Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured while working as a carman for CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT). Appellant sued CSXT under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), asserting that his injuries were, in part, the result of CSXT’s negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment on Appellant’s negligence claims in favor of CSXT. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellant’s injuries resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of CSXT, and the issues were within the common knowledge and experience of the jury; and (2) therefore, summary judgment was improper. View "Caniff v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant represented Claimant in a workers’ compensation case. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) entered an interlocutory order, which resulted in Claimant receiving temporary total occupational disability benefits. The claim was later returned to the active docket, and the parties reached a settlement. Appellant subsequently filed two motions for approval of attorney fees, requesting approval of $12,000 for work performed in obtaining the lump sum payment and requesting approval of $8,369 for work performed in obtaining the benefits which Claimant recovered from the interlocutory award. The CALJ granted Appellant’s motion for $12,000 but denied the motion for $8,369 in fees, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.320(2)(a) caps attorney fees to a total of $12,000. On appeal, Appellant argued that an interlocutory proceeding in a workers’ compensation case should be considered separate from a claim for income benefits and therefore not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys fees established in section 342.320(2)(a). The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney fee for the entire proceeding in this matter was subject to the statutory maximum of $12,000 under section 342.320(2)(a). View "Watts v. Danville Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Appellants, former employees of the University of Kentucky, filed suit against the University alleging that, by rejecting their applications for disability status, the University breached a written contract consisting of a staff handbook and associated personnel policy documents defining the disability compensation programs. The court of appeals dismissed Appellants’ claims on the basis of governmental immunity, concluding that the documents establishing the University’s employee disability compensation did not constitute a written contract, and therefore, the University was shielded from Appellants’ claims by the doctrine of governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants did not establish that the General Assembly expressly waived sovereign immunity in claims based upon implied contracts arising from a state university’s employee handbooks and personnel policies, and the relevant University personnel documents specifically disclaimed the creation of a contract; and (2) therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances presented. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

After Donald Brown had worked for Charles T. Creech, Inc. for more than sixteen years, Creech asked Brown to sign an agreement that contained a non-compete provision. Brown signed the agreement. After Brown went to work for Standlee Hay Company, Creech sued Brown and Standlee, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, intentional interference with a contract, intentional interference with existing, and prospective business contacts. The trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining Brown from directly or indirectly competing with Creech and from using information regarding Creech’s customers. The court of appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporary injunction, and the trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Standlee and Brown. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that issues of fact remained as to whether the non-compete portion of the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was not enforceable. View "Creech, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellants, three physicians, were formerly employed by The New Lexington Clinic (“NLC”) but resigned to practice at a facility opened by Baptist Healthcare System Inc. through its subsidiary (collectively, “Baptist”). NLC subsequently brought actions against Appellants for breach of fiduciary duties owed in their capacity as members of the NLC board of directors. Baptist was joined as a defendant on the ground that it aided and abetted Appellants’ breaches. The trial court dismissed the complaints, concluding that the complaints did not properly invoke Ky. Rev. Stat. 271B.8-300, which the court considered controlling to all actions involving a breach of a corporate director’s duties. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court, holding (1) section 271B.8-300 does not abrogate common law fiduciary duty claims against Kentucky directors but codifies a standard of conduct and liability for directors derived from business judgment rule principles; (2) section 271B.8-300 did not apply in this case because preparing for and participating in a competing venture does not constitute the type of conduct addressed in the statute; and (3) NLC properly pled common law fiduciary duty claims on the alleged facts. View "Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. New Lexington Clinic, P.S.C. " on Justia Law

Claimant was working for Employer when she was seriously injured. Claimant, a janitor, became trapped in a stalled elevator and fell several stories down the shaft when Employer's security staff attempted to rescue her. An administrative law judge (ALJ) enhanced Claimant's worker's compensation award based on Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1), which penalizes an employer for an intentional failure to follow a safety protocol. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Claimant was not entitled to an award enhancement because there must be a finding that Employer "ignored or willfully overlooked a safety hazard that was reasonably foreseeable." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in order to warrant enhancement under section 342.165(1), the employer must be found to have intentionally disregarded a safety hazard that even a lay person would recognize as likely to cause serious physical harm; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Employer intentionally disregarded a safety hazard in this case. View "Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.011(8), reductions within a job classification must be made based on seniority. Pamela Meyer had been employed for several years at the Clark Elementary School as a coordinator for the Family Resource Youth Service Center (FRYSC). When a new elementary school was opened in 2007, two older elementary schools were closed, including Clark Elementary. When positions were reassigned, Meyer was placed at the new school as a FRYSC clerk, rather than a FRYSC coordinator, with an accompanying reduction in salary. Meyer subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that her statutory rights under section 161.011(8) had been violated because her transfer was the result of an improperly conducted reduction in force. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Meyer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a reduction in force under section 161.011(8) requires a reduction in the total number of employees, based on a sound business reason; and (2) in this case, there was no reduction in force, and therefore, section 161.011(8) did not apply to Meyer. View "Webb v. Meyer " on Justia Law