Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A mechanical maintenance technician employed at a steel manufacturing facility contracted COVID-19 in August 2021, which ultimately led to his death following a double lung transplant and subsequent infection. The employee worked closely with a single partner during long shifts, and both were unvaccinated, sometimes failing to comply with company mask policies. The employee’s family and estate filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging that his work conditions placed him at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 than the general public. Evidence included testimony about his work environment, social activities, and the timeline of symptom onset.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewed the claim and found that the estate failed to prove the employee’s exposure to COVID-19 at work was greater than that of the general public, or that his work increased his risk of contracting or exacerbating the disease. The ALJ dismissed the claim, concluding that the statutory requirements for an occupational disease under Kentucky law were not met. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings, as did the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both determining that substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits and that the ALJ had not misapplied the law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, for a communicable disease like COVID-19 to be compensable under workers’ compensation, the claimant must prove the disease was work-related, that the nature of the employment increased the risk of contracting the disease compared to the general public, and that the injury exceeded the normal effects of such a disease. The Court found the estate did not meet its burden of proof on the threshold issue of work-related causation and affirmed the dismissal of the claim. View "ESTATE OF PERKINS V. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS" on Justia Law

An employee worked for over sixteen years as a shuttle car operator for a coal company, primarily in Kentucky, where he was regularly exposed to hazardous noise. After the Kentucky mine closed, he continued working for the same employer in Alabama for nine months before retiring. The employee began experiencing hearing difficulties before leaving Kentucky, and was later diagnosed with work-related hearing loss. He filed a workers’ compensation claim in Kentucky, listing his last day of work in Kentucky as the date of last exposure.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the employee’s claim for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis but granted his hearing loss claim, finding that the injury occurred on his last day working in Kentucky. The ALJ relied on medical testimony indicating that the short period of exposure in Alabama was inconsequential to the hearing loss, and applied Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.7305(4), which presumes liability for the employer with whom the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, concluding that Kentucky had jurisdiction and that the injury manifested while the employee was still working in Kentucky. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that extraterritorial coverage statutes did not apply because the injury occurred in Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, under the amended KRS 342.7305(4), the date of injury for liability purposes is when the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year with the employer, here in Kentucky. The Court concluded that Kentucky had jurisdiction over the claim and that the insurer covering the employer on that date was liable. View "KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE V. CLAS COAL CO., INC." on Justia Law

A retired teacher who continued to work as a substitute until 2014 filed a workers’ compensation claim in 2015, alleging he developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure during his employment with a county school board. Initially, he identified his last exposure as occurring during his full-time employment, which ended in 2003, and named Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) as the insurer. Later, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the last injurious exposure actually occurred in 2014, when the teacher stopped substitute teaching, which would make Encova Mutual Insurance Group the responsible carrier for the claim.After the ALJ’s finding, KEMI sought to have Encova certified as the responsible insurer, but the ALJ denied the motion as untimely and questioned his authority to resolve the issue. The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) affirmed the denial, but on the ground that neither KEMI nor Encova had standing, as neither had been formally joined as parties. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ and WCB had the authority and obligation under the Workers’ Compensation Act to determine and certify the proper insurance carrier, even after a change in the last date of exposure.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that the ALJ and WCB have statutory authority to determine which insurer is responsible for payment of benefits when the last date of injurious exposure changes, and that insurers have standing to participate in such proceedings. The Court further held that the Act binds the insurer on the risk at the time of last exposure, regardless of notice or formal joinder, and that equitable defenses such as laches or estoppel do not bar certification in these circumstances. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "ENCOVA MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP V. HALL" on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries.The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

A fatal motor vehicle accident occurred after a patron, Bailey, was served alcohol at two establishments, including one operated by the appellants. Bailey drove the wrong way on an interstate, resulting in a collision that killed himself and five members of the Abbas family. The Abbas family’s estates sued the restaurant operators (collectively “Roosters”) for dram shop liability and negligent training. At the time, Roosters held both a businessowners policy (BOP) and a commercial umbrella policy (CUP) with Grange Insurance Company. The BOP provided $1,000,000 in liquor liability coverage, which was undisputed. The dispute centered on whether the CUP also provided liquor liability coverage, particularly in light of an endorsement (CU 47) that replaced the liquor liability exclusion in the CUP.The Fayette Circuit Court found the language of the CUP and CU 47 ambiguous when considered alongside the BOP, reasoning that umbrella policies are intended to supplement underlying coverage. The court granted summary judgment to Roosters, holding that the CUP provided additional coverage. Grange appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding CU 47 unambiguously replaced the liquor liability exclusion and precluded coverage under the CUP. The appellate court remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment in Grange’s favor.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case de novo. It held that CU 47 unambiguously replaced the liquor liability exclusion in the CUP, leaving no basis for additional coverage. The court enforced the policy as written, declining to consider extrinsic evidence or arguments not preserved below. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the commercial umbrella policy does not provide liquor liability coverage for the claims at issue. View "GEORGETOWN CHICKEN COOP, LLC V. GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

