Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, two miners died in a mining accident while employed by Webster County Coal, LLC. That same year, another miner died in a mining accident while employed by River View Coal, LLC. Both River View and Webster County were wholly owned subsidiaries of Alliance Coal LLC, the parent company. Alliance, which had obtained a self-insurance contract, guaranteed payment of benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act in the event its subsidiaries failed to pay benefits. Webster County and River View accepted the workers’ compensation claims made on behalf of the surviving widows and children of the deceased miners, and Alliance paid the benefits. Appellants filed lawsuits against Alliance alleging that it had liability for the miners’ deaths. The trial court granted summary judgment for Alliance, concluding that it had immunity under the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent company that completely self-insures the liability of its subsidiary is a carrier and immune from tort liability. View "Falk v. Alliance Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against her former manager and then amended her complaint to assert direct claims against Appellees, her employer and related corporate entities. The trial court entered a summary judgment dismissing the claims against Appellees as being time barred. The summary judgment left the manager as the sole remaining defendant but did not recite any of the finality language provided in CR 54.02(1). Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the summary judgment. The circuit court subsequently entered a nunc pro tunc order purporting to interject, retroactively, the necessary finality language into the summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the nunc pro tunc order could not have retroactively conferred finality upon an order that was not originally designated as final and that the “relation forward” doctrine of Johnson v. Smith did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the filing of a notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over this case and transferred that jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, and therefore, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order, and its attempt to bestow finality upon the summary judgment was ineffective; and (2) the relation forward doctrine did not apply. View "Wright v. Ecolab, Inc." on Justia Law

Randy Ellington owned and operated R&J Cabinets as a sole proprietorship. When Ellington received a work-related injury, R&J had no employees. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) had previously issued a workers’ compensation policy to Ellington and R&J as “insureds.” At the same time, the policy included a specific exclusion from coverage of Ellington as the sole proprietor. KEMI denied Ellington’s claim for benefits, arguing that it was not covered because of the sole-proprietor exclusion endorsement. An administrative law judge concluded that Ellington was not covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the policy was ambiguous and construing it in Ellington’s favor to provide coverage for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy, as issued, is not a personal policy but rather a business policy purchased by a sole proprietor, and Ellington, as the sole proprietor, was not entitled to benefits under the policy. View "Ky. Employers Mut. Ins. v. Ellington" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when a horse she was exercising at Gardens Glen Farm (Appellant) rolled over on her. Appellee negotiated a lump sum settlement with Appellant, which reflected a twenty-nine percent impairment rating and a return to work factor of 1.5509453. Appellee later moved to reopen, alleging that her occupations disability was worsening. The motion was sustained. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellee showed a worsening of her condition and calculated credit for money paid to Appellee pursuant to the settlement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by refusing to give it a dollar for dollar credit based on the lump sum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in calculating the credit owed to Appellant. View "Gardens Glen Farm v. Balderas" on Justia Law

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law

Appellee, an at-will employee of Appellant, a government program focused on rural development, was fired for insubordination and other reasons following certain remarks she made at a staff meeting. Appellee filed suit under Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.102, the Kentucky whistleblower statute, claiming she was terminated for making a good faith report to local law enforcement officers and Appellant’s representatives regarding an actual or suspected violation of the law. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant, concluding that Appellee’s disclosure did not touch on a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unambiguous language of section 61.102 contains no requirement that reports under the statute must touch upon a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 61.102 does not require an employee’s report or disclosure to touch on a matter of public concern; but (2) none of the reports and disclosures presented by the facts of this case fit within the protections afforded by the statute. View "Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Dr. Mosen Khani, the owner and operator of Alliance Chiropractic, LLC (Alliance), filed an application for resolution of injury claim alleging that he suffered injuries while he was moving or assisting patients. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI), which provided workers’ compensation insurance to Alliance, provided a defense on behalf of Alliance and presented a separate defense in its own name. Both KEMI and Alliance contested Dr. Khani’s claim, arguing that his conditions were preexisting and unrelated to the alleged work injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury and dismissed his claim. The Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ’s determination to treat Dr. Khani as a lay rather than an expert witness was not erroneous; (2) the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Khani had not suffered a work-related injury was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) there was no error in the ALJ’s failure to award temporary benefits. View "Khani v. Alliance Chiropractic" on Justia Law

Appellee, an at-will employee of Appellant, a government program focused on rural development, reported to law enforcement officers and Appellant’s representatives that a coworker was allegedly trespassing by making uninvited visits to employees’ homes. The next morning, Appellee was fired for insubordination. Appellee filed suit under Kentucky’s whistleblower statute, claiming that she had been terminated in retaliation for her reporting about the suspected violations of law. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellant on the grounds that Appellee’s disclosure of her coworker’s alleged trespass did not touch on a matter of public concern. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the whistleblower statute contained no requirement that reports under the statute must touch upon a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the whistleblower statute does not require an employee’s report or disclosure to touch on a matter of public concern in order to come within the protections of the statute; but (2) none of the reports and disclosures presented by the facts in this case fit within the protections afforded by the statute. View "Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Andrea Schrecker was injured when she crossed a street where there was no crosswalk and was struck by a car. Schrecker had decided to skip her lunch break due to an absence of a co-employee that day and was going to get something to eat from a fast food restaurant across the street during her afternoon break when she was injured. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Schrecker’s injury occurred while she was within the course and scope of her employment and awarded her medical expense benefits and income benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding that Schrecker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schrecker was not in the course and scope of her employment when injured because she undertook a route to seek personal comfort that exposed her to a hazard completely removed from normal going and coming activity and which was expressly prohibited by the Commonwealth and impliedly forbidden by her employer. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing Schrecker’s claim. View "US Bank Home Mortgage v. Schrecker" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded. View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law