Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law

Appellee, an at-will employee of Appellant, a government program focused on rural development, was fired for insubordination and other reasons following certain remarks she made at a staff meeting. Appellee filed suit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102, the Kentucky whistleblower statute, claiming she was terminated for making a good faith report to local law enforcement officers and Appellant’s representatives regarding an actual or suspected violation of the law. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant, concluding that Appellee’s disclosure did not touch on a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unambiguous language of section 61.102 contains no requirement that reports under the statute must touch upon a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 61.102 does not require an employee’s report or disclosure to touch on a matter of public concern; but (2) none of the reports and disclosures presented by the facts of this case fit within the protections afforded by the statute. View "Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Dr. Mosen Khani, the owner and operator of Alliance Chiropractic, LLC (Alliance), filed an application for resolution of injury claim alleging that he suffered injuries while he was moving or assisting patients. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI), which provided workers’ compensation insurance to Alliance, provided a defense on behalf of Alliance and presented a separate defense in its own name. Both KEMI and Alliance contested Dr. Khani’s claim, arguing that his conditions were preexisting and unrelated to the alleged work injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury and dismissed his claim. The Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ’s determination to treat Dr. Khani as a lay rather than an expert witness was not erroneous; (2) the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) there was no error in the ALJ’s failure to award temporary benefits. View "Khani v. Alliance Chiropractic" on Justia Law

Appellee, an at-will employee of Appellant, a government program focused on rural development, reported to law enforcement officers and Appellant’s representatives that a coworker was allegedly trespassing by making uninvited visits to employees’ homes. The next morning, Appellee was fired for insubordination. Appellee filed suit under Kentucky’s whistleblower statute, claiming that she had been terminated in retaliation for her reporting about the suspected violations of law. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellant on the grounds that Appellee’s disclosure of her coworker’s alleged trespass did not touch on a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the whistleblower statute contained no requirement that reports under the statute must touch upon a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the whistleblower statute does not require an employee’s report or disclosure to touch on a matter of public concern in order to come within the protections of the statute; but (2) none of the reports and disclosures presented by the facts in this case fit within the protections afforded by the statute. View "Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Andrea Schrecker was injured when she crossed a street where there was no crosswalk and was struck by a car. Schrecker had decided to skip her lunch break due to an absence of a co-employee that day and was going to get something to eat from a fast food restaurant across the street during her afternoon break when she was injured. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Schrecker’s injury occurred while she was within the course and scope of her employment and awarded her medical expense benefits and income benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding that Schrecker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schrecker was not in the course and scope of her employment when injured because she undertook a route to seek personal comfort that exposed her to a hazard completely removed from normal going and coming activity and which was expressly prohibited by the Commonwealth and impliedly forbidden by her employer. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing Schrecker’s claim. View "US Bank Home Mortgage v. Schrecker" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded. View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

William Goble suffered a work-related back injury and timely filed a claim and an amended claim asserting that he suffered a low-back injury and that he also suffered a psychological injury. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Goble suffered low-back and psychological injuries and related permanent impairment ratings and awarded Goble permanent partial disability income and medical expense benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Goble had a permanent psychological impairment rating. View "Martin County Coal Co. v. Goble" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against her former employer, a hospital, alleging that she was terminated because she was preparing to report a medication error to an appropriate hospital regulatory authority pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 216B.165. The district court certified a question of Kentucky law to the Supreme Court, asking whether a plaintiff who alleges that her employment was wrongfully terminated in violation of section 216B.165 may assert a claim for the recovery of front pay, along with other damages she may have sustained, by reason of her discharge. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that, pursuant to the general remedial provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070, an employee covered by section 216B.165, who suffers reprisal in violation of section 216B.165(3), may recover front pay as an element of compensable damages. View "Macglashan v. ABS Lincs Ky., Inc." on Justia Law

After Employer terminated an employment agreement with Employee, Employee sued for wrongful termination, seeking a declaration that a non-competition provision in the employment agreement was unenforceable. The trial court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the non-competition provision. Employer sought to dissolve the temporary injunction by filing a motion for temporary relief. The court of appeals granted the relief sought and dissolved the temporary injunction, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the temporarily injunction because Employee failed to make the requisite showing of irreparable injury. Employee subsequently requested that the Supreme Court granted him interlocutory relief and restore the trial court’s temporary injunction. The Supreme Court denied interlocutory relief, holding that the court of appeals did not err in finding that Employee failed to establish that he would suffer irreparable injury. View "Gharad v. St. Claire Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) was the workers’ compensation carrier for Beacon Enterprises, Inc. at the time that Julian Hoskins was injured during the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation, Inc. (Four Star). Four Star had configured its workforce pursuant to an employee leasing arrangement with a company affiliated with Beacon Enterprises, an employee leasing company. The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that Hoskins was not covered by Beacon Enterprises’ policy with KEMI because Hoskins was not an employee of Beacon Enterprises at the time of the injury. The court of appeals upheld the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615 does not require an employee to have knowledge of his status as a leased employee or of the nature of his relationship with the employee leasing company; and (2) because the court of appeals grounded its opinion upon Hoskins’s lack of knowledge, the matter must be remanded for the court to address other issues raised by KEMI in support of the Board’s decision. View "Ky. Ininsured Employers’ Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law