Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Morris worked for Owensboro Grain, a refinery located on the Ohio River. Morris suffered a work-related injury while performing deckhand duties, including loading items onto a barge. Morris received benefits from Owensboro Grain's Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) insurance policy. Later, Morris filed a claim for Kentucky workers' compensation benefits. Owensboro Grain denied the claim on the grounds that the injury was not covered under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. An ALJ dismissed Morris's claim, finding that Morris's injury fell under the LHWCA, and therefore, Kentucky had no subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. The Workers' Compensation Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Morris was covered under the LHWCA, he was exempt from Kentucky's workers' compensation law unless Owensboro Grain provided him voluntary coverage; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that Owensboro Grain provided voluntary workers' compensation coverage to Morris. View "Morris v. Owensboro Grain Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee worked for the City of Middlesboro. Approximately one month before the last date of his paid employment, Appellant filed for disability retirement benefits as a member of the County Employees Retirement Systems. Appellant based his application on a work-related back injury and "breathing problems," citing his diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) as the reason for his breathing problems. A hearing officer recommended denial of benefits, concluding that Appellee's COPD was the result of his chronic use of tobacco and that there was no permanent impairment to Appellee's back. The Disability Appeals Committee adopted the hearing officer's recommended order. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the hearing officer had failed to consider the cumulative effect of Appellee's various impairments and that the hearing officer improperly considered Appellee's chronic tobacco use as a "pre-existing condition." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the hearing officer did, in fact, consider the combined effect of Appellee's impairments as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.600; and (2) the hearing officer's conclusion that Appellee's COPD was a pre-existing condition was reasonable. View "Ky. Ret. Sys. v. West" on Justia Law

Sarah Crossett was employed by Jackson Purchase Medical Associate (JPMA), which leased space within a medical pavilion. Crossett was injured when she slipped and fell in snow that had accumulated outside of the building. Crossett filed for workers' compensation. JPMA disputed Crossett's claim, asserting that the injury did not occur on its operating premises under the going and coming rule, which provides that injuries that occur while an employee is on the way to or from a worksite are not compensable. An ALJ concluded that Crossett's injury was compensable, finding that Crossett fell within the operating premises of JPMA. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because JPMA could assert control over the parking area and because Crossett was not taking an unreasonable path between her car and her office, she was entitled to workers' compensation benefits for her injury. View "Jackson Purchase Med. Assocs. v. Crossett" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for unexcused absences, chronic tardiness, and leaving work without providing a reason. Employee filed for unemployment benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance granted benefits, determining that Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. The Unemployment Appeals referee disagreed and set aside the decision. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission reversed. Employer appealed by filing a complaint against the Defendant and Employee. Because Employee never responded, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Employee and simultaneously entered an order affirming the decision of the Commission. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Employee was not required to answer Employer's complaint, default judgment was not proper under these circumstances; (2) the evidence established that Employee knowingly violated Employer's attendance policy, and thus, Employee should have been disqualified from benefits on this basis. Remanded. View "W. Ky. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Runyon" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Appellant became trapped in a stalled elevator. Employer's security staff attempt to rescue Appellant, but as a result of their attempt, Appellant fell several stories down the elevator shaft, causing serious injuries. Appellant filed for workers' compensation. The ALJ enhanced Appellant's workers' compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which provides that if an accident is caused by the intentional failure of an employer to comply with a statute or regulation relative to the maintenance of safety appliance, the claimant's benefits shall be increased, and Ky. Rev. Stat. 338.031, which states that an employer must provide his employees a place to work free from dangerous hazards. The workers' compensation board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ALJ correctly applied the four-part test set forth in Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Offutt to determine that Employer violated section 338.031, and accordingly, the ALJ properly applied the enhancement to Appellant's weekly benefit because of Employer's violation of section 342.165. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

