a horse named Flash before letting her ride the horse, holding that Defendants were not liable under the statute.When Plaintiff visited a stable owned by Defendants to test-ride horses for sale she was injured when she was thrown by Flash. Plaintiff sought compensation for her injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Court of Appeals revered, finding that Defendants had a duty to make a reasonable and prudent inquiry into Plaintiff’s ability to manage flash before letting her ride the horse and that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding Plaintiffs allegation that defendants caused Plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants reasonably determined that Flash was suitable for Plaintiff to ride based upon Plaintiff's representations; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Defendants’ liability under the statute. View "Daugherty v. Tabor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of Norfolk Southern Railway Company on Appellant’s complaint alleging negligence, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the common-law Firefighter’s Rule barred Appellant’s claim.Appellant, a patrol officer with the Danville Police Department, fell down an embankment and was injured while pursuing a suspect on foot. Appellant filed suit against Norfolk Southern, asserting that the embankment was a dangerous condition on the company’s premises and that the company was liable to her for the fall. The circuit court granted Norfolk Southern’s motion for a directed verdict, determining that Appellant’s claim was barred by the Firefighter’s Rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the case did not satisfy the three factors under the rule. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the circuit court’s directed verdict, holding that Appellant met the three prongs of the Firefighter’s Rule and may therefore not recover from Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals concluding that the Kentucky Coal Employers Self-Insurers Guaranty Fund was fully responsible for McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corporation’s workers’ compensation liabilities, including a thirty percent enhancement arising from the employer’s safety violations.Farley Sargent II was fatally injured while working in a mine. The decedent’s statutory beneficiaries settled their workers’ compensation claims with his employer, McCoy Elkhorn, leaving a bifurcated issue regarding enhanced benefits. The administrative law judge concluded that the decedent’s survivors and estate were entitled to the thirty percent increase of workers’ compensation payments that would otherwise be if the accident was caused by the employer’s failure to comply with statutes or regulations regarding workplace safety. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1). At issue before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court was whether the Guaranty Fund, which assumed the obligations of McCoy Elkhorn, its insolvent member, could be held responsible for the thirty percent enhancement. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Guaranty Fund was fully responsible for McCoy Elkhorn’s workers’ compensation liabilities. View "McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Sargent" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Kentucky Parole Board’s revocation hearing in this case was an adjudicative function, a discretionary act for which the Parole Board enjoyed absolute immunity from liability for its decisions whether to grant, deny, or revoke parole.Phyllis Roach was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with a three-year conditional discharge period after she pled guilty to sodomy in the first degree. After she was released, Roach was charged with violating the terms of her postincarceration supervision. At a parole revocation hearing, the Parole Board sentenced Roach to serve fourteen months, the remainder of her conditional discharge period. Roach filed a complaint with the Board of Claims seeking damages for her “wrongful incarceration.” The Board of Claims rejected her claims. The circuit court reversed, finding that the Parole Board was grossly negligent in applying an unconstitutional sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s adjudication of Roach’s rights as to whether she violated her postincarceration release requirements was a quasi-adjudicative function and therefore a discretionary act for which the Board enjoyed absolute immunity. View "Roach v. Kentucky Parole Board" on Justia Law

Stigma damages are a measure of damages stemming from actual injury to property, but if remediation damages are settled and a claim on the stigma damages resulting from the actual damages is reserved, the injured party may be awarded stigma damages regardless of the partial settlement on remediation.Plaintiffs’ property was damaged from oil contamination. In a federal action, the parties entered into a partial settlement that allocated $60,000 to Plaintiffs for repair costs, intended to remedy actual damages to their property. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss all claims against Defendants except for a reserved claims asserting the diminution of the value of their real estate due to the stigma resulting from the contamination. Plaintiffs then filed this state claim alleging negligence, trespass, and permanent nuisance. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the partial settlement barred the state action because Plaintiffs were fully compensated for the actual damages the contamination caused to their property. The circuit court dismissed the stigma damages claim, holding that Plaintiffs could not seek both the costs of remediation and the diminution in value due to stigma damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs’ claim for damages resulting from the stigma of the contamination may be recovered in addition to the settled repair costs. View "Muncie v. Wiesemann" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Appellant, Auslander Properties, LLC, was an “employer” and thus subject to certain employee safety regulations promulgated pursuant to the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Act (KOSHA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 338, and the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., and that Appellant had violated duties owed to Appellee, Joseph Herman Nalley, under KOSHA.The trial court awarded Nalley compensatory damages for serious personal injuries he sustained while working on a roof at property owned by Appellant. The Supreme Court remanded the case for dismissal of Nalley’s claim, holding (1) contrary to Nalley’s argument, Appellant properly appealed the denial of summary judgment seeking reversal of the trial court judgment; and (2) Appellant was entitled to dismissal of the negligence per se claim because Nalley was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the LLC, and the responsibility for complying with safety laws applicable to the specialized work Nalley was performing at the time of his injury was upon Nalley. View "Auslander Properties, LLC v. Nalley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals declining to issue a writ sought by Miki Thompson prohibiting the trial court from enforcing discovery orders entered for inspection and discovery in a wrongful death and negligence action pending in the circuit court. The court of appeals found that Thompson failed to show irreparable injury without the writ or the existence of facts sufficient to justify issuance of the writ under the special-case exception. In affirming, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that complying with the trial court’s orders will not lead to an irreparable injury for Thompson or that the writ must issue under the special-case exception. View "Thompson v. Honorable Eddy Coleman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board upholding the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ), which awarded Michael R. Plumley permanent partial disability benefits.On appeal, the Court held that the ALJ did not err (1) by relying upon the medical report of Dr. Greg Snider, who evaluated Plumley under the range-of-motion method and used terminology different from that which Plumley would use to describe essentially the same condition; (2) by finding that Plumley had three distinct work-related injuries, for each of which the ALJ made three tandem benefit awards rather than a single-injury with a single-benefit award; and (3) in his use of modifier multipliers. View "Plumley v. Kroger, Inc." on Justia Law

The scope of appellate review of an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s determination of qualified official immunity is limited to the specific issue of whether immunity was properly denied.In this interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals not only agreed with the trial court that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but also conclusively determined that Defendants were not negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the court of appeals exceeded its scope of appellate review when it addressed the substantive claim of negligence on an interlocutory appeal of a decision about qualified official immunity. View "Baker v. Fields" on Justia Law

The language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 258.235(4) imposes strict liability upon the owner of a dog that attacks and injures a person.Plaintiff sued Defendant after Defendant’s dogs attacked and injured her, relying on section 258.235(4). After the conclusion of the evidence, Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested instruction requiring an imposition of liability upon Defendant solely by showing Defendant’s ownership of the dogs that attacked her. The jury determined that Defendant was the owner of the dogs that caused injury to Plaintiff but that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the jury instructions properly stated the law of a dog owner’s liability for injuries caused by his dog. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that a dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused when his dog attacks a person and that a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in a dog bite case may be considered in measuring the damages awarded to her. View "Maupin v. Tankersley" on Justia Law