Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this workers' compensation enforcement action the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing in part and reversing in part the circuit court's order granting Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial summary judgment, holding that the court of appeals erred in not dismissing Appellees' appeal from the portion of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Appellant on his third and fifth motions for partial summary judgment.Appellees, Appellant's employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, appealed the circuit court's order granting Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial summary judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the portion of the order granting Appellant's fourth motion for partial summary judgment as an appeal from an interlocutory order, but it refused to dismiss the remainder of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals should have dismissed the appeal from the portions of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Appellant on his third and fifth motions for partial summary judgment, along with his fourth partial summary judgment motion, as being an appeal from a nonfinal order. View "Hampton v. Intech Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part Appellant's petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from compelling her husband's deposition testimony, thereby denying Appellant's writ petition in whole, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the deposition to move forward.Appellant filed suit against Baptist Healthcare, Inc., her former employer, alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination. Baptist sought to depose Dr. Gregory Collins - Appellant's husband, treating physician, and employer - but Appellant objected to the deposition based on the husband-wife privilege. Baptist then filed a motion to compel Collins's testimony. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion, ordering that Baptist could depose Collins on three specified topics. The court of appeals granted Appellant's writ of prohibition as it related to Collins's testimony of Lucas's public manifestations of emotional health but denied the writ as it related to the other two topics. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order appropriately limited Collins's deposition testimony and properly allowed the deposition to take place subject to additional objections or assertions of privilege. View "Lucas v. Honorable Judith E. McDonald-Burkman" on Justia Law

In a whistleblower action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the order of the court of appeals denying the petition for a writ of prohibition/mandamus sought by the University of Louisville and Ruby Fenton, holding that remand was necessary in this case.Plaintiff filed this whistleblower action against the University after the University did not renew his faculty appointment. During discovery, Plaintiff served a subpoena upon Fenton seeking all written communications and notes reflecting communications between Fenton and any person associated with the University relating to faculty grievance proceedings initiated by Plaintiff. Fenton represented Plaintiff's supervisors during the grievance proceedings. The University and Fenton asserted that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The trial court permitted the discovery. Fenton and the University then filed this writ of prohibition/mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court held (1) the lower courts did not err in determining the the attorney-client privilege was not applicable under these circumstances; but (2) the court of appeals did not rule upon the University and Fenton's request for protection of the subject communications based upon the work-product privilege. View "University of Louisville v. Honorable Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) award of six percent permanent partial disability benefits to Appellant because of a work-related injury, holding that substantial medical evidence supported the six percent permanent partial disability found by the ALJ.On appeal, Appellant argued that the ALJ erred by making insufficient findings to exclude a pre-existing condition in assessing his impairment rating. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded that remand was necessary for the ALJ to address Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261 (Ky. App. 2007). The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the ALJ did not need to apply Finley and that the ALJ based her opinion on substantial medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in limiting her discussion of Finley and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. View "Wetherby v. Amazon.com" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certificate of a question of law from a federal district court and answered that Seven Counties Services, Inc.'s participation in and its contributions to the Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS) are based on a statutory obligation, rather than a contractual obligation.In 1979, the then-Governor designated Seven Counties, a non-profit provider of mental health services, a "department" for purposes of participating in KERS, a public pension system. Thereafter, Seven Counties paid into KERS to secure retirement benefits for its employees. In 2013, Seven Counties initiated bankruptcy proceedings primarily to reject its relationship with KERS as an executory contract. KERS countered that Seven Counties should be required to comply with its statutory obligations to contribute to KERS. The bankruptcy court determined that Seven Counties' relationship with KERS was contractual and, therefore, that Seven Counties could reject the contract in bankruptcy and leave the retirement system. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the relationship between KERS and Seven Counties was statutory. View "Kentucky Employees Retirement System v. Seven Counties Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion of the court of appeals holding that the section of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.7305 treating hearing loss workers' compensation claimants differently from other types of traumatic injury claimants violated constitutional equal protection guarantees, holding that a rational basis existed for the unequal treatment.Under section 342.7305, workers' compensation claimants suffering hearing loss may not receive income benefits unless their whole person impairment rating is at least eight percent, but other types of non-hearing loss traumatic injury claimants need not meet this threshold impairment rating to qualify for income benefits. The court of appeals held that section 342.7305(2) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the ALJ's determinations that the claimants in this case did not qualify for income benefits based on their impairment ratings, holding that a rational basis existed for the eight percent impairment threshold for income benefits. View "Teco/Perry County Coal v. Feltner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reversing the determination of an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Roger Hall's claim for benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. chapter 342, holding that the ALJ erred by finding that Hall's claim was barred under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316(4)(a).Hall developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos over the course of his employment. Hall brought a claim for benefits. The ALJ denied the claim, concluding that Hall's mesothelioma was caused by his exposure to asbestos during the course of employment but that his claim was untimely filed pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316(4)(a). The Board reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence compelled reversal of the ALJ's order. View "Letcher County Board of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in favor of Employer on Employee's complaint alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint.Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for informing other workers that one of their supervisors was a registered sex offender or, at the least, that this was a substantial motivating factor in her termination. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act establishes a public policy that the sex offender registry should be open and accessible to the public at large. The circuit court granted Employer's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even if a right to disseminate information from the sex offender registry existed to prevent termination for that dissemination, the dissemination would need to be effectuated in a manner consistent with appropriate workplace behavior and decorum. View "Marshall v. Montaplast of North America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the ALJ's determination that Appellant was not entitled to benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342 in connection with his injury while working as a bus driver for Transit Authority of River City (TARC), holding that the ALJ's decision denying Appellant benefits was supported by substantial evidence.While operating a TARC bus Appellant was assaulted by a passenger, resulting in injuries. TARC denied Appellant's claim for benefits pursuant to the special defense provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(3), asserting that Appellant was the aggressor in the altercation and that he acted outside of the scope of his employment. After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ denied Appellant benefits. The Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination to deny benefits. View "Trevino v. Transit Authority of River City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court that the agreement furnished to Carol Greissman for signature did not violate Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court 3.130, Rule 5.6 as a matter of law, holding that an obligatory Rule of Professional Conduct for attorneys carries public policy weight and that the agreement did not violate Rule 5.6.Greissman, an attorney, was terminated by Rawlings & Associates for refusing to sign an agreement providing for non-solicitation of Rawlings & Associates' customers or clients following the end of her employment. Greissman subsequently brought a wrongful termination claim. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Rawlings & Associates. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's ultimate decision dismissing Greissman's complaint but concluded that Greissman's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim because the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court did not provide the public policy to support Greissman's wrongful termination claim. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding (1) for purposes of wrongful termination actions, an obligatory Rule of Professional Conduct for attorneys carries equal public policy weight as any public policy set forth in statute or the Constitution; and (2) the agreement in this case did not violate Rule 5.6. View "Greissman v. Rawlings & Associates, PLLC" on Justia Law