Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Donald Brown had worked for Charles T. Creech, Inc. for more than sixteen years, Creech asked Brown to sign an agreement that contained a non-compete provision. Brown signed the agreement. After Brown went to work for Standlee Hay Company, Creech sued Brown and Standlee, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contract, intentional interference with existing, and prospective business contacts. The trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining Brown from directly or indirectly competing with Creech and from using information regarding Creech’s customers. The court of appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction, and the trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Standlee and Brown. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that issues of fact remained as to whether the non-compete portion of the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was not enforceable. View "Creech, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellants, three physicians, were formerly employed by The New Lexington Clinic (“NLC”) but resigned to practice at a facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, “Baptist”). NLC subsequently brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties owed in their capacity as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant on the ground that it aided and abetted Appellants’ breaches. The trial court dismissed the complaints, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the court considered controlling to all actions involving a breach of a corporate director’s duties. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, holding (1) section 271B.8-300 does not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors but codifies a standard of conduct and liability for directors derived from business judgment rule principles; (2) section 271B.8-300 did not apply in this case because preparing for and participating in a competing venture does not constitute the type of conduct addressed in the statute; and (3) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. New Lexington Clinic, P.S.C. " on Justia Law

Claimant was working for Employer when she was seriously injured. Claimant, a janitor, became trapped in a stalled elevator and fell several stories down the shaft when Employer's security staff attempted to rescue her. An administrative law judge (ALJ) enhanced Claimant's worker's compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which penalizes an employer for an intentional failure to follow a safety protocol. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Claimant was not entitled to an award enhancement because there must be a finding that Employer "ignored or willfully overlooked a safety hazard that was reasonably foreseeable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in order to warrant enhancement under section 342.165(1), the employer must be found to have intentionally disregarded a safety hazard that even a lay person would recognize as likely to cause serious physical harm; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Employer intentionally disregarded a safety hazard in this case. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.011(8), reductions within a job classification must be made based on seniority. Pamela Meyer had been employed for several years at the Clark Elementary School as a coordinator for the Family Resource Youth Service Center (FRYSC). When a new elementary school was opened in 2007, two older elementary schools were closed, including Clark Elementary. When positions were reassigned, Meyer was placed at the new school as a FRYSC clerk, rather than a FRYSC coordinator, with an accompanying reduction in salary. Meyer subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that her statutory rights under section 161.011(8) had been violated because her transfer was the result of an improperly conducted reduction in force. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Meyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a reduction in force under section 161.011(8) requires a reduction in the total number of employees, based on a sound business reason; and (2) in this case, there was no reduction in force, and therefore, section 161.011(8) did not apply to Meyer. View "Webb v. Meyer " on Justia Law

Jason Morris worked for Owensboro Grain, a refinery located on the Ohio River. Morris suffered a work-related injury while performing deckhand duties, including loading items onto a barge. Morris received benefits from Owensboro Grain's Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) insurance policy. Later, Morris filed a claim for Kentucky workers' compensation benefits. Owensboro Grain denied the claim on the grounds that the injury was not covered under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. An ALJ dismissed Morris's claim, finding that Morris's injury fell under the LHWCA, and therefore, Kentucky had no subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. The Workers' Compensation Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Morris was covered under the LHWCA, he was exempt from Kentucky's workers' compensation law unless Owensboro Grain provided him voluntary coverage; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that Owensboro Grain provided voluntary workers' compensation coverage to Morris. View "Morris v. Owensboro Grain Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee worked for the City of Middlesboro. Approximately one month before the last date of his paid employment, Appellant filed for disability retirement benefits as a member of the County Employees Retirement Systems. Appellant based his application on a work-related back injury and "breathing problems," citing his diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) as the reason for his breathing problems. A hearing officer recommended denial of benefits, concluding that Appellee's COPD was the result of his chronic use of tobacco and that there was no permanent impairment to Appellee's back. The Disability Appeals Committee adopted the hearing officer's recommended order. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the hearing officer had failed to consider the cumulative effect of Appellee's various impairments and that the hearing officer improperly considered Appellee's chronic tobacco use as a "pre-existing condition." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer did, in fact, consider the combined effect of Appellee's impairments as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.600; and (2) the hearing officer's conclusion that Appellee's COPD was a pre-existing condition was reasonable. View "Ky. Ret. Sys. v. West" on Justia Law

Sarah Crossett was employed by Jackson Purchase Medical Associate (JPMA), which leased space within a medical pavilion. Crossett was injured when she slipped and fell in snow that had accumulated outside of the building. Crossett filed for workers' compensation. JPMA disputed Crossett's claim, asserting that the injury did not occur on its operating premises under the going and coming rule, which provides that injuries that occur while an employee is on the way to or from a worksite are not compensable. An ALJ concluded that Crossett's injury was compensable, finding that Crossett fell within the operating premises of JPMA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because JPMA could assert control over the parking area and because Crossett was not taking an unreasonable path between her car and her office, she was entitled to workers' compensation benefits for her injury. View "Jackson Purchase Med. Assocs. v. Crossett" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for unexcused absences, chronic tardiness, and leaving work without providing a reason. Employee filed for unemployment benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance granted benefits, determining that Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. The Unemployment Appeals referee disagreed and set aside the decision. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission reversed. Employer appealed by filing a complaint against the Defendant and Employee. Because Employee never responded, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Employee and simultaneously entered an order affirming the decision of the Commission. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Employee was not required to answer Employer's complaint, default judgment was not proper under these circumstances; (2) the evidence established that Employee knowingly violated Employer's attendance policy, and thus, Employee should have been disqualified from benefits on this basis. Remanded. View "W. Ky. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Runyon" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Appellant became trapped in a stalled elevator. Employer's security staff attempt to rescue Appellant, but as a result of their attempt, Appellant fell several stories down the elevator shaft, causing serious injuries. Appellant filed for workers' compensation. The ALJ enhanced Appellant's workers' compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which provides that if an accident is caused by the intentional failure of an employer to comply with a statute or regulation relative to the maintenance of safety appliance, the claimant's benefits shall be increased, and Ky. Rev. Stat. 338.031, which states that an employer must provide his employees a place to work free from dangerous hazards. The workers' compensation board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ correctly applied the four-part test set forth in Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Offutt to determine that Employer violated section 338.031, and accordingly, the ALJ properly applied the enhancement to Appellant's weekly benefit because of Employer's violation of section 342.165. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

Employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation. Despite being hired by Four Star, Employee was initially considered an employee of Better Integrated Services. Better Integrated leased Employee to Beacon Enterprises, which then leased Employee to Four Star. Beacon had an insurance policy with Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance (KEMI). An ALJ determined (1) Employee's injury entitled him to benefits and a permanent partial disability award, and (2) KEMI's policy covered Employee's injury. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, finding Employee was not covered under the KEMI policy due to the fact he was unaware that Four Star was leasing him from different entities, including Beacon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee could not be considered Beacon's employee because he did not enter into a contract for hire with Beacon; (2) the Board did not act arbitrarily in finding that the ALJ's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Board and lower court's decision was not based on Better Integrated and Beacon's failure to comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615. View "Ky. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law