Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles Rawlings suffered injuries as he was rolling straps beside his tractor-trailer while it was being unloaded. Thirteen months after the accident, Rawlings filed an action against Defendants, his employer and the companies involved in loading and unloading the trailer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the action based on the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.140(1)(a). The court of appeals reversed, applying the two-year statute of limitations in the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. At issue on appeal was whether Rawlings was in fact unloading his truck at the time of the accident, which would determine whether the one- or two-year statute of limitations applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rawlings's activity in releasing the straps and rolling them qualified him as a participant in the unloading process; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly applied the one-year personal injury statute of limitations found in section 413.140(1)(a). Remanded. View "Interlock Indus., Inc. v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

Appellants, a county fiscal court, a county fire district, and ten municipal corporations, appealed from a final order of the circuit court that held (1) the state labor cabinet had jurisdiction to pursue an administrative agency action against Appellants to collect, on behalf of firefighters employed by Appellants, unpaid overtime compensation; and (2) the Appellant municipalities were not cloaked with governmental or sovereign immunity from such claims. The Supreme Court granted Appellants' motion to transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the relevant statutes directing city and county governments to pay their employees in a prescribed manner necessarily implies a waiver of immunity from liability to the employees for non-payment; and (2) the labor cabinet was authorized to proceed with its action against Appellants to recover the unpaid portion of the firefighters' overtime pay for firefighters pursuant to Commonwealth, Labor Cabinet v. Hasken. View "Madison County Fiscal Court v. Ky. Labor Cabinet" on Justia Law

Employee, who resided in Kentucky, worked for Employer as a tractor-trailer driver, hauling automobiles. Employee fell and injured his right foot while unloading a car in New Jersey. Employer, which had no corporate offices in Kentucky, denied Employee's claim for benefits, asserting that Kentucky lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over the claim because the employment was not principally localized in any state and the contract for hire was made in Missouri. The ALJ agreed with Employer and dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Employee's contract for hire was not made in Kentucky. The Workers' Compensation Board and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ applied the law correctly and based the finding on substantial evidence. View "Graham v. TSL, Ltd." on Justia Law

Miguel Rivera, a fifteen-year-old unauthorized alien, sought workers' compensation benefits from Abel Verdon Construction for injuries sustained when he fell through a hole in the second floor of a home that Verdon was constructing. The ALJ found Rivera to be Verdon's employee and awarded Rivera partial disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed Rivera's partial disability award. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Verdon's argument that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) preempts the application of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, which provides workers' compensation coverage to employees without regard to the legality of the employment relationship, to this claim based on the claimant's status as an unauthorized alien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employment relationship existed between Rivera and Verdon and that the IRCA does not preempt a workers' compensation law that covers unauthorized aliens. View "Abel Verdon Constr. & Acuity Ins. v. Rivera " on Justia Law

Claimant Anthony Traugott, a Kentucky resident, filed an application for benefits alleging that he injured his left arm in Missouri while working for defendant-employer under a contract of hire. The employer was headquartered in Rhode Island and had no office in Kentucky. The employer denied the claim on the grounds that Kentucky lacked extraterritorial jurisdiction over the matter under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.670. The ALJ dismissed the claim based on findings that the claimant's employment was not principally localized in Kentucky and that the contract for hire was not made in Kentucky. The claimant appealed, and the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, noting that the claimant failed to petition for reconsideration and that the record contained substantial evidence to support the ALJ's legal decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the claimant maintained that the court erred by failing to find that contract for hire was made in Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the record contained no evidence to support claimant's argument. View "Traugott v. Va. Transp." on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed the decision in which the Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") held that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by denying future medical benefits for claimant's work-related injury but that the evidence did not compel an award of permanent income benefits. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported an award of future medical benefits and whether the evidence compelled the ALJ to find that claimant's injury produced a permanent impairment rating and entitled him to permanent income benefits. The court held that KRS 342.020(1) entitled claimant to be awarded future medical benefits where evidence that he required no medical treatment as of the date he reached maximum medical improvement or the date that his claim was heard was an improper basis to deny future medical benefits. The court also held that the evidence the injury warranted a permanent impairment rating was not so overwhelming as to render the decision that was made unreasonable.

An administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that claimant's work for defendant's temporary employment agency was sporadic but failed to specify whether KRS 342.140(1)(d) or (1)(e) was used to calculate her average weekly wage. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed and remanded the claim and this appeal was taken from the decision by the court of appeals to affirm. The employer argued that which subsection of KRS 342.140(1) applied was a factual determination to be made by the ALJ; that the ALJ committed harmless error by failing to specify the subsection of KRS 342.140(1) used in the average weekly wage calculation; and that additional proof should not be permitted on remand. Claimant defended the court of appeals' decision but also argued in a cross-appeal that the record compelled a finding under KRS 342.140(1)(e) that her average weekly wage was $320.00. The court held that the ALJ did not commit harmless error by failing to specify the subsection relied upon and that the ALJ must analyze the evidence under KRS 342.140(1)(e) on remand. The court reversed with respect to the decision to reopen for additional proof because claimant argued from the outset that KRS 342.140(1)(e) controlled the calculation. The court also held that the record contained adequate evidence to apply the statute under the present circumstances and did not compel the finding that either party sought.

Claimant alleged a work-related cumulative trauma injury to his neck and was initially awarded workers' compensation benefits on March 28, 2002. Claimant moved to reopen the award after undergoing surgery and the administrative law judge ("ALJ") rendered another award to claimant on July 19, 2004. On March 3, 2009, claimant filed a motion to reopen. At issue was whether the ALJ properly denied as untimely the claimant's motion to reopen in order to correct a mistake of law in his workers' compensation award and denied as unauthorized his motion to reopen under CR 60.01 and CR 60.02 for the correction of a clerical error in the award. The court concluded that, although KRS 342.125(1)(c) permitted an award to be reopened based on a mistake in applying the law as it existed at the time of the award, KRS 342.125(3) limited the period for such a reopening to four years after the original award or order granting or denying benefits. The court also concluded that the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings before an administrative agency only to the extent provided by regulation and neither Chapter 342 or 803 KAR 25:010 adopted Cr 60.01 or CR 60.02 with respect to workers' compensation proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.