Employee sustained injuries in the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation. Despite being hired by Four Star, Employee was initially considered an employee of Better Integrated Services. Better Integrated leased Employee to Beacon Enterprises, which then leased Employee to Four Star. Beacon had an insurance policy with Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance (KEMI). An ALJ determined (1) Employee's injury entitled him to benefits and a permanent partial disability award, and (2) KEMI's policy covered Employee's injury. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed, finding Employee was not covered under the KEMI policy due to the fact he was unaware that Four Star was leasing him from different entities, including Beacon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee could not be considered Beacon's employee because he did not enter into a contract for hire with Beacon; (2) the Board did not act arbitrarily in finding that the ALJ's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Board and lower court's decision was not based on Better Integrated and Beacon's failure to comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615. View "Ky. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of county employees who were members of the County Employee Retirement System, which was administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KRS). Plaintiffs sued KRS and the Commonwealth, alleging that Ky. Rev. Stat. 637(1), which states that a retiree who is reemployed by the state or county shall have his retirement payments suspended for the duration of reemployment, was unconstitutional and asking for a declaration of their rights under the statute. The Commonwealth moved for dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the Commonwealth's motion, holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a declaratory judgment action because such an action does not result in a loss of public funds or property. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the state cannot be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity in a declaratory immunity action; and (2) nevertheless, separately naming the Commonwealth was not necessary because the interests of the state were adequately represented by KRS. View "Commonwealth v. Ky. Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation, alleging that he sustained injuries while working for Restaurant. Employee gained employment with Restaurant through a staff leasing company (Company). Employee agreed to a settlement of his claim. Later, Employee moved to re-open the workers' compensation award and to join the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) as a party, asserting that Restaurant and Company were no longer available to pay for his continuing medical expenses. The ALJ subsequently joined the UEF. The ALJ found Employee's condition to have worsened so he was totally disabled and that the UEF was responsible for all benefits for which Employee was entitled. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the portion of the ALJ's opinion regarding the amount of benefits Employee would receive and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee's claim was properly reopened and the UEF joined as a party; (2) Employee presented sufficient evidence to show that his condition had worsened since the entry of his original workers' compensation award; and (3) although the original settlement agreement only listed Employee's lower back injury as compensable, Employee was not barred from raising a claim for his thoracic spine injury upon reopening. View "Commonwealth v. Allen" on Justia Law

After an administrative hearing by a Fayette County Public Schools tribunal, Appellee, an elementary school teacher of twenty-two years, was found guilty of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" and was suspended without pay from her employment for a period of time. The circuit court reversed. Appellants, the superintendent of the Fayette County Public Schools and the County Board of Education, appealed, arguing that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its authority by substituting its own judgment of the facts for the tribunal's findings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the charge of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" lodged against Appellee was not sustained by the evidence and was not supported by the tribunal's findings; and (2) remand to the tribunal for further adjudication was not appropriate where the Court accepted in full the facts found by the tribunal. View "Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County v. Hurley-Richards" on Justia Law

Matthew Stanford volunteered with the US Army Cadet Corp. (USACC). Stanford also participated in a program administered by Bluegrass Area Development District (Bluegrass). While accompanying the USACC cadets on a field trip, Stanford fell from a zip line and suffered a permanent injury that rendered him a quadriplegic. An ALJ granted Stanford benefits, finding Stanford was primarily an employee of USACC, who served as a subcontractor for Bluegrass, and accordingly, Bluegrass would be responsible for the payments because USACC did not carry workers' compensation insurance. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded (1) Bluegrass could not be held responsible for paying Stanford's benefits, and instead, USACC was liable, and (2) Stanford was working as a USACC employee at the time of the accident. The court of appeals affirmed and ordered the Uninsured Employers' Fund to reimburse Bluegrass for the medical expenses Bluegrass paid on behalf of Stanford. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bluegrass shared responsibility with USACC as Stanford's employer and may be held responsible to pay his workers' compensation benefits. Remanded for a recalculation of which employer - Bluegrass or USACC - was liable for what proportion of Stanford's benefits. View "Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Stanford" on Justia Law