A man named Donald Prater, Jr. was found partially nude and behaving erratically after leaving a hospital, having previously told a deputy he had used methamphetamine and was hallucinating. Law enforcement officers from the City of Paintsville and Johnson County, along with emergency medical personnel, responded to reports of his behavior. When officers attempted to arrest Prater on a public street, he resisted and force was used, including a taser, pepper spray, and baton strikes. After being handcuffed, Prater stopped breathing and, despite immediate lifesaving efforts, died. The medical examiner found no lethal trauma and attributed the death to excited delirium syndrome, with other health factors possibly contributing.The personal representative of Prater’s estate filed a wrongful death suit in Johnson Circuit Court against various city and county entities and their employees, alleging excessive force, negligence, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the officers and emergency personnel were entitled to qualified official immunity, that the force used was reasonable, and that there was no evidence their actions caused Prater’s death. The court also dismissed claims against the city and county entities, including those for negligent hiring and supervision, on the basis that no underlying tort had been established.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some claims against the city and police department for negligent hiring and supervision could proceed, and that the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity required further factual findings. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that all defendants were properly dismissed. The Court concluded that the officers’ actions were discretionary, performed in good faith, and within the scope of their authority, entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for any necessary proceedings. View "CITY OF PAINTSVILLE V. HANEY" on Justia Law

Jennifer Albright, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased son David Albright, filed a lawsuit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) following David's death. David was swept into a drainage pipe in their backyard during a rainstorm and subsequently died from his injuries. The drainage system, including the pipe, was owned by MSD. Albright alleged that MSD was negligent in maintaining the drainage system and failing to warn of its dangers, particularly by not installing a grate over the pipe entrance.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of MSD, finding that MSD was entitled to municipal immunity under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA). The court reasoned that MSD's decision not to install grates was a discretionary act protected by CALGA. Albright appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that MSD was not entitled to immunity under the facts of the case.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that MSD, while subject to CALGA, was not entitled to immunity because the alleged negligent acts were ministerial in nature, not discretionary. The court emphasized that municipalities have a ministerial duty to non-negligently maintain and repair their sewer systems. The court also found that MSD's decision not to install a grate or warn of the pipe's dangers did not arise from its legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT" on Justia Law

Officer Henry Volentine, a deputy of the Hardin County Office of Sheriff (HCOS), initiated a traffic stop of Maurice Green on October 14, 2014, after noticing Green's vehicle had an expired license plate belonging to a different vehicle. Green initially pulled over but then drove off, prompting Volentine to pursue him. During the pursuit, Volentine believed Green had committed assault and wanton endangerment by nearly hitting two pedestrians. The pursuit ended in a head-on collision with Susan Sheehy’s vehicle, leading to the present litigation.The Hardin Circuit Court denied Volentine’s and HCOS’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified and governmental immunity. The court found that Volentine did not have a reasonable basis to believe a violent felony had occurred to justify the pursuit and that his actions were not in good faith. The court also determined that Volentine violated ministerial duties by failing to terminate the pursuit when it posed an extreme safety hazard and by not obtaining approval from a supervisor to continue the pursuit.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Volentine was entitled to qualified official immunity and that HCOS was entitled to governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Volentine’s belief that he witnessed a felony was reasonable and that his actions during the pursuit were discretionary.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that Volentine was not entitled to qualified official immunity because he failed to abide by ministerial duties and lacked good faith in exercising his discretion to initiate the pursuit. Consequently, HCOS’ governmental immunity was waived by operation of KRS 70.040. The case was remanded to the Hardin Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "SHEEHY V. VOLENTINE" on Justia Law

Jaime Morales, a Sheriff’s Deputy with the Scott County Sheriff’s Office, was shot and paralyzed during a law enforcement operation to apprehend a bank robbery suspect in September 2018. Morales filed a negligence suit against several employees of the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police Department, alleging that their actions led to his injuries. The case centers on whether the government defendants are immune from suit.The Scott Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they were immune from Morales’s claims. The court found that Officer Joseph Enricco and Lieutenant James Wagoner were entitled to qualified official immunity for their discretionary actions, and that the City and the Georgetown Police Department were immune from vicarious liability and negligence claims.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of Lt. Wagoner’s actions were ministerial and not protected by qualified official immunity. The court also found that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held vicariously liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions and directly liable for their own negligence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court held that Officer Enricco’s decision to fire his weapon was discretionary and protected by qualified official immunity. However, it found that Lt. Wagoner had a ministerial duty to formulate a plan to apprehend the suspect and to enforce certain training requirements, making him potentially liable for negligence. The court also ruled that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions but were immune from direct negligence claims related to training and personnel selection. View "MORALES V. CITY OF GEORGETOWN, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

On April 25, 2018, John Crawford stopped his tanker truck on the shoulder of Interstate 71 to remove loose dogs from the roadway. Kentucky State Trooper Michael Gonterman arrived to assist, parking his cruiser with flashing lights. Shortly after, three vehicles approached: a Nissan Altima, a box truck driven by James Baumhower, and a tractor trailer driven by Teddy Seery. Traffic slowed, and Baumhower swerved into the right lane to avoid the Altima, followed by Seery, who collided with Baumhower’s truck. The collision caused the box truck to flip and slide, pinning Crawford and knocking Gonterman off the bridge, resulting in severe injuries to Gonterman and Crawford’s death.The Henry Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, applying the Firefighter’s Rule, which bars claims by public employees injured while responding to specific risks inherent in their duties. The court found all three prongs of the rule met: the defendants were similarly situated to other drivers, Gonterman was responding to a specific risk, and the accident arose from that risk. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defendants did not meet the first and third prongs, as they had no connection to the loose dogs and the accident was independent of the specific risk.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It clarified that the Firefighter’s Rule does not extend to independent and intervening negligence unrelated to the specific risk that necessitated the public employee’s presence. The court held that the negligence of Seery and Baumhower was independent of the hazard posed by the loose dogs, thus the rule did not bar Gonterman’s claims. The case was remanded to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "WOOSTER MOTOR WAYS, INC. V. GONTERMAN" on Justia Law